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Abstract
This thesis is organised in three chapters. The first two chapters link the industry- 
specific expertise of managers to the value of conglomerates and diversifying acquisi­
tions. The third chapter explains how Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) accounting 
can explain the diversification discount.
The first chapter studies the cross sectional variation of conglomerate’s value. I 
test the hypothesis th a t unrelated diversification destroys value because managers 
(CEOs) lack expertise outside the core business. I test two main implications: firms 
with more business activities outside the core business should have lower value and the 
discount should be greater for firms with more activity in unrelated-to-core secondary 
segments. The evidence supports both  hypothesis. I test more directly if the results 
are linked to a lack of managerial expertise by using an industry index of managerial 
discretion. I find th a t increasing non-core business sales weight by 10% decreases firm 
value up to 3%, if the firm has high managerial discretion.
The second chapter quantifies the value of CEO industry-specific experience, using 
diversifying M&A announcements. I find tha t industry experienced CEOs add value 
for their shareholders. The abnormal return is between 1.0% and 1.3% higher when 
the acquirer’s CEO has top management experience in the target’s industry. Analyz­
ing potential mechanisms, I provide evidence tha t CEOs with industry experience in 
the target’s industry negotiate better terms and tha t this experience is particularly 
valuable in environments of high informational asymmetries (1.6% - 2.9%). The re­
sults suggest that certain CEO skills are neither completely general nor firm-specific 
but rather specific to an industry.
The third chapter shows tha t M&A accounting can explain the diversification dis­
count measured with Tobin’s q. The typical M&A accounting procedure inflates the 
book value of assets and creates a mechanical drop in the common measure of ac­
quirers’ q. Because diversified firms are more acquisitive than  standalones, their q is 
likely to be lower, generating a spurious diversification discount. After adjusting q for 
goodwill by excluding it from the book value of assets, I find no significant diversifi­
cation discount in most specifications. As an alternative to the goodwill correction, I 
use the change in the M&A accounting rules in 2001 as a natural experiment to test 
my main hypothesis.
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1 C ore-business E xpertise, M anagerial D iscretion  and Cor­
porate D iversification
1.1 In trod u ction
The literature on the diversification discount is vast and several explanations are of­
fered to the fact th a t conglomerates are worth less than an equivalent portfolio of stand 
alone firms.1. In this chapter I explore the cross-sectional variation of conglomerates’ 
value to test the intuitive hypothesis tha t conglomerates with more unrelated busi­
nesses are less valuable due to a lack of managerial expertise outside the core-business 
of the firm. Managers are likely to be experts in the core-business industry, but are 
also likely to lack knowledge and expertise in industries th a t do not correspond to the 
main operations of the firm. As a result, diversified firms are expected to underper- 
form when compared to  stand alone firms, at least in their secondary segments. In 
order to test this hypothesis, I develop a set of alternative diversification measures to 
capture both the extent of diversification outside the core-business and the distance of 
secondary segments to the core-business of the firm. Then, in a more direct analysis, 
I use an industry index of managerial discretion, which captures how determinant are 
managerial actions to firm performance, to test if high managerial discretion firms 
suffer more from increasing non-core activities. Using a panel of US firms from 1984 
to  1998, I find empirical evidence consistent with my hypothesis.
I proceed in three steps. I start by testing two implications of the argument tha t 
lack of managerial expertise outside the core-business destroys value. First, firms with 
more business activity in secondary businesses should have lower value, because the 
lack of expertise from the manager affects a larger proportion of its operations; and 
second, this value loss should be greater for companies where secondary segments are 
more unrelated-to-the-core-business, because the lack of managerial expertise is likely 
to be greater in unrelated industries. To test the first implication I create a sales-shift 
measure of diversification that captures the importance of non-core business segments 
in the firm. The sales-shift measure is defined as the proportion of sales in non-core 
business segments, where the core business corresponds to  the business-segment with 
the highest sales. The second implication is tested using a distance-to-core-business 
measure to capture the unrelatedness between the core industry and the industries of 
the secondary segments. The distance-to-core-business is defined using the SIC-code 
structure at the 4-digit level by comparing the code of the core-business with the code 
of non-core segments. Secondary business are therefore classified as being one, two, 
three or four digits away from the core-business depending on the number or left digits 
of the code they share with the core-business. I then compute the sales-shift measure
xLang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Rajan Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Lam- 
ont and Polk (2002) find evidence of a diversification discount. Laeven and Levine (2008) find a 
conglomerate discount in financial conglomerates.
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for the different distances to core. In this first step, I find evidence th a t increasing the 
proportion of sales outside the core by 10% decreases firm value by approximately 1%. 
I also find tha t the negative impact of sales-shifting is higher for business segments 
tha t are 2 or more digits away from the core. For instance, increasing the sales weight 
by 10% in segments 3-digits away from the core negatively impacts firm value in 1.4%.
Because the previous analysis does not directly tests the hypothesis th a t diver­
sification destroys value due to a lack of managerial expertise I further investigate 
the previous results for firms with different levels of managerial discretion. In this 
second step, I use an industry index of managerial discretion developed by Hambrick 
and Abrahamson’s (1995) th a t classifies industries according to its reliance on the 
managers’ actions. If managerial expertise is core-specific, high discretion conglomer­
ates, whose performance highly depends on managerial skills, are more likely to  suffer 
from diversification outside the core and even more if the secondary segments are 
unrelated. I find supporting results; increasing the sales-weight of secondary business 
segments by 10% in a high discretion conglomerate has a negative impact in value 
of approximately 2%, while no impact is found in low discretion conglomerates. The 
strongest negative impact of sales-shift is found for high discretion conglomerates with 
secondary segments 3-digits away from the core-business: a 10% increase in sales-shift 
in those segments decreases firm value by approximately 3%.
Finally, to support my previous results and the validity of the managerial discretion 
index I test two additional hypothesis using data  on managerial compensation. If the 
market for managers works efficiently then two effects can be expected. First, if 
managers in diversified firms lack expertise in secondary businesses and underperform 
stand alone managers in the same industries, no premium in compensation should be 
observed for managing a diversified firm. In a similar way, if managers in low discretion 
industries are less crucial for firm performance then their compensation should be lower 
as well. I find consistent evidence; I find tha t firms with higher level of managerial 
discretion pay more to their CEO, after controlling for other variables that impact 
compensation. This positive correlation between compensation and the managerial 
discretion level of firms validates the index of managerial discretion, suggesting th a t 
it is properly measuring the importance of managerial actions to  the firm. I also find 
no evidence that managers in diversified firms are paid more.
The argument tha t firms should diversify to related industries because managers 
have limited expertise to run businesses th a t are different from the core was first used 
by Jensen (1986). However, little work has been done using the managerial dimension 
to explain causes and effects of corporate diversification with the exception of Schoar
(2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2008). Schoar (2002) provides a rationale for the 
diversification discount based on managers’ behaviour tha t she calls the "new toy 
effect". She finds an overall negative effect of diversification using plant level data, 
caused by a simultaneous decrease in productivity of the incumbent plant and an 
increase in productivity of the acquired plant tha t she argues to be caused by a defocus
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in managerial attention towards the new plant. Malmendier and Tate (2008) show 
th a t overconfident managers destroy value by overestimating the returns of mergers.
In a more broad sense, this paper relates to the literature tha t uses the manage­
rial dimension to explain differences in firm policies and value. Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) attribute unexplained variations in firm practices and performance to individ­
ual managers, saying th a t managers fixed effects are relevant to explain acquisitions 
and diversification decisions. Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) use CEO’s power 
to explain the degree of variability in firm performance. Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 
2005b, 2008) a ttribute inefficient corporate investment and mergers decisions to man­
agerial overconfidence. This paper contributes to this literature by providing new 
evidence tha t the managerial dimension m atters while explaining differences in firm 
actions and value. It also adds to the literature on corporate diversification by iden­
tifying the lack of managerial expertise outside the core business as a source of value 
destruction and by identifying managerial discretion as an industry characteristic that 
is relevant for the linkage between diversification and performance. In this sense, the 
paper relates to Santalo and Becerra (2008) who find that diversified firms perform 
better in industries with a smaller number of specialized players.
This chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 formalizes the empirical hypothesis 
and describes the diversification measures and managerial discretion index. D ata is 
presented in section 3 and empirical tests in section 4. Session 5 deals with robustness 
issues and finally section 6 concludes.
1.2 E m pirical h yp oth esis, d iversification  m easures and  m anagerial 
d iscretion  in d ex
The main hypothesis to be tested in this paper is the following: diversification activ­
ities outside the core are expected to destroy value because managers have industry- 
specific expertise, being experts in the core-business industry of the firm and lacking 
knowledge and experience in other industries2.
If managers do have industry-specific human capital to the core-business of the 
firm this implies that, with respect to the core business, they should perform as well 
as the average manager of a stand alone firm in the same industry. Once diversifying 
towards a different industry though, they are expected to perform worse than the av­
erage manager of a stand alone company in tha t industry. Therefore, and neutralizing 
other possible effects of corporate diversification, the value of a diversified company 
should be lower than a portfolio of stand-alone companies in the same industries. 
This is because the diversified firm will be destroying value, at least, in the periphery. 
Furthermore, although managers are assumed to have the necessary skills to do well
2Lazear (2003) and (2005) and Harris and Helfat (1997) find significant evidence for the existence 
of both industry-specific and generic skills of managers.
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in the core-business, the lack of expertise in the periphery may have side effects on its 
performance as well. This can be the case, for instance, if managers need to allocate 
proportionally more time to secondary segments to reduce the comparative disadvan­
tage and thus neglecting the core business. Diversification outside the core business 
is measured in this paper by the contribution of secondary segments sales to the to tal 
sales of the firm. The business segment’s sales proxy for the manager’s attention, 
or time spent while running that segment. The hypothesis that managers underper- 
form outside the core-business reducing the value of the diversified firm implies th a t 
companies with more sales outside the core-business present lower value.
The more unrelated the secondary segments are to  the core-business, the greater 
the underperformance in those segments with respect to specialized firms is likely to 
be. Different industries require different skills from managers and this dissimilarity 
should be greater for more unrelated industries. The second implication of my main 
hypothesis is th a t diversified firms with more activities in more distant-to-core sec­
ondary segments should present lower value. The negative effect of diversification 
outside the core is expected to be increasing with the distance-to-core business of the 
secondary segments.
To support the claim that lack of managerial ability drives the link between di­
versification and performance I analyse an industry characteristic that is likely to  
impact this linkage: the level of managerial discretion. The importance of manage­
rial skills is heterogeneous across industries. There are industries where managers 
have crucial influence on organizational outcomes and industries where environmental 
factors are much more significant. It then follows th a t firms operating in industries 
where the role of the manager is very im portant should suffer more from their lack of 
expertise. Therefore, diversified firms operating in high discretion industries should 
evidence worse performance than the ones operating in less managerial dependent en­
vironments. Two main effects are in place. First, if secondary segments correspond to  
industries of high managerial discretion, the underperformance outside the core (and 
thus of the whole firm) should be higher because the managerial skills are critical 
to subsist in those industries. At the same time, the core-business is also likely to 
be affected because the manager might need to allocate a proportionally higher part 
of his attention to the periphery to cope with the needs of these highly demanded 
segments. Secondly, if the core-business industry is characterized by high managerial 
discretion then, deviating attention away from it is likely to negatively impact perfor­
mance and thus the value of the firm. The prediction is for firms with a higher level of 
managerial discretion to have a stronger negative impact from diversification outside 
the core-business, and for this effect to be greater for unrelated-to-core diversification. 
Managerial discretion is measured here using an industry index created by Hambrick 
and Abrahamson (1995).
As a last step I further explore the relationship between managerial compensation, 
diversification and managerial discretion. Under the assumption tha t the market
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for managerial skills works efficiently, if according to the previous hypothesis the 
manager of a diversified firm underperforms the managers of focused firms at least 
in the periphery one should not observe a premium in compensation for managing 
a diversified firm. An alternative hypothesis is tested by Rose and Shepard (1997) 
who argue th a t diversified firms are more complex organizations, and more difficult 
to manage, and therefore CEOs should be paid at a premium. They find consistent 
evidence using a sample of 473 CEOs in 397 firms from 1985 to 1990.
A similar argument is applied to managerial discretion. If the market for market 
managerial talent does a good job allocating more talented managers to places where 
their skills are more valuable then one should observe a positive relation between 
managerial discretion and compensation. It is expected that managers working in 
high discretion industries to be paid at a premium, because they can add more value 
in those industries. Note tha t the notion of managerial discretion here is related 
to  the ability of managers to influence the performance of firms or, in other words, 
to the importance of managers for the performance of firms. It does not necessarily 
correspond to the usual agency theory notion of managerial discretion where it implies 
higher agency costs and greater extraction of private benefits from managers. The fact 
th a t managers within an industry have more latitude of action does not imply here 
they use it to destroy value.
1.2.1 Sales-shift and distance-to-core business
I define a set of diversification measures to  capture the relative importance of the core 
business in the firm and the distance of the secondary segments to  the core: sales-shift 
and sales-shift- 1,2,3 and 4 digits. The core business is defined as the business segment 
with the highest sales. The distance to core is defined using the SIC code structure. 
The SIC code is a 4-digit code that allows the assessment of how related/unrelated 
the industries are. The more left digits of the code the industries share, the more 
related they are.
Sales-shift, corresponds to the proportion of sales outside the primary business seg­
ment of the firm - the core business.
Sales-shift - N  digit(s), is defined as the sales proportion generated by secondary 
segments N  digits away from the core-business. The distance between the seg­
m ent’s industry and core business’ industry equals 1, if the segment’s SIC code 
differs from the core business SIC code at the 4th digit and not a t the 1st, 2nd 
or 3rd; a value of 2 if the segment’s SIC code differs from the core business SIC 
code at the 3rd digit and not in the 1st or 2nd, a value of 3 if the segment’s SIC 
code differs from the core business SIC code at the 2nd digit and not at the 1st 
and finally a value of 4 if the segment’s SIC code differs from the core business 
SIC code at the 1st digit.
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I use this set of measures to test the first two implications of my hypothesis. Firms 
with more sales-shift should present a lower value and this value loss should be greater 
for more distant to  the core secondary segments.
1.2.2 The managerial discretion index
Following Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), I use an industry index of manage­
rial discretion developed by Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) aimed to measure 
how much influence executives have on organizational outcomes. This index relies 
on the theoretical formulation of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) who specify seven 
industry-level factors tha t determine managerial discretion: product differentiability, 
market growth, industry structure, demand instability, quasi-legal constraints, pow­
erful outside forces and capital intensity. Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) index 
corresponds to a  panel rating of managerial discretion by academics for 17 industries. 
Then, they examine the association between this rating and the determinants of dis­
cretion proposed by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) and conclude for the validity of 
the index. For instance, according to the index computers are considered to be an 
industry of high managerial discretion while natural gas distribution is classified as a 
low managerial discretion.
The index classifies the 17 industries at the 4-digit SIC code level. However, in 
order to minimize missing values for firms which SIC codes are not covered by this 
ratting I average the discretion score a t the 2-digit SIC level, in the same way as in 
Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005).
I use this index at the firm level. I define the firm managerial discretion score as 
the sales-weighted average of its business segments’ industries discretion score. For 
stand alone firms this score corresponds to the industry score.
This score allows me to test if firms with higher levels of managerial discretion 
have a greater negative impact from diversification outside the core-business.
1.2.3 Firm characteristics
In order to control for other diversification effects rather than the lack of managerial 
expertise outside the core I use a diversification dummy as additional diversification 
measure. This variable assumes the value one if the firm reports two or more business 
segments according to COMPUSTAT segment data  file and zero otherwise. The goal 
of adding the diversification dummy is also to capture the effect in firm value of the 
decision to  become diversified and to disentangle this effect from shifting sales away 
from the core business.
I use Tobin’s q as the main measure of firm value. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio 
between the market value and the book value of assets, being the market value of
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assets defined as the book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity. Return on Assets (ROA), Excess value and Excess ROA axe used as 
alternative measures of firm value. ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) divided by total assets. Excess value and Excess ROA are similar measures 
to the ones developed by Berger and Offek (1995). Excess value corresponds to the 
logarithm of the ratio between the firms’ actual Tobin’s q and its Imputed Tobin’s q. 
The Imputed Tobin’s q is defined as the sales-weighted average of hypothetical qs of 
the firm segments, where the hypothetical q is the average q of stand alone firms in 
the same industry in th a t year. The 4-digit SIC code is used in this match whenever 
there are five or more stand alone players in the industry. If there are less than 5 stand 
alone firms in the industry the next SIC code level is used, and so forth. A similar 
procedure is used for Excess ROA. Excess ROA is the difference between ROA and 
imputed ROA. Im puted ROA is a sales-weighted average of hypothetical ROAs of the 
firm segments, where the hypothetical ROA is the average of stand alone firms in the 
same industry in th a t year. The hypothetical ROA is constructed using at least five 
non-diversified firms in the same 4-digit SIC code.
The firm financial variables used as controls for firm performance are standard 
in the corporate diversification literature and include size, measured by the natural 
logarithm of assets, capital expenditures standardized by sales, profitability measured 
by EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) to sales and leverage defined by debt to  
assets ratio.
1.2.4 Com pensation and CEO characteristics
I use to tal CEO total compensation, including for the individual year: salary, bonus, 
total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using 
Black-Scholes) and long-term incentive payouts, to measure CEO pay. Following 
Rose and Shepard (1997) I use firm and CEO characteristics tha t are known to affect 
compensation as control variables. These include the CEO age at appointment, years 
of tenure as CEO and a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was hired from 
outside the firm.
1.3 D a ta  and sum m ary sta tis tics
My innicial sample consists of a panel of 100,588 firm-years from the Compustat 
Industrial Annual and Compustat Segments files, including stand alone and diversified 
firms th a t are present in both data bases. Firms are classified as diversified if they 
report sales in more than  2 business segments. The Compustat Segments file provides 
the data  at the business segment level. The Compustat Industrial Annual file provides
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data  on the market value of firms and other financial variables tha t will be used 
as controls. Both active and companies tha t are delisted during the sample period 
are included. The sample period is 1984 to 2005, beginning in the first year with 
available SIC codes per business segment and ending in the last year with available 
data. Following the literature (e.g. Villalonga (2005)) I exclude firms with segments 
in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6999), agriculture (SIC code lower than 
1000), government (SIC 9000) and other non-economic activities (SIC 8600 and 8800). 
Unclassified services are also excluded from the sample (SIC 8900). Finally, I drop 
firms for which the sum of business segments sales deviate from the firm’s to tal sales 
by more than 5%, and firms with sales of less than $20 million.
Because there is a change in financial reporting in 1998 that impacts the way 
companies report their business segment data, namely the number of segments, I 
restrict my sample to the period before 1998. My final panel consists of 48,171 firm- 
years observations. This issue is discussed in detail in the next section. I use the full 
sample period only to test the robustness of my results.
For the compensation analysis, I use a sub-sample of the full panel including 2,892 
ceo-years from 1991 to 1998. This subsample results from merging the main sample 
with compensation data  from Execucomp.
1.3.1 Sales-shift across tim e and changes in segment disclosure
Figure 1.1 shows a downward trend in the average sales-shift across time for the 
subsample of diversified firms. In the full sample, however, there is a sharp increase 
in average sales outside the core in 1998. This effect is explained by an increase in the 
number of firms th a t starts reporting 2 or more business segments in this year due to 
the change in financial reporting of business segments. Before 1998 companies were 
disclosing segment information according the SFAS No. 14. SFAS 14 requires firms 
to report industry segments tha t are determined by grouping products and services 
by industry line. SFAS No. 131 changes the definition of business segment to be 
determined by organizational structure using a management approach. After 1998 
firms can decide to report their segments based on line of business, geographic region 
or combination of both. This change is analysed by Street, Nichols and Gray (2000), 
who find that a greater number of segments is reported after 1998. The impact of 
this change only in the subsample of diversified firms, is a decrease in sales weight 
outside the core, meaning th a t already diversified companies redefined their business 
segments and assigned more operations to the core business segment. However, the 
decreasing trend of sales-shift was valid both before and after 1998, suggesting that 
diversified firms are becoming more focused.
Figure 1.2 presents the average sales-shift at the four different distances, per year, 
in the full sample and sub-sample of diversified firms. The global decreasing trend
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observed for to ta l sales-shift is mainly driven by a decrease in sales’ proportion of 
segments tha t are 2, 3 and 4 digits away from the core business. The same pattern  is 
not observed in closely related segments, even before 1998. The impact of the change 
in reporting seams to be stronger in these related to the core segments. There is a 
sharp increase of sales proportion in 1998 for one-digit away from the core segments, 
especially in full sample, suggesting th a t the new segments reported after SFAS No. 
131 is introduced are mainly closely related segments to the core business.
1.3.2 D e sc rip tiv e  s ta t is t ic s  a n d  c o rre la tio n s
Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample of firms and the sub­
sample of diversified firms, for the period 1984 to 1998. Diversified firms constitute 
about 30% of the sample. On average, and when compared to stand alone firms, 
the diversified firm is bigger, has a higher level debt, similar profitability and capital 
expenditures with respect to sales.
The summary statistics for the sub-sample of diversified firms allow some charac­
terization of the diversification activity. On average, diversified firms have 3 business 
segments, thus, 2 secondary segments, which contribute with 33% of total sales. Dis­
aggregating this value, 2% of the sales occur in segments th a t are just one digit away 
from the core business, 7% in segments 2-digits away, 11% in segments 3-digits away 
and finally, the highest proportion, 14% in segments that are 4-digits away from the 
centre.
The firm average managerial discretion score varies between 2 and 7 points and is 
slightly higher for stand alone firms. Regarding CEO characteristics and compensa­
tion, the CEO of a diversified firm is, on average highly paid, older when appointed 
and less likely to be externally hired.
The correlations between value, performance measures and independent variables 
are shown in Table 1.2. As expected, there is a negative correlation between diver­
sification variables and performance. Also to note, there is a positive correlation of 
discretion score and firm value and a negative correlation between managerial discre­
tion and the diversification dummy.
1.4 R egression  resu lts
1.4.1 T h e  im p a c t o f S ales-sh ift o n  firm  value  a n d  p e rfo rm a n c e
To test the impact of sales-shift and distance-to-core on firm market valuation and 
performance I run fixed effects regression of diversification variables on Tobin’s q, 
Excess value, ROA and excess ROA measures. Tobin 's q is defined as the ratio 
between the market value of assets and the book value of assets, being the market
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value of assets defined as the book value of assets less the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity. By using fixed effects regression, I expect to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity among firms th a t might impact their decision to become 
diversified and also to correct, into some extent, the endogeneity problem. The fact 
th a t firms might not randomly decide to become diversified or specialized affects 
the analysis of the link between diversification and performance. Villalonga (2004) 
and Campa an Kedia (2002) suggest a procedure to correct for this self-selection 
problem. Santalo and Becerra (2008) discuss this procedure in the context of industry 
heterogeneity and find th a t some of the instruments used are questionable. Because 
my main identification strategy relies on an industry measure of managerial discretion 
I follow Santalo and Becerra (2008) approach and use firm fixed effects, w ith the caveat 
th a t this procedure only corrects for endogeneity as long as it is caused by unobserved 
fixed characteristics of firms. I also add year dummies in all my specifications to 
control for business cycle effects that might affect firms in general.
The coefficients from regressions of sales-shift on firm value and performance are 
presented in Table 1.3. All models include additional financial variables th a t are 
known to impact market valuation and performance of firms as controls. These con­
trols include size measured by the natural logarithm of assets, capital expenditures 
standardized by sales, profitability measured by EBIT (earnings before interest and 
taxes) to sales, and leverage defined by debt to assets ratio.
All the models reported in this table show a negative effect of sales-shift on firm’s 
market value, excess value, performance and excess performance. This result is sig­
nificant also when controlling for the decision to  diversify, i.e., when including the 
diversification dummy in the models. The results are also economically significant. 
W hen sales-weight outside the core business increases by 10%, the firm value decreases 
approximately by 1%. This negative effect of sales-shift suggests th a t on top of the 
negative impact of the decision to become diversified (the diversification dummy co­
efficient is negative, although not significant) the market is also discounting the fact 
th a t the company gets away from its primary business3. The fact th a t the diversifi­
cation dummy is not significance once I consider the effect of sales-shift suggests tha t 
this measure does a  good job as a diversification measure per se.
The result for Tobin’s q and excess value show evidence of a discount in market 
valuation for companies th a t shift its operations away from the core business. If this 
discount is driven, as I argue, by a lack of managerial ability outside the core, the 
negative impact of sales-shift and distance-to-core should be observed not only on the 
market value of the firm, which is a forward looking measure based on the expectation 
of futures cash flows, but also on past performance. In fact, this negative effect is also 
significant in terms of performance and excess performance. Both ROA and excess 
ROA suffer a negative impact of 0.3% when sales-shift increase by 10%.
These results are consistent with the previously documented diversification dis­
3 The results are also robust in the subsample of diversified firms
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count but also with Schoar (2002)’s “new toy effect” . Schoar (2002) shows a negative 
net impact of diversification in terms of productivity, where the core business suffers 
from a shift in managerial attention towards the new plant. An implication of this 
“new toy effect” argument is that firms with more activity outside the core business 
should experience a greater shift in managerial attention towards the periphery and 
therefore the impact of sales-shift in firm value should be negative.
1.4.2 The impact of Sales-shift to different distances-to-core on firm value 
and performance
Table 1.4 shows the results of the same models shown in table 1.3 using now the 
desegregated sales-shift measure to four different distances-to-core-business. These 
models test if the negative impact of sales shift is greater for greater distances to 
the core business. This is expected if managers’ lack of expertise is greater for more 
unrelated-to-the-core industries.
Regressions using Log q and Excess value as dependent variable show a negative 
impact of sales-shift for segments that are two or more digits away from the core. The 
effect of sales-shift is increasing with the distance to core up to 3-digits of distance 
to core business, but is decreasing from 3-digits to 4-digits. The strongest impact 
of sales-shift is observed for business segments th a t axe 3 digits away from the core: 
increasing the sales weight of such business segments has an average impact of -1.4% 
in firm value, and no impact is found for sales-shift a t 1-digit level. Performing an 
F  test to check for the equality of these coefficients, I find th a t I can only reject this 
hypothesis for the coefficients of sales-shift 1- digit and sales-shift - 3 digits, a t 10% 
significance level, for the Log q regressions. I cannot reject the hypothesis th a t the 
remaining coefficients are different from each other.
Regressions (5) to (8) use ROA and Excess ROA as dependent variables. I find 
a similar negative impact of sales-shift on performance for all distances-to-core and 
I find no statistically significant difference in coefficients for the 4 different levels of 
sales-shift.
The results of the models with Log q and Excess value provide some evidence 
suggesting that more value is destroyed by diversifying to more unrelated-to-the-core 
industries. This evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis tha t managers’ un­
derperformance is more severe in more unrelated-to-the-core businesses. The results 
with ROA and Excess ROA suggest no differences in the impact of sales-shift in per­
formance for different distances-to-core.
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1.4.3 M anagerial discretion and the impact o f sales-shift
So far the evidence simply suggests tha t non-core business activities destroy firm value. 
Therefore, in order to test my main hypothesis I go a step further and check if this link 
is different for firms with different levels of managerial discretion. This analysis helps 
to  clarify if the lack of managerial expertise outside the core-business can be driving 
the previous results. If the conglomerate discount is caused by underperformance of 
managers outside the core-business, then conglomerates diversifying towards industries 
with low managerial discretion, where managers’ performance is less critical, should 
observe no, or at least a  weaker negative impact from diversification. In a similar way, 
companies tha t operate primarily in industries of low managerial discretion should 
present a  lower effect from a shift in managers’ attention towards a different business.
In order to test this hypothesis, I split my sample of firms according to the average 
managerial discretion score of its business segments. A firm is considered to have high 
managerial discretion if its average score is higher than  the median score for that 
particular year. Table 1.5 shows the impact of total sales-shift for firms with high and 
low managerial discretion. In all the models I find a negative and significant effect of 
the interaction between sales-shift and managerial discretion score, and I find weak or 
no effect of sales-shift for firms with low score of managerial discretion. In my main 
specification, using Log q as dependent variable I find th a t the impact of increasing 
sales-shift in 10% has a negative impact in firm value of approximately 2%. This 
evidence is consistent with my claim that lack of managerial expertise should be more 
critical in industries where firm performance is more manager-dependent and that 
conglomerates in such industries should experience a greater discount. In addition, the 
positive coefficient of managerial discretion score suggests tha t on average the impact 
of managerial discretion in firm value is positive. The sign of this coefficient also helps 
to differentiate my interpretation of the interaction between sales-shit and managerial 
discretion from an alternative one linked to agency theory. The positive signal of 
managerial discretion coefficient is not consistent with an alternative interpretation 
of the previous result as being driven by agency costs of managerial discression. If 
the managerial discretion score is capturing agency costs then this effect should be 
present in non-diversified firms as well.
The impact of sales-shift to different distances-to-core-business for high and low 
managerial discretion firms is shown on Table 1.6. I find no impact of sales shift to 
any distance-to-core in low managerial discretion firms. In the main specification, for 
high managerial discretion firms, I find a negative impact of diversification towards 
business segments th a t are two or more digits away from the core business on Tobin’s 
q. The strongest impact of sales-shift occurs for business segments th a t are 3 digits 
away from the core. Increasing sales weight by 10% in those segments decreases firm 
value by approximately 3%. These results are further evidence tha t the conglomerate 
discount might be explained by a lack of experience outside the core-business of the
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firm. The most severe diversification discount is found in conglomerates with a greater 
proportion of its operations in unrelated-to-core-business industries tha t demand a lot 
of managerial attention. Conglomerate managers underperform stand alone managers 
in industries where they lack experience only if those industries are highly dependent 
on managerial actions.
1.4.4 Controlling for specialized firms com petition effect
In this section I present the results of previous models controlling for the competition 
from specialized industries. Table 1.7 reports these results. Santalo and Becerra 
(2008) find tha t conglomerates perform better in industries with a smaller number 
of specialized firms. In order to make sure that managerial discretion index is not 
simply capturing a competition effect from specialize firms, considering tha t industries 
with a high degree managerial discretion are likely to  have also a higher degree of 
specialization, I add the number of specialized players and the interaction of this 
variable with the diversification dummy as controls in my regression models. My 
previous results are robust to the inclusion of these controls. Surprisingly I find a 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the number of specialized firms 
with the diversification dummy for the Excess value regressions. This is the opposite 
result of Santalo and Becerra (2008). A possible explanation is the fact tha t I am not 
following exactly their procedure when computing the excess value measure, because 
I follow Berger and Ofek (1985). When computing the theoretical q of conglomerates, 
defined as the sales weighted average of stand alone players’ q in the industry defined 
at 4-digits SIC code, I impose a minimum of 5 stand alone players in the industry, 
otherwise I use the industry average at 3-digits level, and so forth. They do not impose 
this minimum number of players’ restriction. Since I am excluding industries with a 
smaller number of stand alone firms, according to their results I am exactly dropping 
those industries where conglomerates do better and therefore my excess value measure 
will be on average lower than theirs.
1.4.5 Managerial discretion, corporate diversification and CEO com pen­
sation
Using CEO compensation I check for the validity of Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) 
index of managerial discretion. I follow Rose and Shepard (1997) models for CEO 
compensation, including the index of managerial discretion and alternative corporate 
diversification measures as additional explanatory variables. Results are presented 
in Table 1.8 and 1.9. Regressions in table 1.8 show a positive correlation between 
managerial discretion and compensation, suggesting th a t this index is doing a good
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job capturing the importance of managers for firm performance. Assuming the market 
for CEO talent is efficient, then more talented CEO’s are allocated to industries where 
their skills are more valuable, and are therefore paid at a premium. Consistent with 
this prediction, I find in the first column of table 8 a statistically significant salary 
premium of 18% for high discretion firms, and in the second and third columns a 
premium of 16%.
For diversified firms, and contrary to the findings of Rose and Shepard (1997), I 
find no compensation premium. To note is the fact th a t I am using a more recent time 
period in my analysis th a t does not overlap with theirs and what makes it impossible 
to replicate their results. Following their models I use the Herfindahl index as mea­
sure of corporate diversification, but I also test these results using the diversification 
dummy and sales-shift. Columns one to six show the results for the diversification 
dummy, Herfindahl index and total sales-shift. The results are consistent with my 
previous predictions tha t no premium should be observed in CEO compensation in 
diversified firms if they underperform when compared to stand alone managers. These 
results axe consistent with Laux (2001) who shows that it is cheaper to provide in­
centives for a manager in a conglomerate than for two managers in stand alone firms. 
He also predicts tha t the expected wage in a conglomerate should be lower than in 
an equivalent portfolio of stand alone firms. The results using the sales-shift measure 
towards different distances-to-core show a negative impact in CEO pay from diver­
sification 2-digits away from the core, but no effect from diversification 3 or 4 digits 
away. In regression eight, I find a positive and significant premium (at 10% level) for 
1-digit related diversification.
To summarize, the results from using CEO compensation data  are consistent with 
my main hypothesis th a t lack of managerial outside the core-business explains the 
conglomerate discount and with the interpretation of my previous results. The re­
sults validate the score of managerial discretion and reject the existence of a CEO 
compensation premium in diversified firms.
1.5 R ob u stn ess te s ts
1.5.1 Using the full sample: 1984-2005
Table 1.10 shows the results of replicating regressions of sales-shift on firm value and 
performance for firms with high and low levels of managerial discretion, for the whole 
sample period. The results do not change and are consistent with the previous findings, 
suggesting tha t there was no impact from the change in segments report to the link 
between diversification and performance. The coefficients of the interaction between 
sales-shift and the discretion dummy are negative and significant as before for all the 
models, although in some of them I also find a discount for low discretion firms, th a t I 
did not find with the restricted sample. In regressions 3, 5 and 7 sales-shift coefficient
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is negative and significant. I still find a stronger negative effect of diversification 
towards 3-digits away segments, especially when this occurs in high discretion firms. 
In models 4, 6 and 8 1 find a discount for the most unrelated diversification irrespective 
of the level of discretion.
1.5.2 Using alternative estim ation methods
So far all the models are estimated using firm fixed effect regressions. In this section I 
redo the estimation of the main models using alternative techniques. Table 1.11 shows 
the coefficients estimated using a pooled OLS regression, Fama Me Beth and median 
regression. Pooled OLS and median regressions include year dummies to take into 
account eventual macro economic factors that may influence firm value. All models 
include industry dummies defined at 2-digit sic level to capture fixed effects within 
industries. Standard errors in OLS regressions are both corrected for heteroskedastic- 
ity and clustered a t the firm level. The dependent variables for OLS and Fama MC 
Beth are the same as previously defined: the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q, Excess 
value, ROA and Excess ROA. For median regression I use Tobin’s q ratio, and Excess 
value defined as the difference between firm actual q and imputed q, instead of the 
logarithm of the ratio between q and imputed q. This is so, because by using the 
median regression model I expect to correct for outliers and therefore I don’t  need to 
do this correction in the dependent variable. Firm ’s controls are as previously defined.
Using pooled OLS estimation and median regression, I find consistent results with 
my previous findings. The coefficients of the interaction of sales-shift with the dis­
cretion dummy are all negative and statistically significant, with the exception of 
regressions 3 and 11, when ROA is used as dependent variable. In those columns I 
find a discount from sales-shift, but no difference for high managerial discretion firms. 
Using the Fama Me Beth models I find consistent results with previous ones using log 
q, excess value and excess ROA, but not with ROA.
In general, the results from using these alternative estimation techniques support 
my previous findings. I find lower a stronger negative impact of diversification outside 
the core business for high discretion firms. According to these models the value loss 
from increasing sales outside the core-business in 10% can go up to  3.5% if those firms 
operate in high discretion industries.
1.5.3 Using alternative unrelatedness measure
I repeat previous tests using an alternative measure of diversification based on the 
measure originally developed by Fan and Lang (2000)4 tha t considers how related the
4 Fan and Lan (2000) measure of diversification designated as Intersegment Complementarity is 
computed as follows: C  =  Y K wi x CV,') where Wj is the proportion of the j th secondary segment
j
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periphery is to the core business. Similarly to my distance-to-core measures, Fan and 
Lang (2000) consider the existence of a core-business and secondary businesses in the 
firm although they use an alternative way to  measure the relatedness between them. 
Relatedness is measured using commodity flow data  from input-output (10) tables 
from which they construct an inter-segment relatedness variable th a t I will use as an 
alternative to my distance-to-core measure.
Table 1.12 shows the results of using the adjusted Fan and Lang (2000) measure. 
The adjusted measure has two main differences from the pure measure. Instead of 
using the sales weigh of secondary segments with respect to the total secondary seg­
ments sales, I use the weigh with respect to  total firm sales in order to capture the 
sales-shift effect. I also use the inverse of the complementary score in order to capture 
the unrelatedness between the core and the periphery instead of complementarity, and 
make it comparable to my previous analysis. By using the inverse of complementarity 
I also avoid having two conflicting effects in the same measure: the proportion of sales 
outside the core (the sales-shift), which I know to be negative and the relatedness, 
which I expect to  be positive.5.
I find an expected negative coefficient of the variable tha t is capturing the in­
teraction between the high discretion dummy and the adjusted Fan-Lang measure 
of diversification. Though, the coefficient is only statistically significant in my main 
specification where I use firm value (measured by Log q) as dependent variable. In 
models 1 and 3, the diversification dummy is negative and statistically significant and 
therefore might be capturing some of the negative impact of diversification. There is 
some evidence supporting previous results from the main specification, and although 
no impact is observed when alternative measures of firm performance are used, the 
results in those models do not contradict my previous conclusions.
1.5.4 Adjusting q for Goodwill
In chapter 3 I show that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) accounting can explain 
a significant part of the diversification discount measured with q. The mostly used 
procedure of M&A accounting tends to generate a mechanical increase in the book 
value of assets, and therefore a drop in Tobin’s q as typically measured (the market- 
to-book value of assets). In this section I control for the impact of M&A accounting by 
adjusting q and excess value for goodwill, as further discussed in chapter 3. Table 1.13
sales in the total sales of all secondary segments and Cij is the complementary coefficient associated 
with the pair of industries to which the primary segment i and the secondary segment j  belong. The 
complementary coefficient captures the degree to which industries i and j share the same input and 
output and is defined as Cij =  | [ corr(bik,bjk ) +  corr(vki ,Vkj)]  where bik is the percentage of the 
output of industry i supplied to each intermediate industry Jc and Vki the dollor value of industry fc’s 
output required to produce 1 dollar’s worth of industry i ’s total output.
5 The samples in these regressions result from merging Fan & Lan (2000) sample with my previous 
sample. The data on complementarity coefficients is provided by the authors.
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shows the results. The dependent variable in all regressions are adjusted for goodwill: 
Log q adjusted is the log of the ratio between market value of assets and adjusted book 
value of assets, where adjusted book value of assets is the book value of assets minus 
goodwill. Excess-value - adjusted corresponds to the excess-value measure where q is 
adjusted for goodwill as defined above.
The results do not contradict the previous conclusions, and axe also consistent with 
the findings in chapter 3. On average I find tha t the decision to become diversified, 
as captured by the diversification dummy, has a is positive and significant effect on 
q and excess value. The coefficient of the diversification dummy has a value between 
0.48 and 0.55 and is significant at least at 10% level in all regressions except for 
specification 7. However, on the cross section and on top of the decision to diversify, 
I find a negative impact from diversifying further away from the core-business.
According to the results in specifications 1 and 2, the overall impact of diversifica­
tion on q and excess value can be positive as long as the non-core activities (sales-shift) 
have a weight of less than 38% and 28%, respectively. In th a t case the positive effect 
of the diversification dummy dominates the negative impact of unrelated diversifica­
tion. Specifications 3 and 4 show that the negative effect of non-core activities are 
mainly driven from segments that are 3 and 4 digits away from the core-business, as 
previously reported. The results in specification 4 suggest tha t 18% of sales in sec­
ondary segment 3 digits away from the core-business axe enough to offset the positive 
coefficient of the diversification dummy.
Columns 5 to 8 show the results from classifying the firms into high and low levels 
of managerial discretion. The results in specifications 5 and 7 axe in line with the ones 
in the previous analysis. I find a stronger negative impact from diversifying way from 
the core-business when the firm is operating in high managerial discretion industries. 
This effect is statistically significant when using log q as dependent variable. However, 
when excess value is used as dependent variable, I still find a negative overall impact 
from diversifying in high managerial discretion industries, but the coefficient on the 
interaction term  is not precisely estimated.
The results reported in table 1.13 suggest tha t correcting q for goodwill do not 
offset the cross-sectional variation associated with the distance-to-core business. This 
correction shifts the average diversification discount to the right, but a negative effect 
from unrelated-to-the-core diversification is maintained.
1.5.5 Conclusion
This paper tests an additional and at same time very intuitive explanation for why 
diversification outside the core-business destroys value based on the lack of managerial 
expertise. I develop a set of diversification measures th a t capture both the weight 
of non-core-business activities and the distance between such activities and the core­
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business. I find significant evidence consistent with the claim th a t if managers diversify 
towards unrelated-to-the-core business segments, they will have limited ability to run 
these new businesses, underperforming stand alone firms in the same industries and, 
consequently, destroying firm value. This argument is supported by the fact that 
increasing non-core business activity (sales-shift) has much stronger negative impact 
if the company operates in industries of high managerial discretion. I validate the 
measure of managerial discretion and previous results on the conglomerate discount 
using CEO compensation data. My main results axe robust to different estimation 
methods, alternative definitions of firm value and performance and an alternative 
measure of sale-shift and unrelatedness.
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Figure 1.1: Average Sales-shift 1984-2005
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Figure 1.2: Average levels of Distance-to-core (1984-2005)
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Table 1.1: Summary of financial, diversification and compensation variables
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample, and for the sub sample of diversified 
US-based publicly traded firms. The full sample consists of 48,171 firm-years of data during the 
period 1984 to 1998. Sales-shift is the percentage of business segments’ sales that do not correspond 
to the core business of the firm. The core business of the firm is defined as the business segment 
with the highest sales. Sales-shift N  digit(s) is the proportion of sales in business segments for 
wich SIC code is N  digits away from the core-business. The distance N  will assume a value of 1 
if the segment’s SIC code differs from the core business SIC code in the 4th digit and not in the 
1st, 2nd or 3rd, a value of 2 if the segment’s SIC code differs from the core business SIC code in 
the 3rd digit and not in the 1st or 2nd, a value of 3 if the segment’s SIC code differs from the 
core business SIC code in the 2nd digit and not in the 1st and finally a value of 4, if the segment’s 
SIC code differs from the core business SIC code in the 1st digit. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio 
between the market value of assets and the book value of assets, being the market value of assets 
defined as the book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. 
Excess value is the log of the ratio between Tobin’s Q and imputed Q. ROA is defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Excess ROA is the diference between ROA and 
imputed ROA. Ebit-to-sales corresponds to earnings before interest and taxes divided by total 
sales. Capex-to-sales is capital expenditures divided by total sales. Leverage is the ratio between 
total debt and total assets. Discretion score is the sales-weighted average discretion score of the 
business segments. Total CEO compensation includes salary, bonus, stocks and stock options. 
CEO tenure is the number of years of the CEO in the position. Age at appointment is the CEO 
age at the start date of CEO position. Outside Hire is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is 
appointed from outside the firm. N is the number of non missing observations.
Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Panel A - Full sample
Assets (millions of dollars)
Sales (millions of dollars)
Tobin’s q
Excess value
Ebit-to-assets (ROA)
Excess ROA
Ebit-to-sales
Capex-to-sales
Debt-to-assets
No of segments
Diversification dummy
Sales-shift
Sales-shift - 1 digit
Sales-shift - 2 digits
Sales-shift - 3 digits
Sales-shift - 4 digits
Discretion score
Total Ceo Compensation
Ceo Tenure
Age at appointment
Outside hired Ceo
Assets (millions of dollars)
Sales (millions of dollars)
Tobin’s q
Excess value
Ebit-to-assets (ROA)
Excess ROA
Ebit-to-sales
Capex-to-sales
Debt-to-assets
No of segments
Diversification dummy
Sales-shift
Sales-shift - 1 digit
Sales-shift - 2 digits
Sales-shift - 3 digits
Sales-shift - 4 digits
Discretion score
Total Ceo Compensation
Ceo Tenure
Age at appointment
Outside hired Ceo
1,105.35 3,348.89
1,044.50 3,195.47
1.695 1.198
-0.001 0.417
0.126 0.116
0.021 0.119
0.078 0.120
0.094 0.163
0.198 0.179
1.583 1.101
0.296 0.457
0.098 0.180
0.006 0.041
0.019 0.076
0.031 0.102
0.042 0.116
4.945 1.123
2,436.84 4,777.53
8.225 7.674
54.137 7.617
0.200 0.400
Panel B - Diversified firms
2,077.75 4,598.82
1,941.65 4,374.04
1.423 0.729
-0.062 0.345
0.126 0.082
0.021 0.090
0.079 0.082
0.092 0.143
0.224 0.163
2.965 1.172
1.000 0.000
0.330 0.179
0.019 0.073
0.065 0.129
0.106 0.165
0.140 0.178
4.765 1.100
2,790.05 6,362.72
7.98 7.77
55.78 7.01
0.123 0.328
1.75 40,585.00 48,171
20.00 104,859.00 48,171
0.554 16.232 48,171
-1.207 2.004 48,171
-1.953 0.382 48,171
-2.113 0.818 48,171
-2.930 0.338 48,171
0.000 2.722 48,171
0.000 0.930 48,171
1.000 10.000 48,171
0.000 1.000 48,171
0.000 0.835 48,171
0.000 0.655 48,171
0.000 0.718 48,171
0.000 0.811 48,171
0.000 0.829 48,171
2.080 6.890 41,539
0.000 202,185.10 4,511
1.000 52.000 4,511
29.000 82.000 4,511
0.000 1.000 4,511
3.49 40,585.00 14,278
20.00 104,859.00 14,278
0.559 13.305 14,278
-1.207 2.001 14,278
-0.883 0.382 14,278
-1.022 0.663 14,278
-0.942 0.338 14,278
0.000 2.356 14,278
0.000 0.929 14,278
2.000 10.000 14,278
1.000 1.000 14,278
0.000 0.835 14,278
0.000 0.655 14,278
0.000 0.718 14,278
0.000 0.811 14,278
0.000 0.829 14,278
2.080 6.890 13,460
0.00 202,185.10 1,541
1.00 52.00 1,541
34.00 79.00 1,541
0.000 1.000 1,541
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Table 1.2: Correlation matrices - full sample and diversified firms
Table 1.2 shows the correlation between firm characteristics and diversification variables for the full sample and for the sub sample of 
diversified firms. All variables are defined in Table 1. N is the number of non missing observations.
Log q Excess
value
ROA Excess
ROA
Log
as­
sets
Ebit-
to-
sales
Capex-
to-
sales
Debt-
to-
assets
Div Sales- 
dummy shift
Sales-
sh iftl
Sales-
shift^
Sales-
shift3
Sales-
shift4
Disc.
score
Panel A - Full sample fobs—41,539)
Log q 1.00
Excess value 0.80 1.00
Ebit-to-assets (ROA) 0.31 0.33 1.00
Excess ROA 0.34 0.29 0.88 1.00
Log assets -0.06 0.02 0.12 0.09 1.00
Ebit-to-sales 0.31 0.32 0.96 0.85 0.12 1.00
Capex-to-sales 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.17 -0.07 1.00
Debt-to-assets -0.25 -0.13 -0.09 -0.11 0.25 -0.10 0.22 1.00
Diversification -0.18 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.28 0.00 -0.02 0.11 1.00
dummy
Sales-shift -0.16 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.30 0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.83 1.00
Sales-shift - 1 digit -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.20 0.24 1.00
Sales-shift - 2 digits -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.38 0.44 0.01 1.00
Sales-shift - 3 digits -0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.14 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.47 0.58 0.02 0.02 1.00
Sales-shift - 4 digits -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.18 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.55 0.65 0.00 0.01 -0.01 1.00
Discretion score 0.18 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.27 0.05 -0.29 -0.22 -0.11 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
Panel B - Diversified firms (obs= 13,460)
Log q 1.00
Excess value 0.77 1.00
Ebit-to-assets (ROA) 0.35 0.31 1.00
Excess ROA 0.34 0.23 0.83 1.00
Log assets 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.12 1.00
Ebit-to-sales 0.35 0.31 0.95 0.78 0.17 1.00
Capex-to-sales 0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 -0.09 1.00
Debt-to-assets -0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 0.17 -0.10 0.22 1.00
Diversification
dummy
Sales-shift -0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 1.00
Sales-shift - 1 digit 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.13 1.00
Sales-shift - 2 digits 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.24 -0.07 1.00
Sales-shift - 3 digits -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.10 -0.07 0.39 -0.09 -0.20 1.00
Sales-shift - 4 digits 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.43 -0.14 -0.25 -0.37 1.00
Discretion score 0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.23 0.08 -0.28 -0.17 0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.06 1.00
Table 1.3: Fixed effects regressions of Sales-shift on firm value and performance
Table 3 shows the impact of sales-shift on firm value and performance. The dependent variable in 
regressions (1) and (2) is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio between the market 
value of assets and the book value of assets, being the market value of assets defined as the book 
value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. The dependent variable 
in regressions (3) and (4) is Excess Value, defined as the log of the ratio between Tobin’s q and 
imputed q. The dependent variable in regressions (5) and (6) is ROA, defined as EBIT to assets. 
The dependent variable in regressions (7) and (8) is Excess ROA, defined as the difference between 
ROA and imputed ROA. Sales-shift is the proportion of firm sales that do not correspond to the 
core business. The core business of the firm is defined as the business segment with the highest 
sales. The diversification dummy is a variable set to one if a firm reports more than one business 
segment and zero otherwise. Size defined as log of total assets, Ebit-to-sales, Capex-to-sales and 
leverage are inlcuded as controls. All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. 
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. N 
is the number of non missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Log q Exc value Exc value ROA ROA Exc ROA Exc ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sales-shift -0.092 -0.089 -0.112 -0.102 -0.026 -0.030 -0.027 -0.026
[-3.74] [-2.92] [-4.35] [-3.24] [-3.80] [-3.62] [-3.62] [-2.94]
Div. dummy -0.002 -0.006 0.002 0.000
[-0.18] [-0.47] [0.59] [0.13]
Log assets -0.104 -0.104 -0.106 -0.106 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.010
[-15.2] [-15.2] [-16.0] [-15.9] [4.15] [4.13] [4.96] [4.80]
Ebit-to-sales 1.067 1.067 0.894 0.894
[16.7] [16.7] [15.6] [15.6]
Capex-to-sales 0.157 0.157 0.094 0.094 -0.035 -0.035 -0.037 -0.036
[9.00] [9.00] [5.69] [5.69] [-8.17] [-8.17] [-8.50] [-8.60]
Debt-to-assets -0.211 -0.211 -0.150 -0.150 -0.080 -0.080 -0.066 -0.066
[-9.84] [-9.84] [-7.31] [-7.31] [-11.1] [-11.1] [-9.34] [-9.42]
N 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171
No. of firms 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Robust t statistics in brackets
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Table 1.4: Fixed effects regressions of Sales-shift on firm value and performance for
different distances-to-core-business.
This table shows the results of replicating the models in table 4 using Sales-shift to four different 
distances-to-core. The distance-to-core will assume a value of 1 if the segment’s SIC code differs 
from the core business SIC code in the 4th digit and not in the 1st, 2nd or 3rd, a value of 2 if the 
segment’s SIC code differs from the core business SIC code in the 3rd digit and not in the 1st or 
2nd, a value of 3 if the segment’s SIC code differs from the core business SIC code in the 2nd digit 
and not in the 1st and finally a value of 4, if the segment’s SIC code differs from the core business 
SIC code in the 1st digit. All regressions are firm fixed effect regressions and include year dummies. 
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. N 
is the number of non missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Log q Exc value Exc value ROA ROA Exc ROA Exc ROA
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6) (7 ) (8)
Sales-shift 1 digit 0.003 0.007 -0.038 -0.028 -0.045 -0.048 -0.050 -0.051
[0.042] [0.090] [-0.55] [-0.40] [-2.17] [-2.33] [-2.46] [-2.45]
Sales-shift 2 digits -0.099 -0.096 -0.113 -0.103 -0.009 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016
[-2.19] [-1.96] [-2.39] [-2.04] [-0.83] [-1.07] [-1.19] [-1.15]
Sales-shift 3 digits -0.144 -0.141 -0.158 -0.148 -0.029 -0.032 -0.034 -0.035
[-4.17] [-3.54] [-4.28] [-3.52] [-3.07] [-3.09] [-3.50] [-3.13]
Sales-shift 4 digits -0.072 -0.068 -0.094 -0.085 -0.027 -0.031 -0.022 -0.022
[-2.23] [-1.89] [-2.85] [-2.28] [-2.95] [-2.99] [-2.16] [-1.97]
Div. dummy -0.002 -0.006 0.002 0.000
[-0.18] [-0.46] [0.62] [0.092]
Log assets -0.104 -0.104 -0.106 -0.106 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011
[-15.2] [-15.2] [-15.9] [-15.9] [4.15] [4.13] [4.95] [4.95]
Ebit-to-sales 1.067 1.067 0.894 0.894
[16.7] [16.7] [15.6] [15.6]
Capex-to-sales 0.157 0.157 0.094 0.094 -0.035 -0.035 -0.037 -0.037
[9.00] [9.00] [5.69] [5.68] [-8.16] [-8.16] [-8.49] [-8.49]
Debt-to-assets -0.211 -0.211 -0.150 -0.150 -0.080 -0.080 -0.066 -0.066
[-9.84] [-9.84] [-7.31] [-7.31] [-11.1] [-11.1] [-9.34] [-9.34]
N 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171 48,171
No. of firms 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208 8,208
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Robust t statistics in brackets
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Table 1.5: Fixed effects regressions of sales-shift on firm value and performance for
high and low levels of managerial discretion.
Table 5 shows the results of regressing sales-shift on firm value and performance for firms with 
high and low scores of managerial discretion. High disc, dummy is one if the firm discretion score 
is higher than the median score for a particular year, a zero otherwise. Firm discretion score is 
a sales-weighted average of business segments’ industry discretion score. High. disc*Sales-shift is 
the interaction of sales-shift with the discretion dummy. All regressions include year dummies and 
the same controls as in table 3. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. N is the number of non missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Log q Exc value Exc value ROA ROA Exc ROA Exc ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High disc.*Sales-shift -0.180 -0.180 -0.082 -0.081 -0.021 -0.021 -0.028 -0.028
[-4.29] [-4.29] [-1.88] [-1.88] [-1.94] [-1.95] [-2.40] [-2.41]
High disc, dummy 0.082 0.082 0.017 0.017 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010
[4.32] [4.32] [0.85] [0.85] [1.34] [1.34] [1.84] [1.84]
Sales-shift -0.007 -0.007 -0.060 -0.050 -0.010 -0.016 -0.007 -0.013
[-0.22] [-0.19] [-1.86] [-1.33] [-1.29] [-1.73] [-0.78] [-1.27]
D iv. dummy -0.000 -0.006 0.003 0.004
[-0.0032] [-0.46] [0.93] [0.97]
Log assets -0.108 -0.108 -0.111 -0.111 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.011
[-14.5] [-14.5] [-15.6] [-15.6] [4.18] [4.16] [5.06] [5.04]
E bit-to-sales 1.063 1.063 0.905 0.905
[15.0] [15.0] [14.2] [14.2]
C apex-to-sales 0.149 0.149 0.088 0.087 -0.034 -0.034 -0.036 -0.036
[8.13] [8.12] [5.15] [5.15] [-7.63] [-7.63] [-8.07] [-8.07]
D ebt-to-assets -0.212 -0.212 -0.146 -0.146 -0.077 -0.077 -0.064 -0.064
[-9.06] [-9.06] [-6.52] [-6.52] [-9.92] [-9.92] [-8.40] [-8.40]
N 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539
No. of firms 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Robust t statistics in brackets
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Table 1.6: Fixed effects regressions of Sales-shift towards different distances-to-core
for high and low managerial discretion firms.
This table shows the results of regressing sales-shift towards different distances-to-core on firm 
value and performance for firms with high and low scores of managerial discretion. High disc, 
dummy is one if the firm discretion score is higher than the median score for a particular year, a 
zero otherwise. Firm discretion score is a sales-weighted average of business segments’ industry 
discretion score. High. disc*Sales-shift is the interaction of sales-shift with the discretion dummy. 
All regressions include year dummies and the same controls as in table 3. T-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. N is the number of non 
missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Log q Exc value Exc value ROA ROA Exc ROA Eke ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
H disc.*Sales shift 1 -0.224 -0.224 -0.012 -0.013 -0.034 -0.034 -0.047 -0.046
H disc.*Sales shift 2
[-1.55] [-1.55] [-0.084] [-0.089] [-0.92] [-0.91] [-1.26] [-1.25]
-0.140 -0.140 -0.094 -0.095 -0.034 -0.033 -0.036 -0.035
[-1.66] [-1.66] [-1.05] [-1.05] [-1.69] [-1.68] [-1.53] [-1.52]
H disc.*Sales shift 3 -0.277 -0.277 -0.153 -0.153 -0.036 -0.036 -0.045 -0.045
[-5.10] [-5.10] [-2.67] [-2.67] [-2.58] [-2.58] [-3.00] [-3.00]
H disc.*Sales shift 4 -0.122 -0.122 -0.038 -0.037 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
[-2.25] [-2.24] [-0.66] [-0.65] [-0.17] [-0.191 [-0.43] [-0.46]
High disc, dummy 0.084 0.084 0.019 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009
IMS . r a [0.95] [1.31] [I-31] I1 -78] [1.781Sales-shift 1 digit -0.006 -0.018 -0.024 -0.023 -0.029
[1.331 [1.331 [-0.151 [-0.048] [-0.70] [-0.93] [-0.92] [-1.16]
Sales-shift 2 digits -0.050 -0.049 -0.065 -0.054 0.005 o .o od -0.001 -0.007
[-0.85] [-0.80] [-1.001 [-0.80] [0.37] [-0.012] [-0.089] [-0.44]
Sales-shift 3 digits -0.010 -0.009 -0.061 -0.051 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.012
[-0.23] [-0.181 [-1.391 [-1-021 [-0.36] [-0.78] [-0.52] [-0.91]
Sales-shift 4 digits -0.013 -0.012 -0.067 -0.057 -0.019 -0.024 -0.010 - O . O l d
[-0.35] [-0.29] [-1.70] [■1 -3 2J [-1.91] [-2.18] [-0.90] t-1 2 4 JD iv. dummy -0.001 -0.007 0.003 0.003
[-0.058] [-0.49] e aLog assets -0.108 -0.108 - 0 . 1 1 1 -0 .111 0.010 0.013
[-14.5] [-14-5J [-15.6] [-15.6] [4.23] [4.22] [5.14] [5.13]
E bit-to-sales 1.063 1.063 0.904 0.905
UhD L1 4 '2i L1 4 -2JCapex-to-sales 0.087 0.087 -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 -0.037
[8.HJ [8.i l l L5 -15J [-7.61] [-7.61] [-7.97] [-7.97]D ebt-to-assets -0.212 -0 .2 l3 -0.146 -0.076 -0.076 -0.064 -0.064
[-9.05] [-9.05] [-6.52] [-6.52] [-9.79] [-9.79] [-8.29] [-8.29]
N 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539
No. of firms 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Robust t statistics in brackets
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Table 1.7: Fixed effects regressions of Sales-shift on firm value and performance 
controling for the number of specialized players in the industry.
This table shows the results of regressing total sales-shift and sales-shift towards different distances- 
to-core on firm value and performance, for firms with high and low scores of managerial discretion, 
controling for the number of stand alone players in the industry. NSC is the number of specialized 
companies in the industry. NSC*Div. dummy is the interaction of the number of specialized firms 
in the industry with the diversification dummy. All regressions include year dummies and the same 
controls as in table 3. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. N is the number of non missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Log q Exc value Exc value ROA ROA Exc ROA Exc ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High disc.*Sales shift -0.178 -0.082 -0.021 -0.027
[-4.24] [-1.90] [-1.92] [-2.32]
Sales-shift -0.002 -0.049 -0.015 -0.013
[-0.066] [-1.29] [-1.68] [-1.29]
H disc.*Sales shift 1 -0.215 -0.024 -0.034 -0.042
[-1.51] [-0.17] [-0.92] [-1.16]
H disc.*Sales shift 2 -0.134 -0.093 -0.032 -0.034
[-1.59] [-1.03] [-1.61] [-1.47]
H disc.’'‘Sales shift 3 -0.279 -0.148 -0.036 -0.046
[-5.13] [-2.61] [-2.55] [-3.08]
H disc.*Sales shift 4 -0.120 -0.041 -0.003 -0.006
[-2.20] [-0.73] [-0.21] [-0.38]
Sales-shift 1 digit 0.142 0.008 -0.023 -0.033
[1.27] [0.064] [-0.89] [-1.32]
Sales-shift 2 digits -0.046 -0.053 0 -0.006
[-0.75] [-0.79] [0.027] [-0.41]
Sales-shift 3 digits -0.002 -0.052 -0.008 -0.01
[-0.042] [-1.05] [-0.71] [-0.77]
Sales-shift 4 digits -0.008 -0.055 -0.023 -0.015
[-0.19] [-1.27] [-2.10] [-1.18]
High disc, dummy 0.082 0.0849 0.016 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010
[4.34] [4.47] [0.83] [0.91] [1.33] [1.31] [1.85] [1.83]
D iv. dummy -0.007 -0.007 -0.085 -0.085 -0.008 -0.008 0.013 0.014
[-0.30] [-0.29] [-3.19] [-3.17] [-1.12] [-1.12] [1.64] [1.66]
NSC 0.01 0.0103 -0.040 -0.040 -0.004 -0.004 0.009 0.009
[1.17] [1.19] [-4.29] [-4.27] [-1.48] [-1.45] [3.05] [3.09]
NSCDiv. dummy 0.006 0.006 0.026 0.026 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.002
[0.71] [0.67] [2.89] [2.86] [1.69] [1.68] [-0.80] [-0.80]
Log assets -0.108 -0.108 -0.109 -0.109 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012
[-14.5] [-14.5] [-15.1] [-15.1] [4.32] [4.29] [4.92] [4.89]
Ebit-to-sales 1.064 1.064 0.902 0.902
[15.0] [15.0] [14.2] [14.2]
Capex-to-sales 0.148 0.148 0.087 0.087 -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 -0.037
[8.08] [8.07] [5.16] [5.15] [-7.63] [-7.63] [-8.01] [-8.01]
D ebt-to-assets -0.212 -0.212 -0.146 -0.146 -0.077 -0.076 -0.064 -0.064
[-9.06] [-9.05] [-6.57] [-6.56] [-9.81] [-9.80] [-8.28] [-8.27]
N 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539
No. of firms 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143 7,143
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Robust t sta tistics  in brackets
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Table 1.8: Regressions of managerial discretion index on CEO compensation
This table presents OLS regressions of managerial discretion index on managerial compensation. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total compensation, including salary, 
bonus, total value of stocks granted and total value of stock options granted. Log sales is defined 
as the natural logarithm of total firm sales. Log employes is defined as the natural logarithm  
of the total number of employes. Stock return is the annual stock return. Accounting return 
corresponds to return on equity, defined as net income divided by total shareholders equity. Stock 
return volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns. Ceo tenure is the number of years as 
CEO in the firm. Ceo age at appointment is the CEO age at the start date in the CEO position. 
Outsid hired dummy is a variable that assumes the value one, if the CEO is hired from outside 
the firm. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include year dummies. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. N is the number of non missing observations.
(1) (2) (3)
High disc, dummy 0.177 0.155 0.155
[6.36] [4.11] [4.12]
Log sales 0.391 0.428 0.386
[36.8] [28.9] [12.4]
Log employes 0.044
[1.50]
Stock return 0.003 0.003 0.003
[7.76] [6.26] [6.27]
Stock return t-1 0.003 0.002 0.002
[7.79] [4.56] [4.60]
Stock return t-2 0.002 0.002
[4.72] [4.76]
Accounting return 0.001 0.001
[0.45] [0.47]
Accounting return t-1 0.001 0.001
[0.49] [0.50]
Accounting return t-2 -0.001 -0.001
[-0.50] [-0.52]
Stock return volatility 0.883 0.850
[4.79] [4.59]
Ceo tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.002
[0.13] [-0.39] [-0.60]
Ceo age at apointm ent -0.002 0.002 0.003
[-0.81] [0.71] [0.78]
Outside hire dummy 0.178 0.119 0.121
[4.27] [2.16] [2.20]
Constant 4.395 3.605 3.822
[31.2] [14.9] [13.9]
N 2,892 1,757 1,757
R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.39
Robust t statistics in brackets
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Table 1.9: Regressions of corporate diversification measures on CEO compensation
This table presents OLS regressions of corporate diversification measures on managerial compen­
sation. The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total compensation, including 
salary, bonus, total value of stocks granted and total value of stock options. Diversification dummy 
and Sales-shift are as defined in Table 1. The Herfindahl index of diversification is H  =  Y i ^ i  
where Pi is the proportion of a firm’s assets in industry i. Industries are defined at 4-digits SIC 
level. Control variables are as defined in table 8. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedas­
ticity. N is the number of non missing observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Div. dummy 0.000 0.025
[0.012] [0.64]
1 - Herfindahl index 0.051 0.110
[0.97] [1.49]
Sales-shift 0.004 0.052
[0.064] [0.57]
Sales-shift 1 digit 0.373 0.582
[1.56] [1.69]
Sales-shift 2 digits -0.501 -0.459
[-3.56] [-2.42]
Sales-shift 3 digits 0.098 0.031
[0.98] [0.25]
Sales-shift 4 digits 0.101 0.205
[1.09] [1.61]
Log sales 0.438 0.456 0.435 0.456 0.438 0.456 0.438 0.456
[38.7] [11.8] [38.0] [11.9] [38.6] [11.8] [38.6] [11.8]
Log employes 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.007
[0.16] [0.081] [0.16] [0.17]
Stock return 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[7.23] [6.23] [7.22] [6.23] [7.23] [6.23] [7.19] [6.19]
Stock return t-1 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
[6.40] [3.93] [6.42] [3.92] [6.40] [3.92] [6.37] [3.91]
Stock return t-2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[3.81] [3.84] [3.80] [3.83]
A ccounting return 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [-0.007] [0.009] [-0.039]
A ccounting return t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.28] [0.29] [0.28] [0.26]
Accounting return t-2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[-0.72] [-0.71] [-0.73] [-0.79]
Stock return volatility 0.567 0.585 0.567 0.543
[2.74] [2.83] [2.72] [2.59]
Ceo tenure 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
[0.25] [-0.19] [0.26] [-0.17] [0.25] [-0.18] [0.040] [-0.44]
Ceo age at apointm ent -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002
[-0.82] [0.30] [-0.86] [0.27] [-0.82] [0.30] [-0.66] [0.47]
O utside hire dummy 0.179 0.169 0.181 0.171 0.179 0.169 0.184 0.175
[4.39] [3.19] [4.44] [3.23] [4.40] [3.20] [4.51] [3.30]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,892 1,757 2,892 1,757 2,892 1,757 2,892 1,757
R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.49
Robust t statistics in brackets
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T ab le  1.10: Regressions of sales-shift on firm value and performance for the full 
sample: 1984-2005
This table presents the robustness tests results of using the full sample of firms, from 1984 to 
2005, ignoring the change in segments reporting. I replicate here the models in tables 5 and 6 for 
the whole period. All regressions include year dummies. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. N is the number of non missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Log q Exc value Exc value ROA ROA Exc ROA Exc ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
H igh disc.*Sales shift -0.175 -0.091 -0.022 -0.025
[-4.31] [-2.19] [-2.35] [-1.97]
Sales-shift -0.049 -0.068 -0.025 -0.022
[-1.62] [-2.07] [-3.35] [-2.41]
High disc.*Sales shift 1 -0.042 -0.05 -0.041 0.032
[-0.36] [-0.41] [-1.60] [0.95]
High disc.*Sales shift 2 -0.208 -0.162 -0.034 -0.006
[-2.78] [-1.99] [-1.85] [-0.19]
High disc.*Sales shift 3 -0.314 -0.143 -0.039 -0.072
[-5.27] [-2.33] [-2.89] [-4.36]
High disc."‘Sales shift 4 -0.099 -0.043 -0.001 -0.017
[-2.04] [-0.82] [-0.042] [-1.03]
Sales-shift 1 digit 0.028 -0.029 -0.013 -0.022
[0.36] [-0.33] [-0.87] [-1.17]
Sales-shift 2 digits 0 -0.026 0.001 -0.02
[-0.0070] [-0.48] [0.056] [-1.32]
Sales-shift 3 digits -0.004 -0.084 -0.022 -0.014
[-0.097] [-1.81] [-2.09] [-1.15]
Sales-shift 4 digits -0.03 -0.083 -0.042 -0.030
[-0.81] [-2.11] [-4.33] [-2.62]
High disc, dummy 0.069 0.069 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.018 0.021
[3.69] [3.64] [0.33] [0.32] [1.63] [1.47] [3.57] [4.04]
D iv. dummy -0.005 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008
[-0.44] [0.38] [-0.31] [-0.39] [0.47] [0.47] [2.33] [2.22]
Log assets 0.777 0.822 0.684 0.684
[13.4] [14.3] [13.3] [13.3]
E bit-to-sales 0.156 0.187 0.130 0.130 -0.057 -0.057 -0.046 -0.046
[9.55] [11.3] [8.39] [8.39] [-12.2] [-12.2] [-9.87] [-9.88]
C apex-to-sales -0.338 -0.266 -0.213 -0.213 -0.071 -0.071 -0.057 -0.057
[-16.7] [-13.1] [-10.7] [-10.7] [-10.9] [-10.8] [-8.30] [-8.30]
D ebt-to-assets -0.105 -0.109 -0.109 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018
[-17.8] [-19.4] [-19.4] [8.70] [8.72] [9.30] [9.31]
O bservations 64,220 64,220 64,220 64,220 64,220 64,220 64,220 64,220
Number of gvkey 9,257 9,257 9,257 9,257 9,257 9,257 9,257 9,257
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Robust t sta tistics in brackets
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Table 1.11: Using alternative regression methods: OLS, Fama Me Beth and Median Regression
This table presents the robustness tests results of using an alternative regression methods. The dependent variables 
for OLS and Fama Me Beth Regressions are as previously defined. For the Median regression, Tobin’s q is used 
instead of Log q. Independent variables are as defined in Table 1. OLS and Median regressions include year 
dummies. Industry dummies axe defined using 2 digit SIC code. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. N is the number of non missing observations. 
The R-squaxed for Median regression is a Pseudo-R square.
OLS Fama M cBeth M edian Regs
Dep. variable Log q Exc value ROA Exc ROA Log q Exc value ROA Exc ROA Log q Exc value ROA Exc ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
H disc*Sales shift -0.295 -0.097 0.013 -0.025 -0.272 -0.087 0.016 -0.021 -0.347 -0.135 -0.001 -0.017
[-7.35] [-2.56] [1.36] [-2.33] [-8.22] [-4.89] [2.70] [-3.73] [-10.7] [-5.91] [-0.22] [-3.48]
High disc, dummy 0.117 -0.008 -0.003 0.012 0.104 -0.014 -0.004 0.013 0.140 0.005 -0.002 0.005
[6.59] [-0.45] [-0.77] [2.75] [7.38] [-1.66] [-1.39] [6.73] [9.88] [0.53] [-0.87] [2.60]
Sales-shift 0.009 -0.045 -0.035 -0.028 0.012 -0.036 -0.032 -0.030 0.008 -0.051 -0.021 -0.013
[0.26] [-1.38] [-4.16] [-3.11] [0.86] [-3.04] [-7.32] [-5.86] [0.25] [-2.37] [-4.43] [-2.77]
Div. dummy -0.048 -0.041 -0.004 0.000 -0.051 -0.041 -0.005 0.001 -0.034 -0.035 -0.004 0.001
[-3.79] [-3.20] [-1.24] [0.076] [-7.27] [-6.69] [-3.14] [0.53] [-3.16] [-4.59] [-2.21] [0.86]
Log assets -0.006 0.002 0.013 0.011 -0.005 0.001 0.012 0.010 -0.005 0.007 0.006 0.004
[-2.20] [0.92] [18.4] [14.4] 1-2.21] [0.91] [9.45] [8.84] [-2.88] [5.26] [20.8] [15.2]
E bit-to-sales 1.233 1.122 1.324 1.230 2.691 2.284
[18.8] [18.7] [14.1] [15.3] [120] [145]
C apex-to-sales 0.239 0.173 -0.017 -0.011 0.236 0.181 -0.011 0.001 0.281 0.178 -0.014 -0.009
[10.8] [9.01] [-3.00] [-1.97] [10.7] [9.12] [-1.51] [0.061] [14.8] [13.4] [-4.88] [-3.14]
D ebt-to-assets -0.453 -0.325 -0.081 -0.081 -0.420 -0.315 -0.087 -0.088 -0.500 -0.321 -0.082 -0.072
[-19.4] [-15.0] [-13.5] [-13.2] [-16.1] [-18.2] [-13.0] [-16.4] [-29.6] [-27.0] [-31.5] [-29.0]
Year dummies yes yes yes yes no no no no yes yes yes yes
Ind. dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539 41,539
R-squared 0.31 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.31 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.04
Robust t sta tistics  in brackets
Table 1.12: Using an alternative measure of non-core diversification
This table presents the robustness tests results of using an alternative way of measuring non-core 
diversification and the unrelatedness between business segments and the core-business. Dependent 
variables are as previously defined in table 3. Fan-Lan measure is computed as follows: F L  =  
5Z(wj  x  (fr )  where Wj is the proportion of the jth secondary segment sales in the total sales of the 
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firm and Cij is the complementary coefficient associated with the pair of industries to which the 
primary segment i  and the secondary segment j  belong. The complementary coefficient is defined 
as Cij =  \[corr{bik,bjk) +  corr(vki, Ufcj)] where bik is the percentage of the output of industry i 
supplied to each intermediate industry k and Vki the dollor value of industry A;’s output required 
to produce 1 dollar’s worth of industry i ’s total output. Fan-Lang*Hdisc dummy is the interaction 
between Fan-Lang measure of diversification described and the high managerial discretion dummy. 
All other independent variables are as defined in Table 1. All the regressions include year dummies. 
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. N is 
the number of non missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Log q Exc value Exc value ROA ROA Exc ROA Exc ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fan-LangH disc dummy -0.102 -0.103 -0.06 -0.061 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
[-1.72] [-1.74] [-0.99] [-1.01] [-0.70] [-0.70] [-0.70] [-0.71]
Fan-Lang measure -0.015 -0.015 -0.033 -0.033 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.008
[-0.46] [-0.45] [-0.95] [-0.93] [1.14] [1.14] [0.74] [0.74]
High disc, dummy 0.021 0.021 -0.019 -0.018 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
[1.26] [1.26] [-1.02] [-1.01] [0.97] [0.97] [1.04] [1.05]
Div. dummy -0.022 -0.029 -0.002 -0.003
[-1.70] [-2.14] [-0.63] [-0.77]
Log assets -0.111 -0.113 -0.111 -0.112 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.014
[-11.9] [-12.1] [-12.2] [-12.4] [3.69] [3.66] [4.48] [4.45]
E bit-to-sales 1.048 1.049 0.875 0.875
[16.9] [16.9] [15.5] [15.5]
C apex-to-sales 0.119 0.119 0.059 0.059 -0.029 -0.029 -0.032 -0.032
[5.56] [5.57] [3.03] [3.04] [-5.54] [-5.54] [-6.03] [-6.03]
D ebt-to-assets -0.215 -0.216 -0.159 -0.160 -0.069 -0.069 -0.056 -0.056
[-7.64] [-7.65] [-5.78] [-5.79] [-7.57] [-7.58] [-6.11] [-6.11]
N 26,509 26,509 26,509 26,509 26,509 26,509 26,509 26,509
Number of firms 5,113 5,113 5,113 5,113 5,113 5,113 5,113 5,113
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Robust t sta tistics in brackets
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Table 1.13: Adjusting q for godwill
This table presents the robustness tests results of using dependent variables adjusted for goodwill. 
Log q adjusted is the log of the ratio between market value of assets and adjusted book value of 
assets. Adjusted book value of assets is assets minus goodwill. Excess-value -  adjusted corresponds 
to the excess-value measure where q is adjusted for goodwill. Assets - adjusted is the book vaue of 
assets minus goodwill. All other independent variables are as defined in Table 1. All the regressions 
include year dummies. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. N is the number of non missing observations.
Dep. variable Log q Ex value Log q Ex value Log q Ex value Log q Ex value
Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sales-shift -0.133 -0.237 -0.004 -0.176
[-1.69] [-2.87] [-0.044] [-1.91]
H disc.*Sales shift -0.314 -0.136
[-2.82] [-1.24]
H discretion 0.167 0.021 0.167 0.0193
[4.68] [0.61] [4.65] [0.56]
Sales-shift 1 -0.193 -0.226 0.145 0.105
[-1.06] [-1.22] [0.44] [0.31]
Sales-shift 2 -0.055 -0.264 0.100 -0.127
[-0.43] [-1.58] [0.56] [-0.43]
Sales-shift 3 -0.231 -0.300 -0.00775 -0.218
[-2.04] [-2.75] [-0.068] [-1.92]
Sales-shift 4 -0.075 -0.193 -0.0263 -0.190
[-0.89] [-2.10] [-0.29] [-1.88]
H disc*Sales shift 1 -0.729 -0.596
[-2.03] [-1.63]
H disc*Sales shift 2 -0.368 -0.280
[-1.45] [-0.88]
H disc*Sales shift 3 -0.409 -0.102
[-2.34] [-0.58]
H disc*Sales shift 4 -0.0725 0.0247
[-0.45] [0.15]
Div. Dummy 0.050 0.054 0.049 0.053 0.052 0.055 0.0483 0.0535
[1.93] [2.01] [1.88] [1.99] [1.69] [1.79] [1.60] [1.76]
Log assets - Adj -0.098 -0.105 -0.098 -0.105 -0.100 -0.111 -0.101 -0.111
[-10.3] [-11.6] [-10.3] [-11.6] [-9.67] [-11.3] [-9.72] [-11.3]
Ebit-to-sales 1.019 0.870 1.018 0.870 1.017 0.885 1.016 0.884
[12.2] [11.6] [12.2] [11.6] [11.0] [10.6] [11.0] [10.6]
Capex-to-sales 0.163 0.091 0.163 0.092 0.155 0.085 0.154 0.0846
[6.10] [3.61] [6.10] [3.61] [5.51] [3.23] [5.50] [3.22]
Debt-to-assets -0.239 -0.158 -0.240 -0.158 -0.248 -0.162 -0.247 -0.161
[-7.97] [-5.45] [-7.98] [-5.46] [-7.51] [-5.07] [-7.49] [-5.05]
N 28,686 28,682 28,686 28,682 24,189 24,187 24,189 24,187
Number of firms 6,364 6,364 6,364 6,364 5,427 5,427 5,427 5,427
R-squared 0.150 0.136 0.150 0.136 0.152 0.144 0.15 0.14
Robust t statistics in brackets
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2 T he Value o f CEO s’ Industry E xpertise - E vidence  
from M ergers 8z A cquisitions
2.1 In trod u ction
There is mounting evidence that CEOs m atter for corporate performance.6 However, 
little is known about the relevance and value of their personal characteristics and skills. 
The exception is a number of recent papers that address the rise on the importance 
of general skills of CEOs.7 By opposition, the literature on mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) is vast, and the heterogeneity in announcement returns is well documented. 
In this paper we study the role of CEO characteristics in the context of M&A. More 
precisely, the paper examines whether industry experience of the acquiring firm’s CEO 
can partly explain the cross-sectional variation in the returns to the shareholders, when 
these companies perform diversifying mergers and acquisitions.
We find tha t CEOs who have work experience in the industry of the target add 
value for their shareholders. The abnormal return to the bidders’ shareholders is 
between 1.1% and 1.3% higher when the CEO has top management experience in the 
target industry. Analyzing potential mechanisms for this effect, we provide evidence 
tha t CEOs with industry experience in the target’s industry are not be tter in creating 
higher synergies but in negotiating more favourable terms. We show th a t experience is 
particularly valuable in environments of high informational asymmetries (1.6% - 2.9%). 
The results suggest tha t certain skills or experience of CEOs are neither completely 
general nor firm-specific but rather specific to  an industry.
The acquisition of a company is an important strategic decisions th a t involves great 
CEO input as the process is complex and non standard to most companies and CEOs. 
First, the company has to define an acquisition strategy by identifying, selecting and 
analyzing potential acquisitions candidates by estimating potentials for synergies and 
evaluating the strategic and organizational fit. Secondly, the company has to design 
a bidding strategy for the target. Thirdly, the acquiring company must integrate the 
new company into the current firm, i.e. it must integrate the asset employees, and 
structure of the new company.
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) find tha t shareholders of the target are, 
on average, the clear winners of a merger.8 The evidence on value creation for share­
holders of the acquiring company is not so clear cut: While some studies find that
6 See for instance Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), Bennedson, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon 
(2008) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003).
7Frydman (2005) documents that modern-day executives have work experience in different sectors 
and that firms hire increasingly from outside their industry. Lazear (2004,2005) and Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2007) report that the educational and professional background of CEOs has become more 
general and less specialized. They define general skills as generic management skills that can easily 
be transferred across firms (and industries).
8 They report 16.0% abnormal return within three days around the merger confirming earlier sum­
mary papers (e.g. Jensen and Ruback (1983) or Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988)).
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shareholders break even, most find slightly negative abnormal returns.9 We study 
whether and how the industry experience of CEOs impacts the performance of di­
versifying mergers and acquisitions. When buying a company, CEOs with relevant 
industry experience might be better at selecting targets, in negotiating with the ta r­
get’s management or in integrating and running the two companies.
We construct a new and unique CEO-firm matched panel th a t allows us to track 
the full employment history of a sample of US firms’ CEOs. In particular, we observe 
whether the CEO of the acquiring company has prior work experience in the target’s 
industry. The final sample consists of 4,844 deals over 1990 - 2007. Conducting a 
short-run event study of acquisition announcements, we find tha t the stock market 
reacts more favourably to diversifying mergers when the acquirer’s CEO has work 
experience in the target’s industry. After controlling for firm and deal characteristics 
and time and industry fixed effects, we find 3-days abnormal announcement returns 
to the acquirer to be higher (1.3%) for CEOs with top management experience in 
the target’s industry. Given an average abnormal return of (0.5%) for diversifying 
acquisitions and an average market value of about US$m 8,000, the effect is large in 
relative as well as in absolute dollar terms.
One key concern is th a t the target industry experience might be correlated with 
more generic managerial skills or other unobserved characteristics, for instance CEO 
talent. However, including manager fixed effects helps us to identify the causal effect 
of industry experience on acquisition performance. Indeed, the fixed effects control for 
unobserved but fixed heterogeneity across CEOs such as generic managerial skills or 
specific talent for performing acquisitions. This is only possible to implement because 
we are able to observe within-CEO variation, i.e. some CEOs acquire multiple firms, 
some in industries in which they have work experience, and others not. The effect 
of experience is higher (3.1%) and statistically significant when including CEO fixed 
effects. In order to identify CEO fixed effects, we run this fixed effects regression 
only for a subsample of CEOs who are doing both diversifying acquisitions with and 
without experience in the target industry. Another concern is the fact that our results 
are driven by skills tha t were acquired in other industries, but not necessarily related 
to the target industry, for instance general CEO skills. In the full sample, we can 
include a proxy for CEO experience across different industries, i.e. for experience in 
other industries, not necessarily in the target industry. Including this proxy to our 
full sample shows tha t our results are driven by specific experience to the target’s 
industry. While the effect of other industry experience is literally zero, the effect of 
experience in the target industry is significant and slightly higher than in our baseline 
analysis (1.6%).
Next, we analyze the potential mechanisms through which industry experience 
operates. First, we test if experienced CEOs are better able to create more synergies
9 Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford report an average three-day abnormal return of -0.7% which is 
not statistically significant.
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by analyzing combined abnormal returns for the subsample of publicly listed targets. 
We calculate the market-cap weighted average of the abnormal returns to acquirer and 
target as a proxy for the value tha t is created or destroyed by the deal. We do not find 
evidence that experienced CEOs create more value in terms of combined returns. The 
effects of experience on the combined abnormal returns is actually negative, though not 
statistically different from zero. The abnormal returns to the acquirer in public target 
deals, on the contrary, are positive and significant, confirming our previous results. 
Together, these findings suggest that experienced CEOs do better when bargaining 
with the target, i.e. they are able to secure a greater fraction of the surplus or they 
are overpaying less.
Furthermore, we analyze this effect across different types of targets. We first 
compare public and private companies. Private companies have to disclose less infor­
mation, and information asymmetries are arguably higher between these companies 
and potential buyers. If experience is valuable we expect it to be relatively more valu­
able in environments of high informational asymmetries. Our findings support this 
hypothesis. Experienced CEOs are able to generate between 2.1% and 2.9% abnormal 
returns compared to non-experienced managers if the target is a private company.
Second, we explore the heterogeneous effects across targets’ industries. Using dif­
ferent proxies for informational asymmetries (R&D expenditures and intangibles) we 
find tha t experience is particularly valuable in industries with high R&D expenditures 
or intangibles (1.7%-1.9%). This supports the view that the return to experience is 
higher when experience is expected to be more important.
Last, we look at high managerial discretion industries.10 Experience should be 
more valuable in industries where firm performance is likely to be more dependent 
on CEO skills and decisions. We therefore, expect industry experience to be more 
valuable when the target is in an industry with high managerial discretion. Using 
different managerial discretion proxies, we find that abnormal returns are between 
1.6% and 2.5% higher when the acquiring CEO is experienced and the target is from 
a high discretion industry. However, interpreting our previous results on the combined 
returns, our finding suggest tha t high managerial discretion industries might be mainly 
a proxy for industries of high informational asymmetries. This interpretation is in line 
with theoretical results of Prendergast (2002) who shows th a t it is optimal to delegate 
responsibilities in uncertain environments.
Most, if not all, studies on the effect of CEOs on corporate decisions suffer from 
endogeneity concerns. CEOs and companies are not matched randomly but CEOs are 
chosen by the board of directors. Indeed, the industry experience of CEOs might be 
a criterion for the appointment of a particular CEO. In the case of acquisitions, one 
concern is that a  firm with acquisition opportunities in a given industry might hire a  
CEO with expertise in th a t industry. In tha t case, the observed abnormal return might
10 In this paper managerial discretion is understood as how much influence executives have on 
organizational outcomes.
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purely originated from the firm’s opportunities, and the effect of the CEO’s industry 
experience might be spurious. Hence, endogenous matching could potentially explain 
our results or at least bias the findings.11 We provide several pieces of evidence th a t it 
is actually the CEO with experience in the target industry who generates the abnormal 
returns.
First, as already discussed, experienced CEOs strike better deals but do not create 
more value. As there are apparently additional no synergies generated by the acquiring 
company, this suggests that it is the CEO herself who is able to negotiate better terms 
due to  her experience. By using a very broad industry classification (Fama-French 12 
industries) to classify diversifying mergers, we try  to minimize the effect of potential 
synergies. Moreover, we take advantage of variation of unobservable synergies in our 
sample. Our argument is based on the assumption tha t conglomerates have higher 
unobservable potentials than focused firms. If selection, i.e. synergies, is driving the 
results and the effect of experience of the CEO is only spurious, we would expect to 
see larger effects for conglomerates (likely to have higher synergies) than for focused 
firms. However, if it is actually the experience of the CEO th a t m atters, the effect is 
expected to  be higher for focused firms where synergies on firm level axe assumed to 
be smaller. We find support for the latter hypothesis: the effect of experienced CEOs 
is stronger for focused firms supporting the view that the effect of experience of the 
CEO on acquisition performance is causal.
Second, experience seems to m atter more where it is more valuable (high vs. low 
discretion, public vs. private target) which is in line with the CEO hypothesis but 
cannot easily supported by selection.
Third, under the selection hypothesis one would expect the transaction to occur 
shortly following the CEO appointm ent.12 However, we do not find tha t the likelihood 
of doing an acquisitions with a CEO who has experience in the target industry is 
higher for more recently hired CEOs. We also find no evidence tha t recently hired 
CEOs outperform CEOs that have been in a company for longer.
Fourth, we exploit the fact th a t mergers occur in waves clustered by industry. We 
use merger waves as quasi-exogenous events triggering acquisitions. The underlying 
assumption is tha t the occurrence of a wave is unexpected by the company and there­
fore, the appointment of the CEO is assumed to be exogenous to the merger.13 The
11 The case of spurious correlation, however, needs strong and, as we argue, unrealistic assumptions 
about the behaviour of a firm. Suppose a company has unobserved growth opportunities towards a 
particular industry and it is planning to acquire a certain company from that industry. Moreover, it 
expects an industry experienced CEO to add value and therefore, it hires an industry expert from 
that particular industry. However, effectively industry experience of CEOs does not matter at all 
for acquisitions and the total observed effect is due to the unobserved growth opportunities of the 
company. In that case, our findings would reflect only a spurious correlation.
12 There is evidence that timing of an acquisition is important: Shleifer and Vishny (2003) build a 
theory of market timing; Moreover, the investor sentiment might be important or the pre-emption of 
potential competitors.
13 We exclude merger waves that are due to deregulation as they are likely to be expected by 
companies.
48
effect of industry experience is positive and higher for acquisitions within a merger 
wave compared to acquisitions outside a wave, providing further evidence th a t it is 
not selection tha t drives our results.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we contribute to research on 
mergers and acquisitions. There is a large number of studies relating abnormal returns 
of bidder and target to firm and deal characteristics. However, except for Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) and Yim (2009), little research has been done on whether the man­
agement of acquiring firms affects the performance of M&As. Malmendier and Tate 
document th a t overconfident CEOs undergo more acquisitions and th a t they perform 
worse on average. Yim shows that young CEOs are more likely to announce acqui­
sitions and perform worse. This might be due to  lower quality of the acquisitions, 
also reflected in a lower likelihood of closing the deals. We contribute to this area by 
showing th a t industry experience of CEOs m atters for the performance of acquisitions. 
Our results might also provide a different explanation for Yim’s findings as on average 
young CEOs axe less experienced than older ones. Moreover, we analyze the mecha­
nism that allows experienced managers to perform better. We provide evidence tha t 
experienced CEOs are not better in creating more synergies but in negotiating better 
terms when bargaining with the target. We show that experience is more valuable 
when it is likely to m atter more, i.e. when informational asymmetries are high and a 
valuation of the target is more difficult. More general, our findings suggest th a t eval­
uation and price finding stage is very im portant for the performance of acquisitions 
and th a t CEOs are important determinants for their success.
Second, the paper adds to the literature whether, and how much CEOs m atter for 
corporate performance (e.g. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Adams, Almeida, and Fer­
reira (2005), Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007), Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), and Graham Li and Qui (2009)). However, with the exception of Bertrand and 
Schoar who look at MBA graduates and Malmendier and Tate who analyze decisions 
of overconfident CEOs, none of these studies tries to specify what characteristics of 
CEOs m atter and how those affect corporate decisions.
Xuan (2009) also analyzes CEOs’ work experience. He shows how the career paths 
of CEOs inside a company m atter for internal capital allocation across divisions. We 
complement these papers by showing that CEOs’ work experience is beneficial for 
some corporate decisions. This reinforces the view that the CEO dimension greatly 
m atters for corporate performance. Moreover, we identify the effect of one particular 
characteristic, namely industry experience.
We also contribute to the current debate on whether CEO jobs place an increasing 
emphasis on general rather than specialized skills. Analyzing the largest publicly 
traded firms in the USA over the last century, Frydman (2007) and Lazear (2004, 
2005) documents an increase of MBA graduates and higher occupational mobility of 
executives which Frydman interprets as evidence for the rise in the importance of 
general management skills. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) also show th a t the fraction
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of MBA graduates among CEOs has increased during the last decades. While our 
finding are not directly contradicting their results, they suggest a more complex view 
on the structure of managerial skills. In particular, CEOs gain experience during their 
career tha t is specific to a certain sector and not transferable across industries. This 
has im portant implications for the understanding of executive compensation or the 
hiring process of CEOs for instance.
Our paper is also related to Cremers and Grinstein (2009). Analyzing CEO re­
placements, they document that managerial talent pools are quite industry-specific 
and often even firm-specific, and tha t they impact compensation structure. Our pa­
per is different in a t least two dimensions. First, while Cremers and Grinstein look 
only at the last position of a new CEO, we consider the full employment history of 
CEOs. This is crucial as it accounts for the fact th a t executives have worked in dif­
ferent companies and industries prior their appointment. For instance, CEOs in our 
sample have worked for 2.6 different companies, in more than 1.6 different industries in 
a top-management position on average.14 Secondly, while Cremers and Grinstein pro­
vide only indirect evidence that industry-specific human capital of CEOs m atters by 
looking at revealed appointment decisions, we show directly how industry experience 
affects firm performance.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and presents de­
scriptive statistics. Section 3 shows the baseline results of our regression analysis. 
In section 4 we analyze heterogeneous effects and investigate potential mechanisms. 
Alternative specifications and robustness checks are analyzed in section 5. Section 6 
concludes.
2.2  D a ta
2.2.1 CEO-firm matched panel
We construct a manager-firm matched panel th a t allows us to observe a CEO’s full 
employment history. Our initial sample is the COMPUSTAT ExecuComp file. The 
Executive Compensation database contains over 2,500 companies. The universe of 
firms covers the S&;P 1,500, including companies th a t were once part of the 1,500 
and companies removed from the index tha t are still trading from 1992 onwards. 
For each firm-year, ExecuComp reports the identity of up to 9 executives and their 
positions, allowing us to identify the current CEO. As ExecuComp keeps track of only 
S&P 1,500 companies, we supplement the data with information from the BoardEx 
database. This database collects information on job-history (including company roles 
and positions), date of birth, and other activities of top executives and non-executives 
in the US and Europe which allows us to track the work experience of CEOs.
14 Considering all positions, CEOs worked for more than 6 companies in more than 3 different 
industries.
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We merge the two datasets by CEO name, company, position/role and year, and 
construct a CEO-firm-year panel. Due to different spellings and abbreviations we 
manually validate the entire panel. To construct measures of experience we are in­
terested in characteristics of previous positions of the CEOs. These characteristics 
include the firm’s industry, the CEO role, and the exact period of each position. To 
identify the firms’ industries, we match the list of CEOs’ past companies with different 
data  sources with information on their lines of business. We obtain information on 
quoted firms from COMPUSTAT and information on private firms from ICARUS.15
2.2.2 M e rg e rs  p a n e l
The M&A data  comes from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum  database. The 
initial sample contains all completed mergers and acquisitions in the US stock market 
over 1990 - 2008. To be included in our final sample, a deal has to meet the following 
criteria:
•  S h ares  A cq u ired . We only include transactions in which the control is trans­
ferred, i.e. a) the share of the acquiror in the target firm has to be below 50\% be­
fore and above 50\% after the transaction (Item PHDA and A_POSTM ERGE- 
_O W N _PC T ). b) alternatively, the acquirer has to buy 50% of the shares out­
standing during the merger process (Item PC TOWN).
• A b so lu te  T ra n sa c tio n s  Size. Following Harford (2005) the transaction value 
of the merger has to be at least US$50M (Item VAL).
•  R eg ion . The acquiror and the target firm are both  US corporations and the 
acquiror is listed on the US stock exchanges. We exclude international (Item 
MATYPE IMA) and overseas mergers (Item MATYPE OMA).
• P r ic e  A n d  A cc o u n tin g  D a ta . The stock price and accounting data  must be 
available in CRSP (Center for research in security prices) and in COMPUSTAT 
in the year before the merger.
We supplement the data  with financial items from the COMPUSTAT database.16 
We classify a merger to be diversifying (dummy 0-1) if acquiror and target differ in 
their Fama-French 12-Industries (FF12) classification. Using this broad classification 
ensures tha t industries of diversifying mergers are unrelated.
15 Sometimes company names are spelled differently in the datasets or the company in the BoardEx 
database refers to  a subsidiary or a financial shell of the company. A simple example is ’Microsoft Corp’ 
and ’Microsoft Inc’. Therefore, we 1) use a string-search matching algorithm, and 2) manually verify 
every single match. Companies that we could not match by this routine are manually researched using 
COMPUSTAT, ICARUS, and online data resources (mainly www.manta.com and www.alacra.com).
16 See data appendix for the definition of all variables.
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Following Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), a transaction is defined to be a ’’stock 
deal" (dummy 0-1) if the acquiror pays a positive fraction of the transaction value 
with its stocks; if the transaction is 100% paid with cash we set the "all cash" dummy 
equal to 1. Public target, private target and subsidiary target are dummies tha t 
classify the public status of the target company. In order to include an intercept we 
choose subsidiary targets as our base category in the regression analysis. We measure 
the relative size of acquiror and target as the ratio of the deal value to the market 
capitalization of the acquiror.17
Finally, we measure the age (in years) of the CEO at the announcement of the 
merger and her tenure in the current company (in years).
The key explaining variable in our study is industry-specific experience. We are 
interested in the impact of CEOs’ industry-specific experience on the performance of 
diversifying mergers and acquisitions. We define a measure of industry experience as 
follows: for a  given deal and a given target’s industry we consider a  manager as having 
experience in the target’s industry if he worked in the same Fama-French-12 industry 
before joining the acquiring firm. This measure includes all roles and positions. We 
set a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has worked in a t least one company in th a t 
industry. We refine this measure by defining a measure of top level experience tha t 
is equal to  1 if the CEO has worked in at least one company in the target’s industry 
as a top manager. Top manager positions/roles include CEO, CFO, COO, Chairman, 
President, Division CEO, Division CFO, Division Chairman, Division COO, Division 
President, Head of Division, Regional CEO, Regional CFO, Regional President. We 
expect top experience to  m atter more, as non-top level experience might also include 
positions th a t are unrelated with a firm’s business line (e.g. being a web programmer 
in the automotive industry) or positions tha t do not allow to obtain industry specific 
skills and/or knowledge.
We use the Fama-French 3-factor model as the return-generating process to es­
tim ate cumulative abnormal returns CAR. We estimate the model over a 255 day 
estimation window ending 21 days prior to  the announcement date, using the CRSP 
value-weighted index as our market proxy. In most specifications we report the CARs 
to the acquiring firm’s stock over a symmetric three-day window around the announce­
ments. We also analyze a longer event windows (eleven-days) considering potential 
information leakage.
2.2.3 D escriptive Statistics
After combining the CEO-company panel with the deal sample we obtain a final data  
sample of 4,844 mergers between 1990 and 2007. The mergers and acquisitions are 
conducted by 1,854 different CEOs. As we see in table 2.1 the average number of
17 A large fraction of the targets is private and data on market value are not available.
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deals per CEO is 2.61, with a median of 2. This means that we observe most CEOs 
doing multiple acquisitions. The key variables in our analysis axe different measures of 
experience. An average CEO has worked in 6.60 companies. Including only top level 
experience an average CEO had 2.61 different CEO had top positions in companies 
before joining the acquiring company. Analyzing the industry experience of CEOs, we 
find tha t on average a CEO worked in 3.15 different industries (using the Fama-French 
12 classification) while he was in only 1.67 different industries at top level positions. 
On average a CEO is 62 years old (as of today) and male (more than  98%).
Table 2.2 shows some descriptive deal statistics. Panel A presents the allocation 
of deals across time and type (diversifying vs. non-diversifying). The fraction of non­
diversifying and diversifying mergers remains quite stable over the years (about 75% 
non-diversifying and 25% diversifying). Panel B presents summary statistics on the 
deal specific characteristics. In most cases the relative size of the target is smaller than 
9% of the acquiror’s size measured as market capitalization (about 24% on average). 
The types of the targets are public, private, and subsidiaries with about equal pro­
portion. About 40% of the bids are considered to be stock deals, i.e. payments where 
some equity was used to pay of the target. About one third (30%) of the deals were 
exclusively paid in cash. Panel C identifies the fraction of diversifying mergers where 
the CEO had experience in the target’s industry. About 35% of the CEOs worked in 
the industry of the target before joining the acquiring company. Only considering top 
level positions the fraction of experienced CEOs reduces to 16.5%.
Table 2.3 presents means and medians for corporate financial information. Panel 
A shows the corporate financial variables of the acquiror. The last two columns 
present equivalent summary statistics for the whole COMPUSTAT universe between 
1990 and 2005 for comparison. As our initial sample (ExecuComp) covers only the 
biggest 1,500 US firms, the acquiring firms in our sample are indeed much larger in 
terms of book value of assets and market capitalization (12,560 and 7,147 on average) 
than the average COMPUSTAT company (1,303 and 1,376).18 Cash and debt ratios 
are similar for acquiring firms and the full COMPUSTAT sample. On average, the 
acquiror’s cash flow profitability is almost 50% higher than the average COMPUSTAT 
cash flow profitability (0.35 compared to 0.26). The bidder has a higher Tobin’s q 
(2.48 compared to 2.11) than  the COMPUSTAT average and therefore more valuable 
growth opportunities. Panel B presents the merger activity of the firms in our sample 
in the period between 1990 and 2007. More than half of the firms bought 2 or more 
companies (with an average of 3.37 deals per company).
Table 2.4 compares key variables across different subsamples. In columns (2)- 
(6) the sample is split between non-diversifying and diversifying acquisitions, while 
columns (7 )-(ll) present diversifying acquisitions with and without top-level experi­
ence of the CEO in the target’s industry. The averages of most variables are sta­
tistically different for diversifying and non-diversifying transactions. Exceptions are
18 Both measures are in Mio. US$
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leverage, free cash flow, relative deal size and tenure of the CEO. Analyzing diversify­
ing acquisitions with and without top-level experience shows th a t experienced CEOs 
perform better on average (0.012 vs 0.004) though the CARs are only weakly sta­
tistically different from each other (at 10% level). Most of the control variables are 
not statistically distinguishable for the two groups. Exceptions are the performance 
measure, stock payment, the relative deal size and the tenure of the CEO. bidders of 
CEOs th a t are experienced in the target’s industry tend to  have a lower profitability 
(0.291 vs. 0.359). They tend to  use more stockpayment (36.9% vs. 29.2%) and the 
targets are relatively larger (33.1% vs. 19.0%). In addition, the CEOs’ tenure on the 
current position is shorter (5.85 years vs. 14.84 years).
2.2.4 Empirical M ethodology and Variable Construction
We propose to estimate the following regression equation:
C ARijjji —  Qij - t -  a^ExpTAi  ♦ divm  -I- ot^divui 4- oc -^Xfn -f- ot^Yj -I- ocqZ  ^ -I- Sijm^ (^*1)
C A R ijm stands for the cumulative abnormal returns of merger m  conducted by 
CEO i while working for company j .  The dummy div is equal to 1 if the transaction 
is diversifying and E x p T A  is the measure of experience in the target’s industry de­
fined above. Note tha t by definition, E xpT a  is only defined for diversifying mergers. 
Therefore, we only include E xpT a  for diversifying mergers in our regression equation, 
i.e. we interact it with the dummy for diversifying acquisitions. The variables X ,Y ,Z  
are deal, company, and CEO related controls respectively, tha t have been used in 
cross sectional merger analyses. The set of controls X  includes the relative size of 
acquiror and target, the method of payment, and the type of the target. Firm  specific 
characteristics Y  control for the size of the acquiror, Tobin’s Q, free cash flow, lever­
age, and profitability. As experience will be correlated with age, we also control, as 
suggested by the empirical literature on wages, for age and age squared as well as for 
tenure and tenure squared in the set of variables Z . Harford (2005) shows tha t merg­
ers occur in waves and are clustered within industries. Therefore, we include year, 
industry and year-industry dummies in all of our specifications. Finally, we account 
for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns by allowing for clustering at the level 
of the announcement date.
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term  between diversifying mergers 
and experience. If industry-specific skills in the target’s industry are beneficial for 
diversifying mergers, we expect the coefficient to be positive.
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2.3  D o  ex p er ien ced  C E O s perform  b etter?
2.3.1 Baseline results
Column (1) of table 2.5 estimates the model including only year-industry dummies as 
controls. Having a CEO who has worked in the target’s industry in a top management 
position leads to  1.1% higher abnormal returns on average compared to a CEO not 
experienced in the target’s industry. The coefficient of the experience-diversifying 
interacted term  is significant at a 10% level. The coefficient on diversifying is not 
distinguishable from zero. In specification (2) we repeat this exercise by including 
further controls. The effect of experience is slightly higher 1.3% and significant at a 
5% level. The controls in the cross-sectional analysis have the expected signs but most 
of them are not significantly different from zero (confirming earlier studies). The three 
consistently significant controls are the type of payment, size, leverage and having a 
publicly listed target. Paying with equity and being big are, on average, viewed 
less favourably by the market. These results are consistent with previous empirical 
studies.19
2.3.2 Unobserved CEO characteristics
As the treatm ent, i.e. experience in a  specific industry, is not randomly assigned, 
the concern is th a t selection biases our results. The observed performance difference 
between acquisitions of CEOs with and without experience can be decomposed into 
the "average treatm ent effect on the treated" plus the "selection bias". In our concrete 
case, industry-specific experience may be merely a proxy for more generic managerial 
skills or other unobserved characteristics tha t axe driving our results. However, our 
setup allows us to observe within-CEO variation, i.e. some CEOs undergo multiple 
acquisitions, some with and some without industry experience. Therefore, we can 
include manager fixed effects controlling for fixed unobserved heterogeneity across 
CEOs like generic managerial skills, talent for performing acquisitions or structuring 
deals. Moreover, we also proxy for inter-industry experience in our analysis controlling 
directly for generic management skills.
In order to absorb unobserved CEO characteristics th a t might be correlated with 
experience we estimate a model where CEO-specific affects fe i  measure unobserved 
CEO heterogeneity:
C A R i j m  —  - (-  O l ' z E x ' p T A i  ♦  d i V m  - (-  O i ^ d t V j j i  -I- C X ^ X f n  - | -  O t § Y j  - | -  Q L § Z i  f  €■{ - } - E i j m i
19Shleifer and Vishny (2003) build a model where overvalued bidders lock in real assets which is 
empirically tested by Ang and Chen (2006). Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) find that small 
companies outperform large ones in mergers.
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Note tha t the CEO related variables in Z, namely age at the day of the announce­
ment and tenure inside the current firm, are time-varying and therefore not dropped 
in this estimation. We restrict our sample to CEOs who conducted at least two di­
versifying acquisitions. Further we require that the CEOs are experienced in one of 
the acquisitions and he does not have experience on the other one. Applying these 
filters leads to a sample of 470 acquisitions conducted by 213 different CEOs. Table 
2.6 presents the results of our regression analysis. The effect of having top-level expe­
rience is much higher (3.1%) and significant at a 5% level. The results provide further 
confidence in a causal interpretation of our findings as they support the view that 
the results are not driven by unobserved CEO characterstics like generic management 
skills or talent for performing acquisitions that are corellated with industry-specific 
experience.
2.3.3 General skills (industries)
We can not include CEO fixed effects to our analysis of the full sample, we can, how­
ever, control for general managerial experience. The positive effects of experience in 
the target’s industry may merely be capturing the effect of having work experience in 
any different industry on general management experience. Being experienced in the 
target’s industry in a  diversifying merger necessarily means th a t the CEO has worked 
in at least two different industries (including the current one). It might be possible 
tha t managers who have worked in different industries are simply better at diversi­
fying acquisitions. Skills needed for successfully diversifying might be more general,
i.e. more related to general cross-industry skills and not necessarily directly related 
to the industry of the target. In order to discriminate between the benefits of experi­
ence related to the targe t’s industry and general experience in different industries, we 
estimate two alternative models: First, we analyze whether experience in any other 
industry has a similar positive impact on abnormal returns for acquiring shareholders. 
In a second step we include experience in any other industry in our original regression 
as further control and check whether the expected effects of the experience in target ’s 
industry variable are still present. Table 2.7 presents the results. Column (1) shows 
the sole effect of having top-level experience in any other industries (not necessarily 
in the target’s industry) when performing a diversifying merger. The effect is small 
in absolute terms and it is statistically not distinguishable from zero. This means 
that work experience in different industries that are unrelated to the target industry 
cannot explain superior abnormal returns. In specification (2) we add the variable top 
experience in the targe t’s industry as further controls. The effect of having experience 
in the target’s industry on the acquisition performance is still large and consistent 
with the previous results. The average abnormal return of a CEO having experience 
in the target’s industry compared to a CEO who is generally experienced in different
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industries is 1.6%. The effect is significant at a 5% level. Overall, these results sug­
gest tha t it is experience in the particular industry of the target th a t m atters for the 
performance and not more general cross-industry experience.
2.3.4 General skills (companies)
An experienced manager is defined as a manager who has worked in the target’s 
industry in the past. This implies that all experienced managers have work experi­
ence in at least two different companies. Therefore, one could argue tha t it is not 
industry-specific experience tha t is driving abnormal returns but more general man­
agerial experience. To address this issue we run additional tests. First, we define an 
experienced manager as someone who has worked in a different company in the past 
(irrespective of the industry), considering all kinds of positions. Then, we run the 
models with our main variable of interest: experience in the target’s industry con­
trolling for experience in any other company as well. Table 2.7 shows these results. 
Column (3) presents the results of the model using experience in any other company, 
irrespective of the industry. We find no evidence that working for other companies 
in the past helps to generate abnormal returns for the acquirer. Column (4) shows 
the results for top experience in the target’s industry as a control. Similarly to  our 
main specification, industry experience increases cumulative abnormal returns around 
the merger announcement by approximately 1.3%. The coefficients are precisely esti­
mated (at a 5% level) and are similar to the effects of controlling for general industry 
experience.
2.4  H eterogen ou s E ffects - P o ten tia l C hannels
By exploring heterogeneous effects in our results, we aim, on hand hand, to  shed some 
light on the channels th a t allow experienced CEOs to perform better in diversifying 
mergers and, on the other hand, to strengthen our confidence tha t it is not selection 
tha t is driving the results.20
Experience might m atter at different stages of an acquisition process: W hen select­
ing targets, implementing the deal or integrating and running the companies. We also 
expect the return to  experience to depend on the relative importance of experience. 
In the following sections, we show th a t experience is particularly valuable in environ­
ments of high informational asymmetry or of high managerial discretion. Moreover, 
we provide evidence th a t experienced CEOs do not create a higher surplus. We then 
discuss our findings relating to theory. We interpret these results as weak evidence 
in favor of the hypothesis th a t experienced CEOs are able to negotiate better terms 
when bargaining with the target due to lower informational asymmetries.
20See section 2.5 for a detailed discussion on selection.
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2.4.1 Public Status
One source for information asymmetries is the public status of the target. We dif­
ferentiate between three different types of targets: publicly listed companies, private 
companies, and subsidiaries. Private companies have to disclose less information, and 
information asymmetries are arguably higher between these companies and potential 
buyers. If industry-specific experience is valuable, we expect experience to be rela­
tively more im portant in environments of high informational asymmetries. This is 
supported by our findings in table 2.8. Column (1) shows th a t experienced CEOs 
are able to generate 2.9% abnormal returns compared to non-experienced managers 
if the target is a private company. The effects of experience axe positve but smaller 
and statistically not different from zero for public and subsidiary targets, suggesting 
th a t the advantage of experience is smaller (or even not existent) when information is 
easily accessable and available.
2.4.2 M anagerial D iscretion
Next, we are interested in whether we find heterogeneous results among industries. 
Having experience in the target’s industry should m atter more in industries where 
managerial discretion is high. Following Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), we use 
an industry index of managerial discretion developed by Hambrick and Abrahamson 
(1995) aimed to measure how much influence executives have on organizational out­
comes.21 For instance, according to the index, computers are considered to be an 
industry of high managerial discretion while natural gas distribution is classified as 
a low managerial discretion industry. The index classifies the 17 industries a t the 
4-digit SIC code level. However, in order to minimize missing values for firms which 
SIC codes are not covered by this rating, we average the discretion score at Fama- 
French-12 level, in the same way as in Adams et al. (2005). Then we classify the 
industry of the target according to this index when available. We obtain a discretion 
score for about 70% of our observations. We then split the sample along the median 
value of the discretion index in our sample. Column (2) of table 2.8 presents results 
for the high-discretion industry and low-discretion industry group. For high-discretion 
targets the coefficient of managerial industry experience on the performance is 2.0%. 
The effect of having experience in the target’s industry is not distinguishable from 
zero if the target is from a low-discretion industry. The results suggest th a t CEOs
21 This index relies on the theoretical formulation of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) who specify 
seven industry-level factors that determine managerial discretion: product differentiability, market 
growth, industry structure, demand instability, quasi-legal constraints, powerful outside forces and 
capital intensity. Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) index corresponds to a panel rating of managerial 
discretion by academics for 17 industries. Then, they examine the association between this rating 
and the determinants of discretion proposed by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) and conclude for 
the validity of the index.
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are im portant in industries where experience is more valuable. On the other hand, 
if CEO skills are not a significant determinant of firm performance, then the lack of 
industry-specifc skills do not hurt the performance of the acquisition.
As an alternative measure for managerial discretion we use the distribution of man­
agers’ fixed effects of a firm performance regression as explained in detail in Metzger 
(2009): Employing the full BoardEx sample of CEOs of COMPUSTAT companies 
between 1980 and 2007 we construct a firm-CEO-year panel. We then run a sim­
ilar regression as Bertrand and Schoar (2003), namely regressing return on assets 
on company size and year dummies, including firm and CEO fixed effects. We can 
only identify the fixed effects for managers who we observe in a t least two different 
companies; we keep the fixed effects and their standard errors. We then restrict our 
sample to fixed effects of managers who only worked in one industry as a CEO and 
calculate the standard deviation of the fixed effects per Fama-French-12 industry.22 
As a robustness check we weight the standard deviation by the standard errors of 
the individual fixed effects giving less weight to less precisely estimated fixed effects. 
The standard deviation of the CEO fixed effects tells us how different the impact of 
different CEOs on performance is in a particular industry. We split the industries 
along the median value of the standard deviations of managers’ fixed effects in high 
and low discretion industries. Column (3) of table 2.8 reports the results of the re­
gression analysis which largely confirm the results of the previous discretion measure 
of Hambrick and Abrahamson. The effect of experience is large and positive for high 
discretion targets. Experienced CEOs are able to generate 1.6% abnormal returns. 
When the target is coming from a low discretion industry the coefficients are very 
small and not distinguishable from zero.
2.4.3 R&D intensive industries and intangibles
We also employ additional proxies for information asymmetries between the target 
and potential buyers. In columns (4) and (5) of table 2.8 we split the industries of 
the target along high vs. low R&D and high vs. low intangibles industries. We 
calculate the average R&D expenditures and intangibles across industries over the full 
horizon (1990-2007) of our sample and split the industries along the median in high 
and low R&D intangible industries. Confirming the results from our previous analysis 
(public status of the target and the managerial discretion), experienced CEOs are able 
to generate large and postive CARs if the target is from an industry with arguable 
higher informational asymmetries. The effects are about 1.9% and 1.7% for high R&D 
and high intangibles industry targets; the effects are smaller and not distinguishable 
from zero for targets from industries with lower informational asymmetries.
2 2 The restriction is necessary as otherwise we can not allocate the fixed effect to a particular industry 
if the CEO worked in more than one industry.
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2.4.4 C om bined R e tu rn s
About one th ird  of the targets in our sample are publicly listed companies. This allows 
us to analyze the effect of experience on both the acquirers’ as well as the targets’ 
returns. We collect prices and data  on the market capitalization of the target from 
CRSP. We obtain the announcement return (CAR) on the combined companies by 
calculating the market-cap weighted average of the individual announcement returns 
of acquirer and target. The combined CAR can be interpreted as a measure for the 
surplus created by the acquisition. We then run similar regressions as before where we 
regress the CARs of the acquirer, of the target, and of the combined company on the 
experience of the CEO and further controls. Table 2.9 presents the results. As we are 
restricting our sample to public targets only, we first want to ensure tha t our sample 
is comparable to the full sample. Column (2) shows tha t the returns to the acquirer 
are very similar if the CEO has top-management experience (2.0%). The dummy 
whether an acquisitions is diversifying or not for the combined company in column
(1) is large and negative (-2.2%). This supports the view th a t diversifying mergers 
and acquisitions are creating less surplus on average. Interestingly, we do not find 
evidence th a t experience CEOs are better in creating surplus. The effect of industry- 
experience on the combined return is actually negative. However, the coefficient is 
statistically not distinguishable from zero.
2.4.5 D iscussion
W hen buying a company, relevant industry experience of a CEO may add value in 
different ways.
1. T a rg e t’s se lec tion : In the selection process of a potential target, an experi­
enced CEO might have a superior overview on the market environment; for ex­
ample competitors, customers, and suppliers. Moreover, industry-specific knowl­
edge of the financial statements, being im portant inputs to the decision making 
process, might be important.
2. N e g o tia tio n : When bargaining with the target, experience might be also an 
im portant determinant of success. Having access to better information or being 
an industry expert might help when negotiating with the target. Given that 
an acquisition is an asymmetric information scenario, where one party has an 
informational advantage, the informed party ’s (the target) self-interest is served 
by deceiving the uninformed party (the acquiror) into believing that the available 
surplus is smaller than it really is. Moreover, the level of experience might affect 
the bargaining power of both parties.
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3. In te g ra tio n : Experience might be beneficial in the post-deal stage when inte­
grating and running the two companies. This is particularly true if the organiza­
tional design and the operations are very specific to each of the industries. The 
knowledge of both  industries might alleviate this complexity and facilitate the 
coordination of the two organizational designs. Moreover, experience in the ta r­
get’s industry might be beneficial for running the company in case management 
is partly industry specific.
Hypotheses 1 (selection) and 3 (integration) imply that experienced CEOs generate 
higher surplus. On the contrary, the implication of hypothesis 2 (bargaining) is th a t 
experienced CEOs are able to lock a bigger fraction of the surplus. In general, these 
effects are not mutually exclusive, i.e. it is possible tha t experienced CEOs increase 
the surplus and, at the same time, negotiate better terms. However, by analyzing the 
combined return  to bidder and target, we do not find evidence tha t experienced CEOs 
are better in creating surplus as we do not find a positive effect of experience on the 
combined abnormal return. This is suggesting th a t the positive abnormal returns for 
the bidders are created during the bargaining process.
Our results relate to  findings by Mantecon (2008) and Eckbo and Langohr (1989) 
who show th a t information asymmetries between the target and the market affect 
the return  to  bidders’ and targets’ shareholders. Mantecon argues tha t information 
asymmetries lead to less competition, i.e. to  a reduced pool of potential buyers, 
and ultimately, weakens the bargaining power of the target. This is consistent with 
Bradley, Desai, and Han (1988) who show th a t competition among bidding firms 
increases the returns to targets and decreases the returns to bidders. Eckbo and 
Langohr (1989) claim th a t the success from acquisition activity depend on whether 
the bidder’s initial information advantage can be maintained throughout the process, 
providing some evidence from changes to  public disclosure rules in France, tha t might, 
by revealing information in the initial offer, stimulate competing bids.
Our results are consistent with these findings. We do not find evidence tha t expe­
rienced CEOs create more surplus, suggesting th a t the positive returns for the bidders 
are created when bargaining with the target. By analyzing heterogeneous effects, we 
find the effect of having experience to  be higher for private targets or for targets from 
high managerial discretion industries supporting the view th a t informational asym­
metries m atter.23 However, our interpretation heavily relies on the observation th a t 
experienced CEOs are not better in creating a higher surplus. A shortfall of our da ta  
is th a t we can only get a  proxy for the surplus for one third of our observations (for the 
public targets) and it is not clear if the findings generalize to  all deals. Moreover, our 
estimate for the effect of experience on the combined return  is, though not positive, 
not very precisely estimated.
23Prendergast (2002) shows that uncertain environments optimally lead to more delegation.
61
2.5  Id en tification  C oncerns and R ob u stn ess T ests
2.5 .1  S e lec tio n
While our results are consistent with the hypothesis tha t industry experience is bene­
ficial while diversifying via acquisition, a key concern is th a t selection or endogeneity 
is driving our results.
Selection emerges from the fact tha t CEOs and companies are not matched ran­
domly but CEOs are chosen by the board of directors. Industry experience of CEOs 
might be a selection criterion of the board for the appointment of a particular CEO. 
In the present case, one may be concerned about the following scenario: Given a com­
pany has (to us) unobserved opportunities towards a certain industry and therefore, 
intends to buy a company in tha t particular industry, the board might hire an indus­
try  expert for doing the acquisition. Hence, endogenous matching could potentially 
explain our results or, at least, bias the findings.
The case of a spurious correlation, however, needs strong and, as we argue, unre­
alistic assumptions about the behavior of a firm. Suppose a company has unobserved 
opportunities towards a particular industry and it is planning to  acquire a certain 
company from that industry. In addition, it expects an industry experienced CEO to 
add value and therefore, hires an industry expert from th a t particular industry. How­
ever, effectively industry experience of CEOs do not m atter at all for acquisitions and 
the to tal observed effect arises only from unobserved opportunities at the company 
level. In th a t case, our findings would reflect only a spurious correlation.
In what follows we provide several pieces of evidence suggesting tha t it is not 
selection tha t is driving our results and supporting the view th a t the positive impact 
of industry experience on acquisition performance is causal.
M e rg e r  W aves Previous research by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford 
(2005) shows that mergers and acquisitions occur in waves and within a wave they 
strongly cluster by industry. These waves might be triggered by technological inno­
vation or by supply shocks for instance. Assuming th a t these shocks and the need to 
acquire are less likely to be foreseen by the board of directors when appointing a new 
CEO, we build a subsample of mergers where the bidder comes from an industry tha t 
is hit by a merger wave at the date of the announcement. We define an acquisition be­
ing part of a merger wave if the announcement date of the merger is between 6 months 
before and 6 months after the date of a merger wave and the industry of the bidder 
corresponds to the affected industry (as identified by Harford (2005)). We further 
exclude waves that are due to  deregulation as these waves are likely to be expected by 
the firms. By applying this definition we identify 677 mergers th a t are involved in a 
merger wave. Table 2.10 presents the results. Experience of the CEOs is positive and 
significant (at a 10% level) for top-level experience within and outside merger waves
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supporting the view th a t it is not selection tha t is driving our results. Moreover, the 
effects are stronger within a wave (2.4% vs. 1.1%) suggesting th a t experience is more 
valuable in unexpected situations.
T im in g  o f E x p e r ie n c e d  A cq u is itio n s  If a company is planning to buy a particu­
lar company in a certain industry and therefore, hires an experienced CEO to conduct 
the acquisition, we would expect to  observe this announcement shortly after the ap­
pointment. We therefore estimate the probability of making a diversified acquisitions 
and having an experienced CEO as a function of the CEO tenure. The dependent 
variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the CEO has previous experience in the 
target’s industry. Our covariates consist of a set of dummy variables for different years 
of tenure of the CEO. If companies appoint experienced CEOs in order to execute ac­
quisition for them  we would expect to observe higher coefficients on the dummies that 
stand for recent hires. We use OLS as well as probit estimation. Column (1) and
(2) of table 2.11 present the results using OLS and Probit respectively. There is no 
monotonic relationship between the probability of observing an experienced acquisi­
tion and the appointment of the experienced CEO. These findings are supportive of 
the view th a t industry-experience in connection with acquisitions considerations play, 
if any, a rather minor role when appointing a CEO.
T im in g  a n d  R e tu rn s  As a further robustness check we analyze the returns directly. 
If selection is driving the results we would expect th a t the positive abnormal returns 
to be generated by recently appointed CEOs. We therefore interact the experience 
measure with dummies reflecting the relative year of the appointment. Table 2.12 
shows th a t there is no monotonic relationship between the appointment of experienced 
CEOs and abnormal returns. When precisely estimated, the returns are positive and 
at similar levels (between 2.7% and 3.9% for CEOs appointed 3,6, or 8 years before 
the acquisition). The coefficients in the other years are not statistically different from 
zero. Overall, the findings suggest tha t selection can not explain the positive returns 
of experienced CEOs which reinforces the view th a t industry experience is actually 
generating them.
A d d itio n a l E v id en ce  from  p rev io u s  A naly sis  The results of the previous sec­
tion 4 are further evidence for allowing a causal interpretion of the positive effect of 
industry-specific experience on announcement returns. W hen analyzing the combined 
abnormal returns for public targets, we do not find evidence th a t experienced CEOs 
are better in creating synergies. As the effect of experience on abnormal returns of the 
acquiring company is positive, our results suggest th a t experienced CEOs are better 
in negotiating terms tha t are favorable to the shareholders of the acquiring company.
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Moreover, when analyzing heterogeneous effects across industries or public status of 
the target we provide further evidence th a t the observed effects are generated by the 
CEOs rather than  by selection. Overall, our findings suggest th a t experience m atters 
more where it is more valuable (high vs. low discretion, public vs. non-public target) 
which is in line w ith the CEO hypothesis but can not easily supported by selection.
2 .5 .2  R o b u s tn e ss  T ests
A ll a n d  L ow -R an k ed  e x p e rien c e  Managers might have better opportunities to 
accumulate industry specific skills and knowledge in higher level positions. A possible 
explanation is a better access to  information and different (e.g. more strategic) tasks 
tha t are involved in high positions. In table 2.13 we analyze broader measures of ex­
perience. In specification (1) we consider all previous positions in the target industry 
irrespective of the level. As expected the effect is smaller (1.0%) though still signifi­
cant. Moreover, we run a placebo test where we analyze the impact of experience that 
is likely to  be unrelated with the industry in the firm. Examples are low-ranked jobs 
like office workers or interns as well as non-business positions (e.g. web programmer 
working for a car maker). Experience th a t is unrelated to the business or of a lower 
level of decision power or information access does not help to perform better when 
acquiring a new segment. The effect is 0.4% and not distinguishable from zero. How­
ever, we might also capture only a time effect as most of the low-ranked experience 
probably comes from the early stage of the career (see our alternative measure of 
experience that accounts for the recency of the experience). In this setting we are not 
able to differentiate these two effects.
R ecen cy  o f e x p e rie n c e  As industries (e.g. due to technological changes or due 
to changes in the market) change over time it is interesting to analyze how the value 
of experience changes with the recency of the experience. Therefore, we look a t two 
alternative measures of experience tha t incorporate a time component. First, we con­
sider an experience to  be "recent" if it was gained within the last 10 years before the 
announcement of the merger, and to be "old" if it is older than  10 years. Second, 
we refine this measure by sub-classifying the recent experience into experience gained 
within the last 5 years and experience gained between 6 and 10 years before the an­
nouncement of the acquisition. Table 2.14 reports the results. Column (1) and (2) 
show the effect of top-level experience for the two alternative measures. The results 
suggest tha t experience diminishes over time and only rather recently gained expe­
rience helps to perform better when diversifying. The first specification shows very 
strong and statistically effects of having experience (2.0%) tha t was gained within the 
last 10 years before. The coefficient of old experience is small and not distinguishable 
from zero. Analyzing the finer measure of recency in specification (2) shows similar
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results. The recent experience m atters more; the impact peaks for experience th a t 
was gained between 5 and 10 years ago. However, the two coefficients of the recent 
experience are not statistically distinguishable from each other.
E x c lu sio n  o f  c o n g lo m e ra te s  Some companies are multi-segment firms, i.e. oper­
ating in different industries. In our previous specifications we only consider the biggest 
segment of the acquiring firm when defining their industry. A concern might be tha t 
our results axe purely driven by companies that have large secondary segments in the 
industry of the target, i.e. the mergers axe not really diversifying and the positive 
effect of experience of the CEO is actually driven by potential synergies for instance. 
We therefore restrict our sample to firms tha t report either only one business seg­
ment (according to COMPUSTAT segments) or where the largest business segment 
is accountable for a t least 90% of the sales. In column (1) of table 2.15 only single 
segment firms are considered. The effect of experience is still positive and even higher 
than  compared to our baseline specification (3.7%). The results for companies with 
the largest segement accounting for at least 90% of the sales (column (2)) axe simi­
lar, though a bit smaller (3.2%) and not distinguishable from zero when considering 
all levels of experience. Overall, the results seem to suggest tha t experience is more 
valueable when specialised firms diversify.
D iversify ing  on ly  By looking at diversifying acquisitions only we allow the covari­
ates to have different slope coefficients for diversifying and non-diversifying acquis- 
tions. The restriction leads to  a sample of 1,189 acquistions. We then replicate our 
analysis by regressing abnormal returns on the industry experience of the CEO and 
firm and deal characteristics as well as year and industry fixed effects. The results in 
table 2.16 support our previous findings: CEOs who have experience in the industry 
of the target do better on average. Experienced CEOs axe able to generate 1.0% ab­
normal return if they worked in the industry of the target. This effect is significant 
at a 5% level. The finding shows tha t the results also hold for the smaller sample. 
However, the bigger sample helps to estimate the other coefficients leading to more 
precise estimates.
A lte rn a tiv e  E v en t W in d o w  In our previous specifications we use a 3 days event 
window to compute cumulative abnormal returns around the deal’s announcement: 
from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day after. We test for the robustness of 
previous results using an alternative event window: from 5 days before the announce­
ment until 5 days after. This approach allows us to  account for possible information 
leakage regarding the acquisition before the public announcement. If this is the case,
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part of the abnormal returns driven by the event would be realized before the an­
nouncement. The result is shown in table 2.17. The effect of top management expe­
rience, confirming our previous, is larger (1.3%) and significant. Overall, the result 
is consistent with our previous results though they are a bit weaker. However, by in­
creasing the length of the event window we also increase the likelihood that unrelated 
events to the merger are affecting abnormal returns.
2.6  C onclusion
This paper examines the effect of industry-specific human capital of CEOs on the per­
formance of diversifying mergers and acquisitions. We use a new and unique dataset 
tha t tracks the complete employment history of CEOs allowing us to construct a mea­
sure of industry-specific experience. Conducting a short-run event study of acquisition 
announcements, we find th a t the stock market reacts more favorable to diversifying 
mergers when the acquiring CEO has prior work experience in the target’s industry. 
The results suggest industry-specific experience is an im portant determinant of success 
of diversifying acquisitions. The effect of industry-specific experience is particularly 
pronounced if the CEO has top management experience.
In addition, we quantify the relative importance of this experience and we find 
evidence that experience is more valuable if the target is from an industry of high 
managerial discretion or it is a private company. Exploring potential mechanisms, we 
find th a t experienced CEOs are more likely to add value by negotiating better terms 
for the existing shareholders and th a t the value is larger in environments of higher 
informational asymmetries.
Frydman (2005) and M urphy and Zabojnik (2007) posit tha t the drastic increase 
of executive compensation is due to a shift from firm-specific skills towards general 
managerial ability th a t has intensified the competition among companies for CEOs. 
Our results suggest a  complexer view of CEO skills: Some skills of CEOs are neither 
completely general nor firm-specific but rather specific to an industry.
This paper does not explore the implications of the importance of industry-specific 
skills for the understanding of compensation or CEO hiring. Do companies pay for 
these skills? Are they an im portant determinant when hiring a new CEO for instance? 
Another natural extension to  the paper is to  examine the interplay between work 
experience and education. Does education m atter? Are education and experience 
substitutes? These are questions for future research.
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2 .7  T ab les
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: CEOs
Panel A shows experience and characteristics of CEOs. Work experience (companies) 
counts the number of different companies the CEOs worked in. Experience is splitted 
up in "all experience" and TOP experience; while the first measure considers all kinds 
of positions /  roles in a firm the latter one focuses on top positions (CEO, CFO, COO, 
Chairman, President, Division CEO, Division CFO, Division Chairman, Division COO, 
Division President, Head of Division, Regional CEO, Regional CFO, Regional President). 
Work experience (industries) conducts the same analysis for industries. Panel B presents 
age, gender, and education of the CEOs. Age is measured in Dec. 2008.
Panel A: Industry experience
All experiences TOP experience
mean median N mean median N
Work experience (Companies) 6.60 6 1,854 2.61 2 1,854
Work experience (Industries) 3.15 3 1,854 1.67 1 1,854
Panel B: CEO characteritics
mean median N
Age 61.89 62 1,854
Gender
Female 1.39% 1,854
Male 98.61% 1,854
Merger experience 2.61 2 1,854
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Deals
Panel A displays the total number of mergers in the sample by time period; the total num­
ber represents the number of mergers with return data of the acquirer available. The first 
column shows all mergers and columns two and three splits the sample in mergers of compa­
nies that are operating in the same and in different industries respectively (non-diversifying 
and diversifying mergers). Panel B presents deal characteristics. The transaction value is 
the total value of consideration excluding fees and expenses. The public status of the target 
can take values {private, public, subsidiary}. The relative size is the ratio of deal value 
and the marketcap of the bidder, stock deal is a dummy equal to 1 if there are stocks in 
the consideration package and all-cash deal is equal to 1 if the whole acquisition is paid in 
cash. Percentage Cash/Stocks/Others denote the respective fraction on the consideration. 
Contested bid is a dummy equal to 1 if there is at least one company challenging the bidder. 
Panel C shows the experience in mergers of the CEO and her industry experience (all) in 
her diversifying mergers. Merger experience measures the number of mergers a CEO has 
made in this sample. Industry experience in diversifying mergers represents the fraction of 
diversifying mergers where the CEO worked in the target’s industry before (allowing for 
all kind of experiences).
Panel A: Classification by time period and type of the deal
All Diversifying
Years No. No.
1990-1994 618 -12.80% 151 -24.40%
1995-1999 1,722 -35.50% 427 -24.80%
2000-2004 1,622 -33.50% 382 -23.50%
2005-2007 882 -18.20% 233 -26.40%
4,844 -100% 1,193 -24.60%
Panel B: Deal-Statistics
Mean Median
Transaction value in Mio. US (TV)$ 970.08 200
Relative size 23.75 8.83
TV/assets (market) 13.76% 4.75%
TV/equity 23.75% 8.82%
Private target 32.11%
Public target 35.59%
Subsidiary target 31.68%
Stock deal 40.95%
All-cash deal 30.07%
Perc. Cash 39.31%
Perc. Stocks 32.56%
Perc. Other or Unknown 28.42%
Panel C: Industry experience in diversifying mergers
All experiences TOP experience
mean N mean N
Industry exp. in div. mergers 34.95% 1,193 16.51% 1,193
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics: Companies
Panel A shows data on corporate size, profitability and growth opportunities of the ac­
quirer. The market value of equity (market capitalization in millions of US-$) is computed 
as common shares outstanding times the fiscal year closing price. Cash and debt are nor­
malized by the bookvalue of total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market value of total assets 
divided by the book value of total assets and book-to-market (BM) is defined as the ratio 
of book value of equity and marketcap. Profitability is measured as the ratio of operating 
cash flows divided by the market value of total assets. Panel B presents the experience in 
mergers by the companies. Merger experience denotes the number of acquired firms per 
company in this sample.
Panel A: Financial Data
Aquirer COMPUSTAT
Mean Median Mean Median
Assets (book) 12,560.25 1,634.30 1,303.15 74.31
Market capitalization 7,146.63 1,816.75 1,376.95 64.87
Cashassets (book) 0.146 0.068 0.167 0.082
Debtassets (book) 0.189 0.161 0.176 0.112
Debtassets (market) 0.129 0.095 0.132 0.071
Tobin’s q 2.48 1.68 2.106 1.41
BM (equity) 0.483 0.439 0.684 0.517
OCF/assets (book) 0.349 0.327 0.264 0.275
Panel B: Companies experience
mean median N
Merger experience 3.37 2 1,438
69
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics: Univariate Analysis
This table compares key variables across different sub-groups of the acquisitions. Columns 
2-4 contrast non-diversifying and diversifying acquistions; columns 5-7 contrast diversify­
ing acquisitions where the CEO does not have experience in the target’s industry with 
diversifying acquistions of experienced CEOs. The market value of equity (market capital­
ization in millions of US-\$) is computed as common shares outstanding times the fiscal 
year closing price. Cash and debt are normalized by the bookvalue of total assets. To­
bin’s Q is the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets and 
book-to-market (BM) is defined as the ratio of book value of equity and marketcap. Prof­
itability is measured as the ratio of operating cash flows divided by the market value of 
total assets. The transaction value is the total value of consideration excluding fees and 
expenses. The public status of the target can take values {private, public, subsidiary}. The 
relative size is the ratio of deal value and the marketcap of the bidder, Stockpayment is a 
dummy equal to 1 when more than 50% of the transaction is paid with stocks. Percentage 
Cash/Stocks/Others denote the respective fraction on the consideration. Contested bid is 
a dummy equal to 1 if there is at least one company challenging the bidder.
Non-diversifying vs. Diversifying Without experience vs. Experience
Non-div. Div. Diff. No exp. With exp. Diff.
CAR 0.000 0.005 -0.006** 0.004 0.012 -0.008*
Leverage 0.147 0.151 -0.004 0.148 0.161 -0.013
Tobin’s q 2.792 2.475 0.317* 2.384 2.862 -0.478
Size 8.191 7.967 0.224*** 7.971 7.952 0.018
Free cash flow 0.035 0.034 0.002 0.033 0.038 -0.005
Cash flow /  TA 0.306 0.346 -0.041*** 0.359 0.291 0.068***
Stock deal 0.443 0.307 0.136*** 0.292 0.369 -0.077**
All-cash deal 0.282 0.358 -0.076*** 0.366 0.324 0.041
Relative deal size 0.242 0.224 0.018 0.199 0.331 -0.132***
Public target 0.401 0.297 0.104*** 0.291 0.324 -0.033
Privat target 0.298 0.325 -0.027* 0.326 0.32 0.006
Subsidiary target 0.295 0.371 -0.076*** 0.376 0.351 0.025
GIM index 9.269 9.786 -0.517*** 9.792 9.754 0.038
Age 54.174 54.761 -0.586** 54.759 54.769 -0.01
Tenure 13.843 13.739 0.104 14.838 8.991 5.847***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Experience in Target’s Industry - Effects on Diversification
This table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of 
the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative 
abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model 
and an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP 
experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s 
industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, 
age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of 
the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional 
correlation of stock returns.
Dependent variable: CAR (1) (2)
TOP-experience x diversifying 0.011 0.013
[1.867] [2.221]
Diversifying 0.000 -0.003
[0.132] [-1.060]
Bidder’s size -0.003
[-3.682]
Tobin’s q 0.000
[-0.901]
Free cash flow -0.002
[-0.089]
Cash flow measure -0.004
[-0.575]
Leverage 0.03
[2.941]
Relative deal size -0.007
[-1.522]
Stock deal -0.007
[-2.403]
All-cash deal 0.005
[2.030]
Public target -0.02
[-7.203]
Private target 0.001
[0.262]
Age -0.002
[-1.410]
Age square 0.000
[1.486]
Tenure 0.000
[-0.837]
Tenure square 0.000
[0.860]
Intercept -0.290 0.115
[-13.595] [1.812]
Year x Industry dummies yes yes
Observations 5,244 4,844
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Table 2.6: Fixed effects
This subsample consists only of acquisitions of CEOs who made at least two diversifying 
acquisitions whereas he is experienced in one industry and inexperienced in the other. 
Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, 
tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. 
All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of 
stock returns.
Dependent Variable =  CAR (1)
TOP-experience x diversifying 0.031
[2.327]
Fixed Effects yes
Year and Industry dummies yes
Deal and Firm controls yes
Observations 470
Clusters 213
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T able 2.7: Other Industries or Companies
The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of 
the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative 
abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and 
an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. Two different 
measures of experience are presented: TOP experience (TA) is a dummy that is equal to 
1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. TOP experience (other 
industry) are dummy variables equal to 1 of the CEO has experience in any other industry 
but the current one (industry of the acquirer). TOP experience (other companies) are 
dummy variables equal to 1 of the CEO has experience in any other company but the 
current one. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include 
age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement 
of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional 
correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1) (2) (3) (4)
TOP-experience (TARGET) x diversifying 0.016
[2.461]
TOP-experience (other Ind.) x diversifying 0.002 -0.004
[0.593] [-0.993]
TOP-experience (TARGET) x diversifying 0.013
[2.188]
TOP-experience (other comp.) x diversifying 0.003 -0.001
[0.734] [-0.217]
Year x Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Deal and Firm controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,844 4,844 4,844 4,844
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Table 2.8: Target Heterogeneities
In specification (1) the public status (public, private, subsidiary) is analyzed. In specifica­
tion (2) and (3) of the model we split the sample along the index of managerial discretion 
of the target’s industry. In column (2) we use an index developed by Hambrick and Abra- 
hamson (1995). We first match the index (when available) with the industry of the target 
before splitting the sample along the median value of the discretion index in our sample. In 
column (3) we use the index of managerial discretion of Metzger (2009) which constructed 
by analyzing the distribution of managers’ fixed effects across industries. We first match 
the index with the industry of the target before splitting the sample along the median value 
of the discretion index in our sample. In specification (4) we split industries along the me­
dian value of the average R&D spending in high and low R&D industries. In specification 
(5) we split industries along the median value of the average intangibles in high and low 
intangibles industries. The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal 
stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company character­
istics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French 
three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day 
afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP 
position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All 
regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date 
of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to 
account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public - TOP-exp. x div. 0.006
Private - TOP-exp. x div.
[0.711]
0.029
Subsidiary - TOP-exp. x div.
[2.649]
0.005
[0.534]
Discretion high - TOP-exp. x div. 0.02 0.016
Discretion low - TOP-exp. x div.
[1.933]
0.002
[0.225]
[2.182]
0.008
[0.934]
R&D high - TOP-exp. x div. 
R&D low - TOP-exp. x div.
0.019
[2.723]
0.002
[0.236]
Intangibles high - TOP-exp. x div. 
Intangibles low - TOP-exp. x div.
0.017
[1.987]
0.01
[1.433]
Year x Industry dummies 
Deal and Firm controls
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Observations 4,844 4,844 4,844 4,785 4,785
74
Table 2.9: Combined CARs
This specification analyzes public targets only. The table shows the regression of the 
mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (AC), or the target (TA), 
and of the combined firm (AC-TA: weighted by market cap) on different manager, deal, 
and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study 
using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the 
announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the 
CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics 
are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of 
the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered 
by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR AC-TA AC TA
TOP-experience x div. -0.023 0.02 0.011
[-0.643] [1.866] [0.328]
Diversifying -0.022 -0.004 -0.018
[-2.033] [-0.742] [-0.941]
Year x Industry dummies yes yes yes
Deal and Firm controls yes yes yes
Observations 1,673 1,673 1,673
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Table 2.10: Merger Waves
This subsample consists only of mergers that were announced during a merger wave. Har­
ford (2005) provides a measure of clustered merger activity that specifies year, month and 
industry of a merger wave. We define a merger being part of a merger wave if it the ac­
quirer belongs to the affected industry and the merger was announced any time in between 
6 months before and 6 months after the date that is identified by Harford. We exclude 
waves that are due to deregulation. The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumu­
lative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and 
company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using 
the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the announce­
ment until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO 
worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in 
the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the 
CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by 
event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1)
Within wave - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.024
[1.704]
Outside wave - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.011
[1.836]
Year x Industry dummies yes
Deal and Firm controls yes
Observations 4,844
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Table 2.11: Probability of Experienced Merger by Appointment Date
The table shows the regression of the a dummy that is equal to 1 if the merger is by a 
CEO that is experienced on the appointment of the CEO, different manager, deal, and 
company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study 
using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the 
announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the 
CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics 
are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of 
the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered 
by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dep. Var: exp. merger LPM (top-exp.) Probit (top-exp.)
Appointment in t =  0 0.241 0.896
[2.805] [2.859]
Appointment in t =  -1 0.108 0.486
[2.377] [2.629]
Appointment in t =  -2 0.151 0.630
[3.323] [3.533]
Appointment in t =  -3 0.211 0.812
[5.181] [5.201]
Appointment in t =  -4 0.202 0.786
[4.396] [4.487]
Appointment in t =  -5 0.141 0.599
[2.903] [3.125]
Appointment in t =  -6 0.09 0.419
[1.924] [2.168]
Appointment in t =  -7 0.046 0.237
[0.926] [1.093]
Appointment in t =  -8 0.152 0.633
[2.616] [2.813]
Appointment in t =  -9 0.074 0.36
[1.208] [1.392]
Appointment in t =  -10 0.06 0.3
[1.091] [1.273]
Year x Industry dummies yes yes
Deal and Firm controls yes yes
Observations 1,240 1,240
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Table 2.12: Merger Performance by Appointment Date
The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of 
the bidder (CAR) on the appointment of the CEO, different manager, deal, and company 
characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using the 
Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement 
until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked 
in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the 
appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO 
at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event 
date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1)
Appointment in t= -l and Top experience x div. 0.011
[0.590]
Appointment in t=-2 and Top experience x div. 0.013
[0.968]
Appointment in t=-3 and Top experience x div. 0.027
[1.700]
Appointment in t=-4 and Top experience x div. -0.002
[-0.192]
Appointment in t=-5 and Top experience x div. -0.012
[-1.218]
Appointment in t=-6 and Top experience x div. 0.03
[2.433]
Appointment in t=-7 and Top experience x div. -0.014
[-0.939]
Appointment in t=-8 and Top experience x div. 0.039
[2.187]
Appointment in t=-9 and Top experience x div. -0.005
[-0.196]
Appointment in t=-10 and Top experience x div. 0.005
[0.341]
Div ffl2 -0.003
[-1.065]
Year x Industry dummies yes
Deal and Firm controls yes
Observations 4,711
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Table 2.13: All experience and unrelated experience
In this sample we analyze experience of low hierarchy levels or experience that is unrelated 
to the actual business of an company. Examples are internships in a particular industry or 
working as a web programmer in the automotive industry. The table shows the regression 
of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different 
manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from 
an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 
day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. Experience in target’s industry is a 
dummy that is 1 if the CEO has experience in the target’s industry. Unrelated experience 
is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a position that is likely to be unrelated 
with the industry in the firm. Examples are low-ranked jobs like office workers or interns 
as well as non-business positions in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics 
are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of 
the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered 
by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1) (2)
Any experience x diversifying 0.010
[2.369]
Unrelated-experience x diversifying 0.004
[0.684]
Diversifying -0.004 -0.001
[-1.532 ] [-0.513]
Year x Industry dummies yes yes
Deal and Firm controls yes yes
Observations 4,844 4,844
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Table 2.14: Recency
This table analyzes the different effect of the recency of the experience on the performance. 
We make two different splits of the experience by recency. The experience was obtained 
i) less than 10 years ago vs. more than 10 years ago and ii) less then 5 years ago vs. 
between 5 and 10 years ago vs. more than 10 years ago. The table shows the regression 
of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different 
manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from 
an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 
day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is 
equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal 
characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and 
tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard 
errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1) (2)
TOP-experience (less than 10 years ago) x diversifying 0.020
[2.624]
TOP-experience (more than 10 years ago) x diversifying -0.003
[-0.259]
TOP-experience (less than 5 years ago) x diversifying 0.009
[0.892]
TOP-experience (between 5 and 10 years ago) x diversifying 0.032
[2.921]
TOP-experience (more than 10 years ago) x diversifying -0.003
[-0.253]
Diversifying -0.002 -0.002
[-0.915] [-0.922]
Year x Industry dummies yes yes
Deal and Firm controls yes yes
Observations 4,844 4,844
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Table 2.15: No conglomerates
In this sample we exclude conglomerates from our analysis. Columns (1) and (2) report 
regression results of firms that have business in only one segment according to the COM- 
PUSTAT segment data. In columns (3) and (4) we consider only firms where the biggest 
segment is accountable for at least 90% of the total sales. The table shows the regression 
of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different 
manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from 
an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day 
before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience (TA) is a dummy that is 
equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal 
characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and 
tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard 
errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1) (2)
Conglomerate - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.012 0.01
[1.591] [1.319]
Focussed firm - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.038 0.034
[2.485] [2.625]
Diversifying -0.005 -0.005
[-1.648] [-1.523]
Difference 0.026 0.024
Year x Industry dummies yes yes
Deal and Firm controls yes yes
Observations 1,336 1,549
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Table 2.16: Diversifying only
This subsample consists only of diversifying acquisitions. The table shows the regression 
of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different 
manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from 
an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 
day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is 
equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal 
characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and 
tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard 
errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1)
TOP-experience x diversifying 0.01
[2.004]
Year x Industry dummies yes
Deal and Firm controls yes
Observations 1,189
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Table 2.17: 11 days event window
The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of 
the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative 
abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model 
and an event window from 5 day before the announcement until 5 day afterwards. TOP 
experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a  TOP position in the target’s 
industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, 
age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of 
the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to  account for cross-sectional 
correlation of stock returns.
Dependent Variable: CAR (1)
TOP-experience x diversifying 0.013
[2.220]
Diversifying -0.003
[-1.109]
Year x Industry dummies yes
Deal and Firm controls yes
Observations 4„844
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2.8  D a ta  A p e n d ix
Table 2.18: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Panel A : Bidder characteristics
Leverage Book value of debts over market value of total assets.
Tobin’s Q Ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. The market
value of total assets is defined as the book value of total assets 
plus market capitalization minus book value of equity. The market 
capitalization is computed as common shares outstanding times 
the fiscal year closing price. The book value of equity is defined as 
stockholders’ equity minus preferred stock liquidating value plus 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment credit minus post 
retirement assets.
Size Logarithm of the book value of total assets
Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation minus interest expense mi­
nus income taxes minus capital expenditures, scaled by book value 
of total assets.
Cash flow /  TA Operating cash flows (sales minus costs of good sold minus sell­
ing and administrative expenses plus depreciation and goodwill 
expenses) over total assets.
Panel B  : Deal characteristics
Stock deal A dummy that is equal to 1 if the bidder pays a positive fraction
of the transaction value with its stocks.
All-cash deal A dummy that is equal to 1 if the transaction is 100% paid with
cash.
Relative deal size Ratio of the deal value and the market capitalization of the bidder.
Public target Status of the target is "public company".
Private target Status of the target is "private company".
Subsidiary target Company is a subsidiary of a company.
Diversifying dummy We classify a merger to be diversifying if bidder and target differ
in their Fama-French 12-Industries (FF12) classification.
Panel C : Other variables
Age Finally we measure the age (in years) of the CEO at the announce­
ment of the merger.
Tenure The tenure of the CEO in the current company (in years).
CARs Three-day (eleven-day) cumulative abnormal return (in percent­
age points) calculated using the Fama-French 3-factor model. The 
market model parameters are estimated using the return data for 
the period (-270,-21).
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3 M ergers and A cquisitions A ccounting Can E xplain  the  
D iversification  D iscount
3.1 In tro d u ctio n
Most studies of corporate diversification find that conglomerates are on average valued 
less than  industry-matched portfolios of focused firms.24 Several strands of research 
attem pt to explain this so-called diversification discount. First, conglomerates might 
be less efficient than  standalones for instance, due to agency costs or inefficient in­
ternal capital markets.25 Second, the diversification discount might be driven by 
self-selection and the endogeneity of the decision to diversify.26 Last, biases caused 
by data  and measurement problems can generate a spurious diversification discount.27 
This paper identifies mergers and acquisitions (M&A) accounting as a  source of mea­
surement bias in Tobin’s q 28 The typical M&A accounting procedure, the purchase 
m ethod of business combinations, normally leads to a mechanical increase in the ac­
quired assets’ book value and therefore to  a drop in the acquirer’s market-to-book 
ratio, the usual proxy for Tobin’s q.29 Because conglomerates are more acquisitive 
than  standalones, this accounting method can generate a spurious diversification dis­
count. I partially correct q by excluding goodwill from the book value of assets and 
I find tha t this accounting artifact explains a sizeable part, if not all, of the diversifi­
cation discount. In addition, I use the exogenous event of a change in the US M&A 
accounting rules to confirm this hypothesis.
My argument rests on two premises. First, the purchase method creates a  me­
chanical downward bias in the q of acquisitive firms. Second, conglomerates are more 
acquisitive than standalones. I start by discussing the validity of these premises.
Consider the first premise. The purchase m ethod consists in recognizing the fair 
value of the acquired net assets and any acquired goodwill in the acquirer’s balance 
sheet.30 As a consequence, the post-merger book value of acquired assets equals the
24Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment 
and Jarrel (1995), Servaes (1996), Lins and Servaes (1999), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and 
Lamont and Polk (2002) find evidence of a diversification discount. Laeven and Levine (2007) find a 
discount in financial conglomerates.
25 Jensen (1986) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) suggest conglomerates are less efficient due to 
agency costs; Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) due to inefficient 
internal capital markets.
26Villalonga (2004a), Campa and Kedia (2002), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Graham, Lemmon 
and Wolf (2002).
27Villalonga (2004b).
28Market-to-Sales, Market-to-EBIT and ROA have also been used as measures of performance. 
However, most studies use q as their main or only specification.
29For the remainder of the paper I use "q" to refer to the empirical measure of Tobin’s q typically 
used in this literature, i.e. the market-to-book ratio of assets, rather than to the economic theoretical 
concept.
30SFAS 141 defines goodwill as the excess of the consideration transferred plus the fair value of any 
noncontrolling interest in the acquiree at the acquisition date over the fair values of the identifiable 
net assets acquired. The fair value of assets corresponds to the amount at which these asset could 
be bought or sold in a current transaction between willing parties other than liquidation. In the case
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transaction price. Because the transaction price typically exceeds the pre-merger 
market value of the target’s assets, which itself typically exceeds its pre-merger book 
value, this implies th a t post-merger book value of target’s assets exceeds its pre-merger 
book value. For this reason, the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio of assets often drops. 
While other merger effects (e.g. synergies) may increase the assets’ market value, they 
are typically too small to completely offset the effect of the increase in book value on 
market-to-book.31
I model the purchase m ethod’s impact on post-merger acquirer’s q and deal excess- 
value. I define deal excess-value as the difference between the merged firm’s q and 
th a t of a portfolio including the acquirer and the target as standalones. I argue tha t 
a target’s q higher than one and a transaction premium higher than the value of 
synergies, together, are sufficient conditions to generate a negative deal excess-value. 
This result, in particular, helps to  reconcile the diversification discount with the M&A 
literature. On the one hand, it is consistent with the q of conglomerates being lower 
than  an equivalent portfolio of standalones; on the other hand it is also consistent 
with acquirers overpaying for the target firm and synergies.32
From this model, I derive a set of additional empirical predictions, which I test 
using M&A data  from SDC Platinum  over 1984-2007, and I find strong support for 
them. In particular, I find tha t M&A has a negative impact on q: The acquirer’s q 
drops on average by 12% between the pre-merger end of quarter and the post-merger 
end of quarter. However, this drop can be explained by the use of the purchase 
method. Indeed, it disappears once I correct the acquirer’s post-merger book value by 
subtracting the transaction premium paid above the target’s book value. This result 
is true for both diversifying and other deals.
Consider now the second premise i.e. that conglomerates make more acquisitions 
than  standalones. Merging M&A data  with COMPUSTAT Segments data  for 1988- 
2007, I find a strong positive correlation between the number of past deals and di­
versification. Furthermore, conglomerates have, on average, higher goodwill-to-assets 
ratios suggesting that they do not only make more acquisitions, but also do so with 
more goodwill.
These premises established, I tu rn  next to their effect on the diversification dis­
count. First, I replicate the usual conglomerate studies regressions in my COMPU-
of liabilities, the fair value is the amount at which these liabilities could be incurred or settled in a 
current transaction between willing parties, other than liquidation. When there is an available quoted 
market price this is the value to be used as a basis for the measurement, whenever this is not available, 
an estimate using the best information available should be used.
31 See Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) for a model of the relation between a firm’s 
market value and accounting data. The models parameters represent persistence of abnormal earnings, 
growth and accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism is the notion that the long run market 
to book ratio exceeds one when economic assets are excluded from the balance sheet. See Zeff and 
Dharan (1997) on the role of goodwill in financial statement analysis.
32 Most event studies on M&A find that these transactions tend to  add value for shareholders, but 
that most of the gains accrue to the target. In addition, acquirers tend to show negative abnormal 
returns after the mergers’ announcement (see Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) for a survey of 
this literature).
86
STAT Segments sample and find a diversification discount between 0.03 and 0.09.33 
Next, I try  to adjust for the impact of M&A accounting. However, the difference 
between the transaction price and the pre-merger target’s book value is not directly 
observed in financial statements: Goodwill is reported but the rest is imputed di­
rectly to purchased assets. Therefore, I use goodwill as a conservative correction and 
subtract it from the merged firm’s book value of assets. This conservative correc­
tion reduces the diversification discount by 40% on average and in some specifications 
the diversification discount becomes not statistically different from zero. This result 
shows th a t much of the diversification discount can be explain by M&A accounting. 
Moreover, because my correction is conservative, this result understates the impact of 
M&A accounting on the diversification discount.
Because the goodwill correction is not the ideal adjustment, I construct a  differences- 
in-differences test th a t does not rely on this correction. Before 2001 firms could use 
either the purchase m ethod or the pooling m ethod in which no goodwill is recognized 
and which therefore does not generate the spurious change in #.34 I use the exogenous 
shock of a change in US M&A accounting rules (SFAS 142) in 2001 th a t eliminates the 
pooling method and makes the purchase m ethod m andatory35 and I exploit the time- 
series and cross sectional variation of the diversification discount. First, I expect the 
uncorrected diversification discount to increase after 2001 because more firms use the 
purchase method. I find an additional discount between 0.02 and 0.07 for diversified 
firms post-2001. Second, the diversification discount should be smaller in industries 
th a t have lower goodwill, either due to  lower M&A activity or to acquisitions with 
lower goodwill, because the assets’ book value of conglonerates is less inflated. I rank 
industries based on the average goodwill-to-assets ratio. I define a conglomerate’s 
1-digit SIC code as tha t of the segment with the highest sales.36 I observe no sta­
tistically significant diversification discount in the bottom  goodwill industry and a 
higher-than-average diversification discount in the top goodwill industry. These cross 
sectional and time-series variations form the basis of my differences-in-differences es­
timation. I find th a t the change in M&A accounting rule generates a higher increase 
in the non-adjusted diversification discount for the top goodwill industry than  for 
the bottom  goodwill industry. Again, this evidence is consistent with the purchase 
method generating a spurious diversification discount.
Since subtracting goodwill is a conservative adjustment, I analyze in detail a  sam­
ple of 20 firms, which I can identify as reporting multiple business segments for the 
first time and using the purchase method in the corresponding acquisition. For these 
firms I can observe the difference between transaction price and target’s book value.
33 Berger and Ofek (1995) find a diversification discount of 0.12, although their sample is restricted 
to  1986-1991. Bevelander (2002) finds a 0.08 discount using an extended sample: 1980-1998.
34 In order to use the pooling method firms had to meet a set of 12 criteria.
35 See Beatty and Weber (2006) and Bens (2006) for a detailed examination of SFAS 142.
36By using a coarser industry classification I make sure that more conglomerates’ business segments 
share this same industry. More than 50% of secondary segments share the same 1-digit SIC code with  
the highest sales segment.
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In this (admittedly very small) sub-sample goodwill reflects 56% of the to tal difference 
between the transaction price and the target’s book value. Using this ratio to  extrap­
olate to the full sample, I find a significant diversification premium between 0.02 and
0.03 in most specifications.
To summarise, the measurement error generated by M&A accounting seems to 
play a first order role for the diversification discount as usually estimated. Correcting 
for this accounting artefact may very well eliminate the average discount.
This paper is mainly related to papers that identify data and measurement issues 
relevant for the conglomerate discount. W hited (2001) also examines measurement 
error in q but focuses on its impact on investment regressions for conglomerates, in 
which q is an independent variable. In my study instead, q is a dependent variable. 
In this case, measurement error would not be a problem if it were not systematically 
related to independent variables. However, it is in fact systematically related to the 
diversification dummy. In my study, I identify M&A accounting as a  specific source 
of measurement error in q, I show it to be first-order, and propose a partial fix. 
Villalonga (2004b) finds a diversification premium using an alternative dataset to 
COMPUSTAT-segments and suggests the discount may be an artifact of segment-level 
data. She offers two possible explanations: "relatedness" and "strategic accounting". 
She suggests tha t Compustat-segments data is reported in such a way th a t mostly 
unrelated diversification is captured and this generates a discount. The strategic 
accounting explanation suggests that firms self report their da ta  in a ways th a t make 
them  look artificially underperforming with respect to standalones.
Bevelander (2002) shows shows th a t q is higher for younger firms and th a t much 
of the average diversification discount can be explained by the fact tha t conglomerates 
tend to be older than standalones. One possible explanation for younger firms higher 
q is due to their greater growth opportunities. My study suggests M&A accounting as 
an alternative explanation: it is likely th a t younger firms have made less acquisitions 
than  older ones. Massa and Zhang (2009) argue that conglomerates have a lower q 
simply because they are less financially constrained and therefore exercise their growth 
opportunities.
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) also link the conglomerate discount to  M&A 
activity. They show that conglomerates acquire low q targets, which can explain the 
discount. Their argument is therefore based on self-selection, which is very different 
from my measurement error argument.
My results are consistent with Schoar (2002), who finds a  diversification discount 
using stock market performance, but shows tha t conglomerates can be more productive 
than standalones using plant level data. She argues th a t this discrepancy can be 
attributed to conglomerates leaving more rents to workers, which explains 30% of the 
diversification discount. I provide an alternative explanation for this discrepancy.
Finally, this paper is related to the M&A accounting literature. This literature has 
mainly focused on market reactions to the adoption of different accounting methods for
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business combinations and on the implications of different methods of accounting for 
goodwill (see Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978) and Hopkins, Houston and Peters 
(2000)). Jennings, Robinson, Thompson and Duvall (1996) find evidence of a positive 
correlation between goodwill and market value supporting the view th a t goodwill 
should be recognized as an asset. I contribute to this literature by showing th a t 
recognizing goodwill affects the  comparability of market-to-book ratios, in particular 
when comparing diversified to  standalone firms. In addition, I suggest a simple way 
to improve this measure in order to  make it comparable between firms with different 
levels of M&A activity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses M&A accounting’s effect on q 
and the diversification discount. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 
4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 discusses them and shows robustness tests. 
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 M & A  A ccou n tin g  and  th e  D iversification  D iscou n t
3.2.1 M&A Accounting
Until 2001, firms engaging in M&A could use one of two accounting methods: the 
pooling-of-interests or the purchase method. These methods differ mainly in the way 
the target’s net assets are reported in the merged firm’s balance sheet. In the pooling 
method, the book values of the target’s assets and liabilities are simply added to the 
acquirer’s. In the purchase m ethod the acquirer reports the target’s net assets at fair 
value, and capitalizes as goodwill any premium paid in excess of this fair value. The 
fair value is determined by reference to observable prices of market transactions for 
similar assets or liabilities at or near the measurement date whenever th a t information 
is available.37 Otherwise, fair value is estimated using other valuation techniques. The 
main implication of interest for my analysis is tha t the acquired assets’ book value does 
not change after a merger in the pooling m ethod but does in the purchase method.
The pooling method was only applied to  "mergers of equals." To qualify for this 
accounting treatm ent the transaction had to  satisfy 12 requirements related to its 
structure (e.g. at least 90% of the transaction currency had to be stock), the char­
acteristics of the firms (the entities involved had to be autonomous and independent) 
and to  the absence of planned transactions after the deal th a t involved common stocks 
issued as part of the combination or any assets of the target company.38 If these re­
quirements were not met, the purchase method was applied. A large m ajority of firms 
used the purchase method.39 Since June 30, 2001 all firms have to use the purchase 
method. Two main additional changes occurred. Before 2001 goodwill was amortized
37See SFAS 141 and December 11, 2002 FASB meeting minutes on "Business Combinations: Pur­
chase Method Procedures" for further details.
38See Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 16 for further details.
3914% of M&A deals in my sample use the Pooling of Interests method.
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during a period of up to 40 years. Since 2001, goodwill is no longer subject to  amor­
tization but tested for impairment a t least annually. The impairment test consists 
in comparing the carrying amount of goodwill and its fair value and recognizing a 
loss whenever the former amount exceeds the latter. Existing goodwill from previous 
acquisitions are subject to the same treatm ent. Second, before 2001, intangible assets 
were recognized as separate assets whenever they could be identified and named; since 
2001, they are only recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet one of two 
criteria: the contractual-legal criterion or the separability criterion. The contractual- 
legal criterion states tha t the intangible assets must arise from contractual or other 
legal rights (e.g. tradem arks, patents). According to the second criteria the intangible 
asset can only be recognised if it is could be separated from the acquired entity and 
sold, transferred, licensed, rented or exchanged (e.g. costumer lists, databases).
3.2.2 Tobin’s q
I compare the pooling and the purchase methods’ implications for merged companies’ 
q.A0
Consider firm A  (the acquirer) buying firm T  (the target) to form firm A T . Mi is 
the pre-merger market value of firm i = A, T  and B{ its book value. Combining A  and 
T  generates (positive or negative) synergies S. To acquire T, A  pays a (positive or 
negative) premium P  relative to its market value M t-  A fraction c of the transaction 
price (M t  4- P )  is paid in cash from internal funds; the remainder being externally 
financed.41 T  is an all equity firm. 42 Firm  i ’s q (the empirical measure of Tobin’s q) 
is defined as qi — its common measure in the discount literature.
Following the merger,the market value of A T  is the sum of A  and T ’s market values 
{Ma + M t ) plus the synergies S , minus the internal funds spent c (M r+ P ) .43 I t ’s book 
value, however, depends on the accounting method used. Under the pooling method, 
the book value of A T  corresponds to B a  +  B t  — c(Mt  +  P ),  the sum of the book 
values of A  and T  minus the internal funds spent. Under the purchase method the 
target’s assets are reported a t the transaction price M t  + P  and not at the pre-merger 
book value B t -
Lemma 1 The q of the combined firm  under the pooling method and the purchase 
method is repectively:
Pooling _  M a  +  M t  -  c(M t  +  P)  +  S  . .
9a t  ~  B a  + B t - c(M t  + P ) ( ' ’
40 Doing so, I ignore the requirements for using the pooling method, which I use as a benchmark.
41 External financing includes equity or debt financing. This may as well correspond to a cash 
payment for the target, but this cash is obtained externally and does not correspond to internally 
generated funds.
4 2 If the target is not all-equity financed then the acquirer pays the market value of net assets (total
assets minus total liabilities) plus a premium P . This does not affect the main results.
431 assume the market value of internal funds equals their book value.
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„ P u rch a se  _  M a  + M T -  c{MT + P) + S  ^
9AT ~  B a  +  (Mt  + P )( 1 - c ) ( i '2}
I define two variables of interest, both of which depend on the M&A accounting 
m ethod used. First, through the acquisition, the acquirer’s q increases by
A q = qAT ~  qA (3.3)
Second, I define the deal’s excess value as the difference between the q of the merged 
firm and th a t of a portfolio combining the acquirer and the target pre-merger:
c n r  — M a  +  M t  fo ^E V  = qAT -  B a  + B t  (3.4)
I now derive a set of empirical predictions. For this purpose I focus on the case where 
c =  0.44
Prediction 1 Under the pooling method, Aq is increasing in the target’s q and in 
synergies. Under the purchase method, A q  is independent of the target’s q.
Because under the pooling method the target is recognised in the books of the 
mergerd firm at its pre-merger book value, the post-merger q is a combination of 
target’s and acquirer’s pre-merge qs. Therefore, the change in q is only positive when 
QA < Qt +  ^ 7) he., when the q of the target pre-merger plus the synergies is higher 
than  the acquirer’s q before the transaction.
This is not the case when the purchase method is used. In this case, the post­
merger q of the combined firm is independent of the target’s book value and, thus, 
of its q. Thus, A q is also independent of the target’s q. In fact,the impact on qA is 
positive if and only if qA < Mt +P'
In fact, prediction 1 implies th a t we can observe contradicting changes in acquirer’s 
q between the pooling (my benchmark) and the purchase method for mergers satisfying 
the same conditions. For instance, we can observe a drop in q when the purchase 
method is used that would correspond to  an increase in the case of the pooling. This 
particular situation occurs whenever < qA < <7t  +  what happens for a
significant proportion of deals.45
Prediction 2 Under the purchase method and assuming that the premium paid 
above the target’s market value is greater or equal to the synergies, then A q is positive 
(negative) i f  and only i f  pre-merger q is less (greater) than one.
If we assume that the acquirer pays exactly a premium equal to the value of 
synergies then the impact in qA is only positive when qA <  1- Intuitively, because in
44 In the case of the pooling method c is always lower than 0.1 and most frequently zero. Under the 
purchase method the situations in which c is higher than zero occur only when cash is used as mean 
of payment and corresponds to retained earnings.
4 5 Assuming P  ^  S  >  0, a necessary condition for this conflicting result is that qr >  1, which in my 
sample occurs for approximately 95% of the deals.
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this case the target is recognised in the books of the merged firm at i t’s market value 
plus synergies, it works as if the acquirer was merging with a firm with a q of 1. Thus, 
its q drops if higher than 1 pre-merger and increases otherwise.
In the case under which P  > S, i.e., when the acquirer overpays for the synergies, 
qA drops whenever qA > (1 — a ), where a  > 0.
P re d ic t io n  3 Under the pooling method, the deal-excess value is independent of 
target’s q and increasing in synergies. Under the purchase method the deal excess 
value is decreasing in the difference betweeen transaction price and target’s book value 
and increasing in synergies.
Under the pooling method, the deal excess-value corresponds exactly to the syner­
gies generated by merging A  and T  standardized by the book value of A T  post-merger,
i.e., b a+b t • Absent synergies, deal-excess value is zero. In both cases, excess value 
is independent of target’s q. On the contrary, under the purchase method, the deal 
excess-value does not simply depend on the value of synergies and it is not indepen­
dent from target’s q. In fact, because the merged firm’s book value increases by the 
transaction price when the purchase m ethod is used, the deal excess value under this 
m ethod is decreasing in the ratio of transaction price to the target’s pre-merger book 
value. This implies that deal-excess value tends to be lower when high q targets are 
acquired and when the acquirer pays an high premium paid above the target’s maket 
value.
This might generate an over or underestimation of deal excess value under the 
purchase method when compared to the pooling. In fact, deal excess value is over­
estimated whenever E V Purchase > E V Poohn9, i.e., when <  1, and is underes­
tim ated when -  >  1. Because for almost all acquisitions the price paid for the
target is above its pre-merger book value, the deal excess-value tends to be significantly 
underestimated.
P re d ic t io n  4 Under the purchase method, qx > 1 and P  > S  are sufficient 
conditions for a negative deal excess-value.
Under the purchase method, deal excess value corresponds to  ~  £ a + B t
and, therefore ^  >  1 and P  > S  necessarily imply a negative deal excess value. The 
first condition is known to be true for most of the deals. However, even when the 
target’s q is 1 and synergies are positive, if the premium paid above target’s market 
value is higher than the value of synergies, this implies a negative deal excess-value.
And indeed, the empirical evidence on M&A suggests th a t this is the case. First, 
most event studies seem to argue tha t mergers and acquisitions create value, which 
is consistent with positive synergies. This, despite most gains accruing to the tar­
get company and acquirers experiencing zero or negative abnormal returns, which is
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consistent with acquirers overpaying , or at least, not underpaying for the targets.46
3 .2 .3  E m p ir ic a l Im p lic a tio n s  a n d  T es tab le  H y p o th e ses
T h e  D iv e rs ifica tio n  D isc o u n t A standard procedure in the diversification dis­
count literature consists in computing the excess value of a conglomerate. A common 
specification of this measure compares a conglomerates’ observed q with the q of a 
industry-matched portfolio of standalones. However, these standalones are probably 
smaller, younger and have performed fewer acquisitions than the conglomerate. W ith 
respect to this later characteristic, we expect the standalone firms to have lower q 
because they have not used M&A accounting as much as conglomerates. In this sense, 
the excess value measure as previously measured in the literature, should be have 
a downward bias. The main implication tha t follows is tha t the average diversifica­
tion discount, once corrected for the impact of the accounting procedure, both for 
stand-alone and diversified firms, should be lower or otherwise, a premium.
T h e  D iffe rences-in -D ifferences T es t My argument has two main cross-sectional
and time-series implications th a t allow me to implement a differences-in-differences 
test.
In the time series, the change in accounting rule in 2001 is expected to generate 
an increase in the diversification discount because all firms are obliged to apply the 
purchase method. The firms th a t under the past conditions would use the pooling 
method, have to use the purchase method instead. Again, if diversified firms are 
more acquisitive than  standalones, and if these last do not systematically use the 
pooling m ethod pre-2001, this change is expected to  create an additional diversification 
discount post-2001. I test this hypothesis using the following specification:
EVit = P0 + P idD IVa  +  S0dPOST2001  +  drfD IV u  ■ dPOST2001  +  /32X it + eit (3.5)
Where E V  is firm i!s excess value at year t, d D IV  is a diversification dummy, 
dPOST2001  is a post-2001 dummy and X  a  set of firm controls. The coefficient 
of interest is 5i tha t captures if diversified firms show an additional discount after the 
accounting rule’s change.
On the cross section, we expect the diversification discount to be more severe in 
industries where firms acquire with higher prices above the target’s book value and
46Byrd and Hickman (1992), Healy Palepu and Ruback (1992), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Mul- 
herin and Boone (2000) and Andrade et. al (2001) all find negative cumulative abnormal returns for 
the acquirer between -3.8% and -0.37% and combined cumulative abnormal returns between +1.8% 
and +9.1%.
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therefore, with more goodwill. One issue consists in defining the conglomerate’s in­
dustry. There are two main alternatives: either using the core-business’ industry or 
using the most relevant secondary industry. The second alternative has the advan­
tage of coinciding with the industry of most of the conglomerate’s targets (From the 
previous section we know th a t the diversification discount is increasing in the target’s 
goodwill). However, for my differences-in-differences test I need the firms to  be ran­
domly assigned to the control and treatm ent groups, in this case to the high or low 
goodwill industry, i.e., I want to make sure tha t the secondary industry choice was 
not made taking into account the effect of M&A accounting. Therefore, I define the 
conglomerates’ industry as the industry of i t ’s core business defined at the 1-digit SIC 
code.47 By using a coarse industry definition I make sure th a t most of the acquisi­
tions performed by these conglomerates take place in the same SIC code and therefore 
targets to have been acquired with high goodwill.48 To test this hypothesis I use the 
following econometric specification:
EVit =  (30 +  fadD IV a  +  SodHGWi +  bxdD IVit • dH G W { +  /32X it +  ea (3.6)
Where dH G W  is a high goodwill dummy, being one if the firm is in a high goodwill 
industry. The coefficient of interest corresponds to  the the interaction term  between 
the diversification dummy and the high goodwill dummy. We expect Si to be negative, 
meaning th a t a higher diversification discount is observed in high goodwill industries.
I proceed with the diferences-in-diferences methodology. The cross-sectional het­
erogeneity across industries in terms of goodwill allows me to  define a treatm ent and 
a control group tha t are expected to have different responses to the 2001 change in 
accounting rules. The treatm ent group corresponds to diversified firms in the top 
goodwill industry, and the control group to diversified firms in the bottom  goodwill 
industry. This change in the accounting rules is an exogenous shock to the firms and 
we expect diversified firms in industries with different levels of goodwill to be affected 
in different ways. We expect the post-2001 increase in the diversification discount 
to be greater for firms in the top goodwill industry. The equation for analyzing the 
impact of this change in accounting regulation in the two groups is formalized in the 
following way:
EVit = Po + fadH G W D i +  S0dPOST2001  +  5idPOST2001  • d E G W D { +  /32X it +  eit
(3-7)
Where dH G W D  is a high goodwill dummy, being one if the diversified firm is in a 
high goodwill industry, d A F T C H A N G E  is a post-2001 dummy and X  a set of firm 
controls. The coefficient of interest is <$i because it captures the additional impact 
of the change in the accounting rule for diversified firms in high goodwill industries
471 define the core-business as the main industry reported in COMPUSTAT. This corresponds to 
the industry of the business segments with the highest sales.
4 8 Approximately 60% of the secondary business segments are in the same 1-digit SIC code as the 
conglomerate’s core-business.
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with respect to  diversified firms in low goodwill industries. I expect the increase in 
the diversification discount to  be greater for the top goodwill industry and therefore 
<$i is expected to be negative.
This analysis assumes th a t the top goodwill industry and the low goodwill in­
dustries do not respond heterogeneously to  the change in accounting rule in terms of 
acquisitions strategies. More precisely, th a t high goodwill firms do not perform more 
value destroying acquisitions post-2001. But even if we assume they do change their 
M&A policy in response to this change, the most plausible strategy for high goodwill 
firms after 2001 is to acquire less, in order not to  suffer from the mechanical drop in q.
If this is the case, my interpretation would not be affected. In fact, the diversification 
discount would even be bigger in the top goodwill industry post-2001.
Finally I run a triple-differences (or differences-in-differences-in-differences) esti­
mator. The only difference for the previous estimator is the fact tha t the sample in 
use is not restricted to diversified firms. Therefore, using this methodology, we can 
still capture the effect of diversification per se. The econometric specification is as 
follows:
EVit =  Po +  PidD IVit -I- j32dHGW i +  j3sdPOST2001  +  (3.8)
+60dD IVit • dHG W i + SidD IVu  • dPOST2001  +  S2dPOST2001  • dHGW i +  
+63dD IVit • dHG W i • dP O ST200l +  PAX it +  eit
In this case the coefficient of interest is S3, which is expected to be negative, cap­
turing the expected extra discount for diversified firms post-2001. This coefficient is 
equivalent to Si in the previous specification.
3.3  D a ta  and M easures
3.3.1 D ata
I use deals data from the Thompson Financial SDC Platinum  database. The initial 
sample contains all completed mergers and acquisitions in the US stock market over 
1984-2007. To be included in the final sample, a transaction has to meet the following 
criteria: the deal status must be completed; the acquirer must own more than  50% of 
shares after the transaction; the transaction price must be available; and accounting 
data  on the target must be available. I drop deals where the target or the acquirer 
are in the financial sector. Finally, I exclude deals for which the pre-deal or post-deal 
acquirer’s q or target’s q are at the top or bottom  1% of the distribution. I supplement 
this da ta  with financial items from COMPUSTAT -  fundamentals quarterly database 
to  compute the pre-and post-merger acquirer’s <?.49 The pre-merger q is computed at
49 The reason I am using COMPUSTAT for the acquirer and SDC for the target financial information 
is the fact that a significant part of targets are private and therefore, this information is not available 
in COMPUSTAT.
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the end of the fiscal quarter immediately before the announcement date. The post­
merger q is computed at the end of the fiscal quarter immediately after the deal is 
complete. My final sample includes 3,351 deals.
To check tha t conglomerates are more acquisitive than standalones, I use COMPUSTAT- 
segments over 1988-2007 to identify multi-segment firms and standalones. I merge this 
firm panel with the Thompson Financial SDC Platinum database to evaluate the num­
ber and value of deals performed by conglomerates and standalones. This sample of 
deals includes completed transactions where more than 50% of the shares were owned 
by the acquirer post-deal. My final sample includes 79,224 firm-years and 15,876 M&A 
deals.
To study how M&A accounting affects the diversification discount I use the sample 
of firms included in the COMPUSTAT-segments data set over the 1988-2007 period.
In addition, these firms must meet the following criteria: positive sales, no business 
segments in financial sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6999), agriculture (SIC code lower than  
1000), government (SIC 9000) or other non-economic activities (SIC 8600 and 8800); 
unclassified services (SIC 8900) are excluded; firms for which the sum of business 
segments sales or assets deviate from the firm’s total sales or assets by more than  5% 
are also excluded. Firms with missing segment SIC-codes are excluded.50 The final 
sample consists of 79,224 firm-years.
3.3.2 Adjusting q, Deal Excess-value and Firm Excess-value
I adjust deal excess-value and firm excess-value measures in order to correct for the 
impact of M&A accounting.
Deal excess-value. I proxy for deal’s excess-value using the logarithm of the ratio 
between the merged firm’s q and the theoretical q of a portfolio tha t includes the 
target and the acquirer as standalones, as defined in section 2. q is defined as the 
ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets. The market 
value and book value of bo th  target and acquirer as standalones are obtained before 
the merger’s announcement date. Adjusted deal excess-value is defined in the same 
way, except for the book value of the merged firm, th a t I correct by subtracting 
the difference between the transaction price and the target’s pre-merger book value. 
Adjusted deal excess-value is only computed when the purchase m ethod is used.
Firm excess-value. I estim ate firm excess-value using several specifications. Firm 
excess-value corresponds to the logarithm of the ratio between the firms’ observed q 
and its imputed q, defined as the sales-weighted (or assets weighted) average the firm’s 
business segments hypothetical q. The hypothetical q is the median (or average) q of 
standalones in the same industry-year. The industry match is done at the 4-digit SIC
50My results are robust to replacing the missing segments’ SIC-codes with the main SIC code 
reported by the firm in order not to reduce the sample size of diversified firms.
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code level when there are five or more standalones. Otherwise, it is done at the highest 
level where a t least 5 standalones are available. The firm excess value - adjusted 
measure corresponds to the excess value measure where both observed and imputed 
q are corrected for goodwill. Goodwill is used as a proxy the difference between the 
transaction price and the pre-merger target’s book value because this difference cannot 
be obtained from financial statements. Goodwill-adjusted q corresponds therefore to 
the ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets minus 
goodwill.
3 .4  E m pirical resu lts
3.4.1 M&A Accounting and Tobin’s q
Table 3.1 summarizes the data  on completed deals, acquirer and target firms for both 
diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions. The average deal is $776 million and 
corresponds to the acquisition of 93% of the target’s equity. The average market value 
of the equity acquired is $710 million, meaning th a t the acquirer pays on average a 
premium of $65 million above the market value of the target. On average, the target’s 
q (3.47) is higher than the acquirer’s q pre-merger (2.42). However, despite merging 
on average with higher q firms, the acquirer’s’ q drops approximately 12% after the 
deal is complete. These two pieces of evidence together seem contradictory. On the 
one hand the acquirer pays a positive premium above the market value of the target 
which would be consistent with positive synergies arising from the merger. On the 
other hand the q of the merged firm is on average lower than  both the acquirer and 
the target’s pre-merger q.
Because in 86% of the deals the purchase method is applied, M&A accounting is a 
possible explanation for this effect. In addition, more than  95% of the acquirers have 
a pre-merger q higher than  1, what suggests tha t a significant proportion of acquirers 
experience a mechanical decrease in q when they merge, irrespective of the target’s q. 
Thus, I adjust the acquirer’s q post-merger to reflect the difference between the price 
paid for the target and its book value. Once q is corrected, the merged firm’s q turns 
out to be on average higher and the pre-merger q increasing from 2.42 to 2.54.
I then focus in diversifying mergers to check if they show this same pattern. A 
negative impact from a diversifying merger after correcting for M&A accounting would 
be consistent with a diversification discount. I consider a deal to be diversifying if the 
primary 2-digits SIC code of the acquirer differs from that of the target. Diversifying 
deals represent 38% of the sample and the average diversifying deal has a value of 
$553 million. The same negative effect on q after merging is observed for diversifying 
deals despite targets having higher q than  acquirer’s. This is not the case, again, once 
I correct q for M&A accounting.
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In 30% of the deals 100% of the transaction price is paid in stocks. For 100% cash 
payments the proportion of deals is 31%. In the case of stock-financed we can be sure 
th a t external financing is used. However, in the case of cash payments these might 
not correspond to  internal funds. In fact a significant proportion might correspond to 
debt financed deals.
Table 3.2 shows the average A q and deal excess-value, in particular for deals 
satisfying the conditions under which the purchase method and the pooling method 
imply conflicting effects on these variables.
W ith respect to Aq, the most frequent case is the one in which the acquirer has 
a q higher than  1 and merges with an higher q target. Under these conditions the 
purchase method implies a drop in q, but the pooling method an increase. Indeed, 
for deals using the purchase method the average pre-merger q is 1.96 and the post- 
merger q about 10% lower. For the deals satisfying the same conditions using the 
pooling method the q increases from 2.89 to 3.02. Once the post-merger q is corrected 
for the difference between transaction price and target’s book value for the deals 
using the purchase method, it increases to 2.32. The case in which the pre-merger 
acquirer’s q is lower than one but higher than  the target’s q implies a positive A q  
under the purchase method and a negative A q  under the pooling. However, there axe 
no observations under the pooling method satisfying these conditions.
This results suggest tha t firms choose not to use the pooling when they benefit 
from a mechanical increase in q while using the pooling. Remember that doing the 
opposite is more difficult to implement. Choosing the pooling instead of the purchase 
m ethod implies that the deal must qualify for pooling and satisfy all the 12 criteria.
Under the purchase method, as predicted, we observe an average increase in q 
(from 0.95 to 1.10). When adjusting the post-merger q, Aq gets reduced, but post­
merger q is still above pre-merger q. A possible explanation are synergies reflected on 
the market value of the merged firm.
I estimate deal excess-value as the log of the ratio between post-merger acquirer’s 
q and the theoretical q of a portfolio including the acquirer and the target. Under 
the purchase method, whenever the ratio between transaction price and target’s book 
value is higher than one this measure is under-estimated with respect to the pooling 
method. This is the most frequent situation and more than 95% of the deals in my 
sample satisfy this condition. For deals using the purchase m ethod satisfying this 
condition the average deal excess-value is -0.307, which is significantly lower than 
-0.155, the average deal excess-value for deals under the same conditions using the 
pooling method. This is consistent with most of the deals showing an underestimated 
excess-value. Once we correct this measure for deals using the purchase method, it 
increases to 0.197. Now, this value is significantly above the average deal excess-value 
under the pooling method, suggesting that pooling M&As perform worse than those 
using the purchase method, once we correct the books and make them  comparable.
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For the whole sample of pooling and purchase I find an average negative deal 
excess-value (-0.288 for deals using the purchase and -0.154 for deals using the pool­
ing). This result is not consistent with the M&A event studies’ findings of positive 
cumulative abnormal returns when jointly looking at acquirer and target. However, 
once the books of the merged firm are adjusted these two measures become reconciled. 
The adjusted deal excess-value measure suggests tha t on average the merged firm has 
an higher q than  the target and the acquirer together as standalones, which is consis­
tent with positive joint cumulative abnormal returns after the merger is announced.
Table 3.3 shows the regression analysis for the impact on A q of using the pooling 
versus the purchase method. The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm 
of the ratio between the merged firm’s q and pre-deal acquirer’s q. In regressions 2 and 
4, q is adjusted for the difference between transaction price and target’s pre-merger 
book value. As predicted, there is a significant negative impact on A q from the 
acquirer’s pre-merger q being higher than  one, for deals using the purchase method. 
This negative effect is reduced once q is adjusted and inexistent in the pooling method 
sub-sample once additional controls are added. It seems to be the case th a t the 
purchase method is generating part of this negative effect. In fact, these findings 
confirm prediction 2, according to which the purchase method generates a  mechanic 
drop in q whenever acquirer’s q is higher than  one.
According to prediction 1, under the purchase method, target’s q is not expected 
to explain A q. On the contrary, it should have a positive impact on A q when the 
pooling method is used and once q is adjusted under the purchase method. The 
regression results when the pooling m ethod and adjusted q are used are as predicted, 
except for regression 5 where the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. 
W hen the purchase method is used and acquirer’s q is not adjusted I still find an 
impact from target’s q. Nevertheless, this impact is either smaller when compared to 
the same regressions using adjusted q or negative.
As an additional test, I add a diversification dummy as a control in these regres­
sion models to check if the average A q  is significantly different within the groups of 
diversifying and non-diversifying deals. I find no statistically significant impact from 
performing a diversifying deal on Aq. This finding helps to support my main hy­
pothesis in two ways. First, it suggests th a t even if a  diversification discount exists, 
a t least, it is not being generated at the moment when the firm becomes diversified 
through an acquisition. Second it is consistent with the diversification discount beings 
explained by M&A accounting. In this particular framework, both diversifying and 
non-diversifying firms are performing acquisitions and are exposed to the effects of 
M&A accounting in exactelly the same way. If M&A accounting is indeed responsible 
for a mechanical drop in q, there is no reason for diversified acquisitions to  be more 
affected than non-diversifying ones.
Table 3.4 reports regression results estimating the impact of deals characteristics 
on deal excess-value. The dependent variable is deal excess-value in regressions 1,
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3, 5 and 6 and adjusted deal-excess-value in regressions 2 and 4. In order to test 
prediction 3 I include target’s q and premium-to-assets ratio as independent variables. 
Prediction 3 implies that deal excess value under the purchase method is decreasing in 
the difference between the transaction price and the target’s book value and increasing 
in synergies. To test this prediction, I split the difference between transaction price 
and target’s book value in two measures: target’s q and premium-to-assets. Because 
I have no proxy for synergies I assume they axe a positive function of the premium 
paid above the target’s market value. Thus, I expect unadjusted deal excess-value 
to be decreasing in both target’s q and premium-to-assets as long as synergies are 
lower tha t the premium. Once deal excess value gets adjusted and for the pooling 
sub-sample of deals, I expect target’s q to be neutral and premium-to-assets to have 
a positive effect as it is not inflating the books anymore and it is now just a proxy for 
the synergies.
Consistent with prediction 3, I find tha t the target’s q has a negative impact on 
non-adjusted deal excess value under the purchase method. This negative impact is 
significantly reduced when excess-value is corrected for purchase accounting and not 
significant when the pooling method is used. The impact of premium-to-assets on non­
adjusted excess value is not significantly different from zero. This is consistent with the 
negative effect of the premium itself being offset by the positive effect of the synergies 
th a t might being captured by this variable as well. Once the dependent variable gets 
adjusted, the premium is not expected to have a negative impact anymore and the 
effect turns to  be positive and significant, suggesting tha t positive synergies are being 
generated by combining the two firms. The same happens for the pooling subsample, 
where the premium has a positive and significant coefficient. And indeed, under the 
pooling method, excess value, is expected to depend positively and exclusively on the 
value of the synergies.
By including a diversification dummy in these regression models I test for a signif­
icantly different deal excess-value across diversifying and non-diversifying deals. This 
is in fact a clean and direct test for the diversification discount, in the sense tha t 
my benchmark are the two merging companies as standalones before the deal, and 
not an industry matched portfolio. If diversification destroys value, then deal excess- 
value should be negative, on average, for diversifying deals. I do not find this to be 
true: once I adjust for M&A accounting average deal excess value is +0.067 for di­
versifying deals. Moreover, I do not find a significant different deal excess-value for 
non-diversifying deals: the coefficient of the diversification dummy in these regressions 
in negative but not statistically significantly different from zero.
3.4.2 Diversified Firm vs. Standalones
Descriptive statistics for the panel of diversified and standalone firms are reported 
in Table 3.5. Conglomerates represent as much as 8% of the sample and they are
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on average bigger, have lower q, higher profitability and significantly lower capital 
expenditures. Consistent with the previous literature, diversified firms have negative 
excess-value between -0.05 and -0.46, depending on the variable specification. There 
is a significant difference from using the standalones industry average or median while 
estimating this measure, suggesting th a t extreme positive values of q occur for stand­
alones. Using business segments’ assets or sales as a weight to computed imputed 
q shows similar results. Once corrected for goodwill, diversified firms’ discount is 
reduced to values between -0.03 and -0.43. In the full sample, however, there is no 
significant difference between q and goodwill adjusted q.
Regarding M&A activity, conglomerates perform a slightly higher number of deals. 
These deals are also higher in value when compared to standalones. The average deal 
by a conglomerate has a transaction value of $173 million, while the full sample average 
is $112 million. This is also reflected in the fact that, on average, goodwill represents 
7% of the assets for conglomerates but less than 5% for standalones.
3.4.3 D o Conglom erates Acquire More?
There are several reasons to believe th a t diversified firms acquire and have acquired 
more in the past than  standalones. On the one hand, one of the reasons for being a 
conglomerate in the first place is probably the fact th a t the firm acquired one or more 
unrelated business in the past. In this case, being a conglomerate is just a consequence 
of past unrelated acquisitions. On the other hand, conglomerates are known to be on 
average bigger, older and less financially constrained than  standalones (Bodnaruk, 
Massa and Zhang 2009) and therefore to have more conditions to perform more and 
bigger acquisitions. My argument rests on the premise th a t diversified firms are more 
acquisitive than standalones and hence I test this hypothesis.
Table 3.6 shows the results of regressing a diversification dummy on the number of 
past acquisitions performed by a given firm. The sample is a  panel of 79,224 firm/years 
from COMPUSTAT segments. The dependent variable is the to tal number of past 
deals made by a firm until a given year. The number of deals is obtained from 
SDC-Platinum. I rely on SDC reporting all deals performed by firms in Compustat 
segments. If not, on the assumption tha t the deals not reported are random and not 
sistematically related to conglomerates or standalones. Prom the descriptive statistics, 
however, we know already th a t conglomerates have higher goodwill-to-assets ratio, 
suggesting that they do in fact perform more and bigger acquisitions than standalones.
I find a positive and significant correlation between being diversified and past M&A 
activity. The univariate tests show a positive correlation of 30% that increases to 41% 
once firm fixed effects are added. Adding firm size, q and profitability as controls 
reduces the size of the diversification dummy coefficient, However, I am not trying 
to establish a causal link between diversification and acquisitions, but only to show
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th a t diversified firms are more acquisitive than standalones irrespective of part of this 
correlation being due to size, for instance.
Together with the descriptive statistics, these results suggest tha t diversified firms 
have been involved in more deals than  standalones. This is consistent with conglom­
erates growing and /or becoming diversified by acquisitions. In this sense, they are 
more exposed to the effects of M&A accounting.
3.4.4 The G oodwill-adjusted Discount
Table 3.7 replicates the standard diversification discount regressions for the period: 
1988 to 2007 and adjusts this procedure for the impact of M&A accounting. The 
dependent variable in regression 1 is q. The dependent variable in regressions 3, 5, 7 
and 9 is firm excess-value using different specifications. Regressions 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 
use the same specifications variables as regressions 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 respectively, but 
corrected for goodwill.
Using non-adjusted q and firm excess-value as dependent variable I replicate the 
standard diversification discount finding. I estimate the non-adjusted diversification 
discount to  be between 0.04 and 0.11. These values are on average lower than  the ones 
in Berger and Ofek (1995), who find a diversification discount of 0.12. However, their 
sample is restricted to  the period 1986-1991. Bevelander (2002) finds a 0.08 discount 
using an extended sample: 1980-1998.
Once the dependent variable is corrected for goodwill, the diversification discount 
gets significantly reduced. W hen using q as dependent variable this correction is 14%. 
W hen firm-excess value is used, this reduction is between 34% and 51% and for two 
of the four specifications I do not find the diversification discount to be statistically 
significant anymore, suggesting tha t a significant proportion of it is explained by 
goodwill and due to  M&A accounting.
Moreover, this is a conservative adjustment to  q. Goodwill is only part of the 
difference between transaction price and target’s book value before the acquisition. 
Assuming no heterogeneity across diversified firms and standalones with respect to  the 
proportion of goodwill in the to tal difference between transaction price and target’s 
book value, this to tal difference is also expected to be bigger for conglomerates and 
the to tal correction would imply a greater reduction in the diversification discount.
The main implication of this finding is in terms of the average diversification 
discount. The discount gets significantly reduced after correcting for M&A accounting 
suggesting eventually a diversification premium once q is fully adjusted. This result 
is consistent with Villalonga (2004b) who finds a diversification premium using an 
alternative firm segments da ta  set to COMPUSTAT and helps to reconcile the previous 
observed discount with Schoar(2002) who finds tha t diversified firms can be more 
productive than stand alone firms, but still finds a discount when using stock market 
data.
102
3.4.5 The Change in M &A Accounting and the Diversification Discount
Since 2001, all firms doing mergers and acquisitions have to apply the purchase method 
of business combinations. This implies th a t more firms than in the past are affected 
by the mechanical drop in q. Indeed, firms th a t under the past regulation could have 
used the pooling method, now have to use the purchase method, and conglomerates 
are expected to be more exposed to this change and thus this should be reflected in 
term s of firm-excess value.
Table 3.8 reports the regression results of the impact of the new accounting rule 
on the diversification discount as typically measured. The dependent variable is q 
in regression 1 and firm excess-value in the remaining regressions. The dependent 
variables are not adjusted for goodwill.
The coefficient of interest corresponds to the interaction term  between the di­
versification dummy and post-2001 dummy. The estimated values for this coefficient 
suggest an additional diversification discount post-2001 between 0.02 and 0.08. Al­
though this coefficient is negative in all specifications, it is not significant in 2 out of 
the 5 specifications.
These findings suggest th a t the introduction of the accounting rule in 2001 creates 
a spurious additional diversification discount in the post-2001 period.
3.4.6 High vs. Low G oodwill Industries
If the diversification discount is explained by the fact th a t acquirers capitalise the 
premium paid above the target’s book value in their balance sheet, then in industries 
where lower or no premium is paid, one should observe lower no diversification discount 
as typically measured. I test the hypothesis tha t diversified firms in high goodwill 
industries have a higher diversification discount. The regression results are shown in 
table 3.9. The dependent variables are not adjusted for goodwill.
To define the high and low goodwill industries, I rank the 1-digit SIC code in­
dustries according to its average goodwill-to-assets ratio. The top goodwill industry 
corresponds to Health, Social, Legal, Education, Management and Accounting ser­
vices (SIC codes 8000-8999) and the bottom  one to Mining and construction (SIC 
codes 1000-1999). In the top goodwill industry goodwill represents 17% of the assets’ 
book value. In the bottom  goodwill industry this ratio is only 3%. I define a high 
goodwill dummy to be one if the 1-digit SIC code of the firm’s core-business is 8, and 
zero otherwise.
I find tha t firms in the top goodwill industry have a diversification discount tha t 
is higher than the average, and I find no significant diversification discount for firms 
in the bottom  goodwill industry. Diversified firms in the top goodwill industries show 
a statistically significant diversification discount tha t ranges between 0.17 and 0.24 
(this is given by the sum of the diversification dummy coefficient and the interaction
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term  between diversification dummy and high goodwill dummy). The diversification 
discount for the low goodwill industry is given by the coefficient of the diversification 
dummy, tha t is not statistically different from zero in any of the regressions.
These results are consistent with my rationale for diversification discount. In low 
goodwill industries diversified firms are not penalized from recognizing their assets 
a t the transaction price while standalones do not, because the difference between 
transaction price and book value is small. On the contrary, high goodwill firms show 
a higher than the average diversification discount. For instance, in specifications 4 
and 5, the diversification discount is higher than 0.2, while the average diversification 
discount in the full sample, using the same specification is about 0.05.
3.4.7 Differences-in-differences Estim ator
So far we learned th a t the change in accounting rule in 2001 drives an extra diversifi­
cation discount in the post 2001 period, and also tha t firms in high goodwill industries 
are more exposed to  the accounting artefact generated by using the purchase method. 
In this subsection I link these two pieces of evidence to test if the diversification 
discount is in fact explained by M&A accounting using a triple differences and a 
differences-in-differences estimator. The 2001 change in accounting rule is a proper 
exogenous event to  firms th a t is expected to affect mostly firms in the high goodwill 
industries. Therefore, diversified firms in the top goodwill industry correspond to  the 
treatm ent group and the ones in the low goodwill industry to the control group. Table 
3.10 reports these findings.
Regressions 1, and 3 to  6 correspond to the triple-differences tests. Regressions 
2 and 7 to 10 correspond to the pure differences-in-differences test. The dependent 
variables are q and firm excess-value non-adjusted for goodwill.
In the triple-differences test, the main explanatory variable of interest is the triple 
interaction term: high goodwill*post-2001*diversification dummy. In all specifications 
of firm excess-value, the coefficient of this variable is negative and significant, imply­
ing an additional discount for diversified firms, in the top goodwill industry, after the 
change in accounting rule. Using q, this coefficient is still negative but not statisti­
cally significant. The firm excess-value regressions suggest a post-2001, high goodwill, 
diversification discount between 0.3 and 0.5. The coefficients of the remaining dummy 
variables are mostly not significant across the different specifications.
I do a similar test using pure differences-in-differences, where I restrict the sample 
to diversified firms. The findings support the previous evidence. The coefficient of 
interest in this case is just the interaction term  between the high goodwill dummy (the 
treatm ent group) and the post-2001 dummy, because all firms included in the sample 
are diversified. The coefficient on the interaction term  is negative and significant for 
all specifications, except for one. The magnitude of the post 2001- high goodwill 
discount ranges between 0.30 and 0.47.
104
This evidence is consistent with M&A accounting explaining the diversification 
discount. By linking the time series event with the cross sectional heterogeneity helps 
to  reject other possible effects post-2001 tha t could be driving the discount, and other 
possible differences between high and low goodwill firms tha t could also be driving the 
previous results. One concern regarding the previous interpretation would be the case 
in which firms in high goodwill industries would change their M&A policy because of 
the change in accounting rules. But in tha t scenario, we would expect them to engage 
in less M&A not to suffer from the accounting artefact, what would be contradicting 
to what I find. The other possibility would be firms in high goodwill industries start 
engaging in particularly value destroying diversification strategies after 2001 when 
compared to low goodwill firms. Since there is no apparent reason for this to  occur, 
the change in M&A accounting seems to  be responsible for these findings.
3.5  R ob u stn ess  and  D iscu ssion
3.5.1 Correcting for the Total Difference Between Transaction Price and 
Taget’s Book Value
Table 3.11 shows 20 deals from SDC platinum dataset th a t coincide with the acquirer 
reporting to become diversified for the first time in COMPUSTAT Segments dataset 
and for which the accounting method applied is reported to be the purchase method.51 
For this small sample of firms I am able to identify exactly the difference between the 
transaction price and the target’s book value and also the goodwill recognized by the 
acquirer in its books. I find that the total premium paid in excess of book value is 
approximately 3 times the book value of the target and th a t goodwill represents 58% 
of this premium.
I also check the impact on acquirer’s q of these first diversifying acquisitions. The 
average q for this small sample of acquirers before the merger is 2.34 and drops to 
1.72 after the deal. Then, I adjust the post-merger q for the total difference between 
the transaction price and the target’s book value and find no decrease in q. In fact, 
the average adjusted q is 2.67, which is significantly higher than the q before the 
acquisition. This finding is consistent with the ones already reported for the full 
sample of M&A deals.
At this stage, knowing the weight of goodwill in the to ta l difference between the 
transaction price and the book value of the target, I can estimate an adjustment to q 
th a t is closest to the full one and not bounded by goodwill. Table 3.12 shows these 
results.
The to tal difference between transaction price and target’s book value is estimated 
to be 1.72*Goodwill. All specifications in table 3.12 correspond to adjusted measures
51 The size of this sample is consistent with Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) who find only 57 
companies performing acquisitions and reporting a segment increase, during the period 1980 to 1995.
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of q and excess-value based on this assumption. Specifications 1 and 3 to 6 are OLS 
regressions while specifications 2 and 7 to 10 are firm fixed effects regressions. The 
results with q and without firm fixed effects still show a significant diversification dis­
count. However, once I control for firm fixed effects I find a significant diversification 
premium. The excess value regressions suggest either a zero or small diversification 
premium. Regressions 7 and 8 show a statistically significant diversification premium 
around 0.03. Although this evidence is not very strong nor robust in favour of a diver­
sification premium, it suggests th a t correcting for the full impact of M&A accounting 
helps to reject the hypothesis of a diversification discount.
3.5.2 M arket-to-sales Discount
Although the main performance variable used to measure the diversification discount 
in the literature is q, Berger and Ofek (1995) and others have used alternative mea­
sures. The market-to-sales is particularly relevant in this framework, because it is 
immune to the M&A accounting artefact described in this paper. And in fact, if we 
replicate the main regression model with market-to-sales and excess market-to-sales 
we still observe a negative and significant coefficient for the  diversification dummy. 
Table 3.13 reports these results. A market-to-sales discount is, however, consistent 
with the conglomerates being at a latter stage of the firm life cycle, by opposition to 
standalones tha t tend to be younger firms. As younger firms, the standalones have 
higher growth opportunities, but also lower sales and therefore this ratio tends to be 
quite small for them. This explanation is consistent with the evidence in Bevelander 
(2002) who finds tha t age can explain half of the diversification discount measured 
with q.
To address this issue, I test if the observed diversification discount in terms of 
market-to-sales is generated at the moment of a diversifying acquisition. I repeat the 
tests reported in tables 3.3 and 3.4, using market-to-sales instead of q. Table 3.14 
reports these results. I find no negative impact of diversification on market-to-sales 
either by looking at deal excess market-to-sales or by looking a t A market-to-sales. 
In the deal excess market-to-sales regressions the diversification dummy coefficient is 
even positive, although not statistically significant.
These results can coexists with the fact tha t diversified firms have lower market- 
to-sales. W hat they show is that this discount is not created at the moment of di­
versification, at least for firms tha t diversify via acquisition. These results are also 
consistent with the ones previously shown for deal excess-value and A q.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper shows th a t the diversification discount measured with Tobin’s q can be 
explained by M&A accounting. Most frequently, the purchase method creates a me­
chanical drop in acquirer’s q once the deal is completed. This happens because the 
premium paid above the target’s book value is capitalized in the balance sheet of the 
acquirer and inflates the post-merger book value of assets. Because diversified firms 
are more acquisitive than  standalones, their q tends to be lower generating a spurious 
diversification discount.
My argument rests in two main premises and I provide evidence on those. First, 
using M&A deals data, I show that q drops on average after a deal is complete and 
th a t this effect is generated by the purchase method of M&A accounting. I also show 
th a t this effect is reversed once q is corrected for the difference between the transaction 
price and the book value of the target. Then, I show that conglomerates are more 
likely to have been acquirers in the past than stand alone firms.
I suggest a simple correction to q to adjust for this bias, that consists in computing 
q using the book value of assets minus goodwill in the denominator. I replicate the 
standard regressions in the diversification discount literature adjusting q for goodwill 
and I find the average diversification discount to be significantly smaller (abour 40% 
lower). For some excess-value specifications the diversification discount is not statisti­
cally different from zero. These results help to reconcile the results in Schoar (2002), 
who finds a diversification premium using plant productivity data, but a discount 
when using market data.
This correction has implications not only for the average diversification discount 
bu t also for its time series and cross sectional properties. I find tha t the traditional 
excess value approach suggests an additional diversification discount post-2001, when 
the purchase m ethod is compulsory for all firms. In the cross section, I find an higher 
than average diversification discount in the top goodwill industry and no significant 
discount in the bottom  goodwill industry. These findings are consistent with the 
diversification discount being generated by M&A accounting and more severe for firms 
th a t acquirer with higher premium over the target’s book value.
I then link the evidence on the time series and cross section in a differences-in- 
differences approach. I estimate the impact of the exogenous change in the accounting 
rules in 2001 using the top goodwill industry as my treatm ent group and the bottom 
goodwill industry as my control group. I find evidence of an extra diversification 
discount in the period after the change in the accounting rule for firms in the treatm ent 
group.
Finally, because the goodwill adjustment is a conservative correction I estimate 
the magnitude of the full difference between transaction price and book value and 
its impact on the average diversification discount. I find a diversification premium in 
some of the excess value specifications.
107
This papers contributes to the corporate diversification literature with additional 
evidence on the average diversification discount and also on its time series and cross 
sectional characteristics. It suggests a methodological correction to account for the 
impact of M&A accounting in excess value.
Future research may explore the impact of M&A accounting on other cross sec­
tional and time-series properties of the diversification discount. For instance, the 
diversification discount tim e series might be affected by the proportion of firms that 
used the pooling method vs the pooling m ethod before 2001. On the cross section, 
the diversification discount is known to be more severe for conglomerates with more 
dispersed qs, but these may as well be biased due to M&A accounting.
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3 .7  Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics - Deals
The sample corresponds to deals for which financial information is available for both the target and the 
bidder during the period 1984 to 2007. Accounting variables are from the most recent available quarterly 
report before the deal, except for post-merger q, which is from the first quarterly report available after the 
deal is complete, q is defined as the ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets. 
The market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity, q adjusted is the ratio between the market value of assets and adjusted book value 
of assets. Adjusted book value of assets is assets minus the difference between the transaction price and 
target’s book value before the deal. Total difference is the difference between the transaction price and the 
book value of acquired net assets. Target’s q is the ratio between market value and book value of target’s 
assets before the deal. Transaction premium is the difference between transaction price and market value 
of acquired equity. Purchase method dummy is one if the acquirer uses the purchase method and zero if it 
uses the pooling of interests. Diversifying acquisition dummy is one if the primary 2-digits SIC code of the 
acquirer is different from the one of the target. Stock payment dummy is one if 100% of the transaction 
is paid in stocks. Cash payment dummy is one if 100% of the transaction price is paid in cash. N is the 
number of non-missing observations.
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max -  N
P anel A - Full sam ple
Pre-deal Acquirer’s q 2.41 1.84 1.75 0.79 15.98 3,349
Post-deal Acquirer’s q 2.13 1.65 1.41 0.81 10.45 3,349
Post-deal Acquirer’s q Adjusted 2.54 1.90 1.88 0.58 16.34 3,349
Deal Excess-value -0.27 -0.11 1.07 -12.93 6.59 3,349
Deal Excess-value Adjusted 0.14 0.04 1.33 -11.35 13.84 3,349
Target’s q 3.47 2.14 4.28 0.65 43.47 3,349
Total assets - Target ($MM) 505.83 74.37 2,066.03 0.06 56,553.00 3,349
Net assets - Target ($MM) 191.17 31.60 837.15 -994.19 23,534.00 3,349
Total Equity Market Value - Target ($MM) 770.36 118.27 3,443.35 0.05 89,165.59 3,349
Percentage of shares acquired 92.50 100.00 20.63 0.37 100.00 3,349
Market value of shares acquired 711.84 102.00 3,373.44 0.05 89,165.59 3,349
Transaction Value ($MM) 777.01 112.20 3,513.48 0.05 89,167.72 3,349
Total difference ($MM) 606.17 72.74 2,949.75 -496.48 84,069.42 3,349
Transaction premium ($MM) 65.17 0.00 378.94 -3,188.50 9,999.97 3,349
Purchase method dummy 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 3,349
Diversifying acquisition dummy 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 3,349
Stock payment dummy 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 3,349
Cash payment dummy 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 3,349
P anel B - D iversifying acquisitions
Pre-deal Acquirer’s q 2.35 1.80 1.70 0.80 14.17 1,258
Post-deal Acquirer’s q 2.07 1.61 1.32 0.81 10.45 1,258
Post-deal Acquirer’s q Adjusted 2.39 1.84 1.64 0.81 13.01 1,258
Deal Excess-value -0.25 -0.10 1.06 -11.64 6.59 1,258
Deal Excess-value Adjusted 0.07 0.01 1.24 -11.35 9.67 1,258
Target’s q 3.48 2.14 4.48 0.66 43.47 1,258
Total assets - Target ($MM) 350.22 63.27 1,290.50 0.07 31,248.00 1,258
Net assets - Target ($MM) 145.94 26.34 653.47 -581.74 18,775.00 1,258
Total Equity Market Value - Target ($MM) 573.41 100.26 2,351.45 0.05 54,906.81 1,258
Percentage of shares acquired 92.86 100.00 20.07 2.19 100.00 1,258
Market value of shares acquired 515.04 87.92 2,132.55 0.05 54,906.81 1,258
Transaction Value ($MM) 552.57 94.94 2,180.39 0.05 54,906.81 1,258
Total difference ($MM) 431.63 62.37 1,913.04 -305.54 52,070.81 1,258
Transaction premium ($MM) 37.53 0.00 218.39 -1,055.62 5,000.00 1,258
Purchase method dummy 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 1,258
Stock payment dummy 0.29 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 1,258
Cash payment dummy 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 1,258
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Table 3.2: Purchase vs. Pooling: q and Deal excess-value
This table shows the average pre and post-merger acquirer’s q and deal excess value for all deals and under 
the conditions which the pooling and the purchase method imply conflicting results, q is defined as the ratio 
between the market value of assets and the book value of assets, g-adjusted is the ratio between market 
value of assets and adjusted book value of assets where adjusted book value of assets is assets minus the 
difference between the transaction price and the target’s book value. Deal excess-value is the log of the 
ratio between post-merger acquirer’s q and the theoretical q of a portfolio including the acquirer and the 
target. Adjusted deal excess-value is calculated using post-merger adjusted q. Pre-merger data is from the 
quarterly report immediately before the deal is announced. Post-merger data is from the quarterly report 
immediately after the deal is completed. is the ratio between the transaction price and the target’s
book value. N is the number of non missing observations.
Purchase Method Pooling Method
pre-merger
9
post-merger
9
post-merger 
q adj.
N pre-merger
9
post-merger
9
N
Qt  <  Q A < 1 0.95 1.10 1.09 18 - - -
q T  > Q A > 1 1.96 1.78 2.32 1,636 2.89 3.02 300
All deals 2.25 1.95 2.42 2,864 3.36 3.18 485
Deal Excess Value
non- adjusted N non- N
M ^ ± P  <1 adjusted adjusted0.095 0.030 140 0.440 1
> , -0.307 0.197 2,722 -0.155 484
All deals -0.288 0.189 2,864 -0.154 485
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Table 3.3: Purchase vs Pooling: Change in q Regressions
This table shows the impact of the purchase vs. the pooling method on the difference between post-merger 
q and pre-merger acquirer’s q. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio between post-merger q and 
pre-merger acquirer’s q. The adjusted difference is calculated using the post-deal acquirer’s q adjusted 
for the difference between transaction price and the target’s book value. Pre-merger data is from the 
quarterly report immediately before the deal is announced. Post-merger data is from the quarterly report 
immediately after the deal is completed. Models (1) to (4) include only deals where the purchase method 
was used. Models (5) and (6) include only deals where the pooling method was used. Acquirer’s q > l is 
a dummy equal to one if pre-merger acquirer’s q is higher than 1. Transaction premium is the difference 
between the transaction price and the market value of the acquired equity. Diversifying acquisition dummy 
is one when the target and acquirer have different 2-digits SIC codes. Target’s weight is the ratio of the 
transaction price to the book value of the acquirer after the deal. Cash (stock) payment dummy is one 
if 100% of the deal is paid with cash (stocks). Acquirer’s size is the book value of the acquirer’s assets 
pre-merger. Deal value corresponds to the transaction price. N is the number of non-missing observations.
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6)
Purchase Pooling
Acquirer’s q >1 dummy -0.242 -0.203 -0.134 -0.095 -0.108 0.039
[-11.3] [-6.10] [-4.84] [-2.03] [-5.04] [0.90]
Target’s q -0.009 0.005 0.007 0.020 0.006 0.011
[-4.37] [2.23] [2.59] [5.21] [1.19] [1.91]
Acquirer’s q pre-merger -0.090 -0.079 -0.062
[-10.00] [-7.68] [-4.59]
Log Transaction premium -0.001 - 0.000 -0.003
[-1.05] [-0.38] [-0.62]
Div. acquisition dummy -0.015 -0.015 -0.033
[-1.18] [-0.90] [-0.73]
Target’s weight -0.041 0.107 0.179
[-2.07] [0.91] [2.69]
Cash payment dummy 0.021 -0.013
[1.40] [-0.74]
Stock payment dummy 0.020 0.028 0.028
[0.89] [0.97] [0.50]
Log acquirer’s size 0.043 -0.028 0.047
[9.48] [-2.44] [2.34]
Log deal’s value -0.045 0.032 -0.031
[-8.92] [2.60] [-1.37]
Constant 0.150 0.236 0.115 0.286 0.046 -0.141
[7.06] [7.15] [3.32] [4.40] [3.62] [-1.36]
Observations 2,867 2,867 1,537 1,537 484 254
R-squared 0.044 0.018 0.306 0.163 0.006 0.161
Adjusted q
D ependent variable specifications: 
No Yes No Yes No No
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Table 3.4: Deal Excess-value regressions
This table shows the determinants of deal excess-value under the purchase and pooling methods. Deal 
excess-value is the difference between post-merger acquirer’s log q and the theoretical log q of a portfolio 
including the acquirer and the target. Adjusted deal excess-value is calculated using post-merger adjusted q. 
Pre-merger data is from the quarterly report immediately before the deal is announced. Post-merger data is 
from the quarterly report immediately after the deal is completed. Target q is the ratio between the market 
value and the book value of target’s assets pre-merger. Premium-to-assets is the ratio between transaction 
premium and the post-merger book value of merged firm’s assets. Transaction premium is the difference 
between transaction price and market value of acquired net assets before the deal. Diversifying acquisition 
dummy is one when the target and acquirer have different 2-digits SIC codes. Target’s weight is the ratio 
of the transaction price to the book value of the acquirer after the deal. Cash (stock) payment dummy is 
one if 100% of the deal is paid with cash (stocks). Acquirer’s size is the book value of the acquirer’s assets 
pre-merger. Deal value corresponds to the transaction price. N is the number of non-missing observations.
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6)
Purchase Pooling
Target’s q -0.017 -0.003 -0.016 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
[-7.30] [-1.50] [-7.23] [-2.14] [-0.50] [-0.35]
Premium-to-assets -0.006 0.018 0.003 0.013 0.028 0.028
[-0.63] [4.59] [0.43] [3.28] [1.98] [2.03]
Div. acquisition dummy -0.017 -0.017 -0.024
[-1.62] [-1.49] [-0.76]
Target’s weight -0.023 0.229 0.007
[-0.78] [1.62] [0.16]
Cash payment dummy 0.014 -0.021
[1.36] [-1.95]
Stock payment dummy -0.020 -0.027 -0.016
[-1.19] [-1.46] [-0.59]
Log acquirer’s size 0.047 -0.010 0.031
[11.7] [-0.82] [1.94]
Log deal’s value -0.056 0.004 -0.032
[-12.6] [0.35] [-1.97]
Constant -0.064 0.056 -0.117 0.081 -0.042 -0.060
[-8.29] [7.46] [-5.41] [1.59] [-1.96] [-0.89]
Observations 2867 2867 2831 2831 484 481
R-squared 0.058 0.004 0.159 0.071 0.003 0.020
Adjusted q
D ependent variable specifications: 
No Yes No Yes No No
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics - Firms
This table shows descriptive statistics for diversified and standalone firms between 1988 and 2007. q is 
defined as the ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets, being the market value 
of assets defined as the book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, 
q Gw adjusted is the ratio between market value of assets and adjusted book value of assets. Adjusted 
book value of assets is assets minus goodwill. Goodwill-to-assets is the ratio of goodwill to total assets. 
Ebit-to-sales is the ratio of Ebit (earnings before interest and taxes) to net sales. Capex-to-sales is the ratio 
of capital expenditures to net sales. Diversification dummy is one when the firm reports more than one 
business segment. Number of segments is the number of business segments reported by the firm. Number 
of deals is the number of past M&A deals by the firm. Transaction value is the value of the deal. Firm 
excess-value corresponds to the logarithm of the ratio between the firms’ q and its imputed q. Imputed q 
is defined as the sales-weighted (assets-weighted) average of firm’s business segments hypothetical q. The 
hypothetical q is the industry median (average) q of standalones in the same industry/year. The 4-digit 
SIC code is used in this match whenever there are five or more standalones in the industry. If there are less 
than five standalones the next SIC code level is used, and so forth. The firm excess-value — Gw adjusted 
measure corresponds to the firm excess-value measure where q is adjusted for goodwill. N is the number 
of non-missing firm-year observations.
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
P anel A - Full sample
q 2.80 1.58 3.98 0.55 28.80 79,224
q - Gw adjusted 2.96 1.71 4.15 0.57 29.94 79,224
Goodwill-to-assets 0.05 0.00 0.11 -0.04 0.99 79,224
Total Assets (MM$) 734.29 63.90 3522.75 0.00 244192.50 79,224
Ebit-to-sales -1.04 0.04 4.10 -24.17 0.40 79,224
Capex-to-sales 0.18 0.04 0.46 0.00 2.84 79,224
Diversification dummy 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 79,224
Number of segments 1.13 1.00 0.52 1.00 10.00 79,224
Number of deals 0.18 0.00 0.73 0.00 70.00 79,224
Transaction value ($MM) 111.53 7.00 561.48 0.00 27,861.29 9,652
P anel B - D iversified firm s
9 1.79 1.31 1.98 0.55 28.80 6,107
q - Gw adjusted 1.96 1.43 2.13 0.57 29.94 6,107
Goodwill-to-assets 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.81 6,107
Total Assets (MM$) 1525.60 223.06 3799.34 0.02 59305.00 6,107
Ebit-to-sales -0.09 0.07 1.39 -24.17 0.40 6,107
Capex-to-sales 0.05 0.01 0.20 0.00 2.84 6,107
Number of segments 2.66 2.00 0.96 2.00 10.00 6,107
Number of deals 0.19 0.00 0.81 0.00 22.00 6,107
Transaction value ($MM) 173.45 12.43 661.50 0.00 12,455.22 1,184
Excess value measures:
Assets weight - Ind. median -0.05 -0.08 0.52 -3.08 4.21 6,095
Assets weight - Ind. median - Gw adjusted -0.03 -0.07 0.53 -2.95 4.20 6,095
Sales weight - Ind. median -0.05 -0.08 0.52 -3.08 3.35 6,103
Sales weight - Ind. median - Gw adjusted -0.03 -0.07 0.53 -2.95 3.38 6,103
Assets weight - Ind. average -0.46 -0.42 0.61 -3.09 3.08 6,095
Assets weight - Ind. average - Gw adjusted -0.43 -0.40 0.61 -3.00 3.06 6,095
Sales weight - Ind. average -0.46 -0.42 0.62 -3.09 2.69 6,103
Sales weight - Ind. average - Gw adjusted -0.43 -0.39 0.62 -3.00 2.67 6,103
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Table 3.6: Past Deals Regressions
The sample includes diversified and standalones US publicly traded firms from 1988 to 
2007. The dependent variable in all regressions is the past number of deals performed by a 
firm at a given date. Div. dummy is one if the firm reports more than one business segment. 
Log Assets-adjusted is the log of assets minus goodwill. Log q - Gw adjusted is the log of 
the ratio between market value of assets and book value of assets minus goodwill. T-stats 
are reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. N is the number of 
non-missing firm-year observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Past Deals
Div. dummy 0.288 0.407 -0.067 0.083 -0.045 0.087
[4.56] [5.24] [-0.30] [1.12] [-0.20] [1.19]
Log Assets 0.284 0.709 0.299 0.742
[16.5] [21.8] [15.8] [21.6]
Log q - Gw adjusted 0.245 0.197
[9.21] [8.89]
Ebit-to-sales 0.018 -0.008
[10.1] [-4.72]
Constant 0.872 0.863 -0.272 -2.037 -0.487 -2.320
[93.2] [144] [-5.14] [-15.2] [-6.52] [-15.4]
Observations 79,224 79,224 79,224 79,224 79,224 79,224
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.050 0.090 0.054 0.094
Firm fixed effects no yes no yes; no yes
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Table 3.7: q and Firm Excess-value Regressions - Adjusting for Goodwill
The sample includes diversified and standalones US publicly traded firms from 1988 to 2007. Log q is the log of the ratio 
between the market value of assets and the book value of assets. Log q corrected for goodwill is the log of the ratio between 
market value of assets and book value of assets minus goodwill. Firm excess-value is the log of the ratio between q and imputed 
q. Imputed q is the segments’ assets-weighted (sales-weighted) average q. Segment’s q corresponds to the median (average) 
q of stand alones in the same 4-digits SIC industry. Excess-value corrected for goodwill is computed using goodwill adjusted 
q. Diversification dummy is one if the firm reports more than one business segment. Log Assets - adjusted is the log of assets 
minus goodwill. Capex-to-sales is capital expenditures divided by total sales. Ebit-to-sales is earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by sales. T-stats are reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. N is the number of non-missing 
firm-year observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log q Firm Excess-Value
Div. Dummy -0.112 -0.096 -0.037 -0.018 -0.039 -0.021 -0.054 -0.035 -0.056 -0.037
[-8.04] [-6.62] [-2.74] [-1.31] [-2.92] [-1.49] [-3.68] [-2.35] [-3.82] [-2.49]
Assets -0.082 -0.054 -0.054 -0.031 -0.031
[-26.5] [-18.6] [-18.6] [-10.1] [-10.1]
Assets-adjusted -0.079 -0.050 -0.050 -0.027 -0.027
[-25.6] [-17.1] [-17.1] [-9.07] [-9.10]
Ebit-to-sales -0.049 -0.049 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.033
[-33.2] [-32.9] [-20.0] [-20.3] [-20.0] [-20.3] [-20.9] [-21.2] [-21.0] [-21.2]
Capx-to-sales -0.063 -0.089 -0.026 -0.035 -0.026 -0.035 -0.050 -0.067 -0.050 -0.067
[-6.66] [-9.23] [-2.77] [-3.69] [-2.77] [-3.68] [-5.27] [-7.03] [-5.29] [-7.04]
Constant 0.710 0.729 0.274 0.248 0.274 0.248 -0.120 -0.131 -0.119 -0.130
[47.2] [48.7] [19.1] [17.4] [19.1] [17.4] [-8.06] [-8.89] [-8.03] [-8.85]
Observations 79224 79224 79212 79212 79220 79220 79212 79212 79220 79220
R-squared 0.196 0.194 0.087 0.080 0.088 0.080 0.093 0.086 0.094 0.087
D ependent variable specifications:
Industry average - - no no no no yes yes yes yes
Industry median - - yes yes yes yes no no no no
Assets weight - - yes yes no no yes yes no no
Sales weight - - no no yes yes no no yes yes
Goodwill correction no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
T ab le  3.8: The Impact of the Change in Mergers and Acquisitions Accounting 
Rules on the Diversification Discount
The sample includes diversified and standalones US publicly traded firms from 1988 to 2007. Log q is the 
log of the ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets. Firm excess-value is the log 
of the ratio between q and imputed q. Imputed q is the segments’ assets-weighted (sales-weighted) average 
q. Segment’s q corresponds to the median (average) q of standalones in the same 4-digits SIC industry. 
Diversification dummy is one if the firm reports more than one business segment. Post-2001 Dummy is one 
if the year is 2001 or after. Capex-to-sales is capital expenditures divided by total sales. Ebit-to-sales is 
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. T-stats are reported in brackets. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. N is the number of non-missing firm-year observations.
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 )
Log q Firm Excess-value
Div. Dummy -0.091 -0.031 -0.026 -0.045 -0.037
[-5.96] [-2.12] [-1.78] [-2.92] [-2.42]
Post-2001 Dummy 0.455 0.034 0.034 -0.202 -0.203
[28.6] [2.10] [2.10] [-11.6] [-11.7]
Post-2001Div. Dummy -0.078 -0.023 -0.049 -0.033 -0.069
[-2.99] [-0.86] [-1.83] [-1.10] [-2.27]
Log Assets -0.082 -0.054 -0.054 -0.031 -0.031
[-26.5] [-18.6] [-18.6] [-10.1] [-10.1]
Log Assets-adjusted
Ebit-to-sales -0.049 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032
[-33.2] [-20.0] [-20.0] [-20.9] [-20.9]
Capx-to-sales -0.063 -0.026 -0.026 -0.050 -0.050
[-6.63] [-2.76] [-2.75] [-5.26] [-5.27]
Constant 0.708 0.273 0.273 -0.120 -0.121
[47.1] [19.1] [19.0] [-8.12] [-8.15]
Observations 79,224 79,212 79,220 79,212 79,220
R-squared 0.196 0.087 0.088 0.093 0.094
Dependent variable specifications:
Industry average - no no yes yes
Industry median - yes yes no no
Assets weight - yes no yes no
Sales weight - no yes no yes
116
Table 3.9: q and Firm Excess-value Regressions - High vs. Low Goodwill Industries
The sample includes diversified and standalones US publicly traded firms from 1988 to 2007, in the top and 
bottom goodwill-to-assets industries (SIC 8 and SIC 1, respectively). Log q is the log of the ratio between 
the market value of assets and the book value of assets. Firm excess-value is the log of the ratio between 
q and imputed q. Imputed q is the segments’ assets-weighted (sales-weighted) average q. Segment’s q 
corresponds to the median (average) q of standalones in the same 4-digits SIC industry. Diversification 
dummy is one if the firm reports more than one business segment. High Gw is a dummy equal to one if 
the firm is in the top goodwill industry (SIC 8) and zero otherwise. Capex-to-sales is capital expenditures 
divided by total sales. Ebit-to-sales is Earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. T-stats are 
reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. N is the number of non-missing firm-year 
observations.
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5)
Log q Firm Excess-value
Div. Dummy*High Gw -0.166 -0.171 -0.151 -0.237 -0.216
[-2.07] [-2.10] [-1.84] [-2.76] [-2.48]
Div Dummy 0.002 -0.018 -0.038 0.000 -0.010
[0.046] [-0.40] [-0.85] [0.0045] [-0.19]
High Gw 0.241 -0.022 -0.022 0.094 0.094
[7.48] [-0.73] [-0.72] [2.94] [2.94]
Log Assets -0.073 -0.062 -0.061 -0.049 -0.049
[-8.48] [-7.54] [-7.50] [-6.05] [-6.03]
Ebit-to-sales -0.038 -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 -0.029
[-8.74] [-7.41] [-7.42] [-7.50] [-7.51]
Capex-to-sales 0.014 -0.004 -0.003 -0.038 -0.038
[0.81] [-0.22] [-0.18] [-2.24] [-2.23]
Constant 0.469 0.301 0.300 -0.114 -0.116
[10.4] [6.91] [6.88] [-2.53] [-2.57]
Observations 9,734 9,734 9,734 9,734 9,734
R-squared 0.215 0.113 0.113 0.147 0.148
D ependent variable specifications:
Industry average - no no yes yes
Industry median - yes yes no no
Assets weight - yes no yes no
Sales weight - no yes no yes
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Table 3.10: Differences-in-differences(-in-differences)
In specifications (1) and (3) to (6) the sample includes diversified firms and standalones from 1988 to 2007, in the top and 
bottom goodwill-to-assets industries (SIC 8 and SIC 1, respectively). In specifications (2) and (7) to (10) this sample is 
restricted to diversified firms. Log q is the log of the ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets. 
Firm excess-value is the log of the ratio between q and imputed q. Imputed q is the segments’ assets-weighted (sales-weighted) 
average q. Segment’s q corresponds to the median (average) q of standalones in the same 4-digits SIC industry. Diversification 
dummy is one if the firm reports more than one business segment. High Cw is a dummy equal to one if the firm is in the top 
goodwill industry (SIC 8) and zero otherwise. Post-2001 Dummy is one if the year is 2001 or after. Capex-to-sales is capital 
expenditures divided by total sales. Ebit-to-sales is Earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. T-stats are reported in 
brackets. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. N is the number of non-missing firm-year observations.
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6) ( 7) (8) (9 ) (10)
Log q Firm Excess-Value
High Gw * Post 2001 * Div -0.250 -0.436 -0.318 -0.532 -0.415
[-1.47] [-2.38] [-1.72] [-2.69] [-2.02]
High Gw Post 2001 -0.036 -0.318 -0.004 -0.004 0.141 0.141 -0.473 -0.342 -0.411 -0.295
[-0.72] [-1.92] [-0.092] [■■0.085] [2.64] [2.64] [-2.50] [-1.80] [-2.01] [-1.38]
High Gw Div. Dummy -0.112 -0.077 -0.081 -0.118 -0.121
[-1.27] [-0.87] [-0.91] [-1.28] [-1.31]
Post-2001 Div. Dummy 0.041 0.223 0.100 0.320 0.207
[0.35] [1.71] [0.80] [2.21] [1.47]
Div. dummy -0.005 -0.063 -0.059 -0.068 -0.055
[-0.13] [-1.53] [-1.39] [-1.59] [-1.22]
High Gw dummy 0.250 0.149 -0.021 -0.021 0.058 0.058 -0.097 -0.092 -0.069 -0.067
[7.66] [1.71] [-0.70] [-0.68] [1.85] [1.85] [-1.09] [-1.02] [-0.75] [-0.71]
Post 2001 dummy 0.473 0.533 0.009 -0.002 -0.455 -0.465 0.458 0.382 -0.009 -0.014
[8.98] [2.49] [0.17] [--0.032] [-8.10] [-8.38] [2.04] [1.57] [-0.033] [-0.046]
Observations 9,734 602 9,734 9,734 9,734 9,734 602 602 602 602
R-squared 0.215 0.142 0.114 0.114 0.150 0.150 0.127 0.103 0.174 0.170
D ependent variable specifications:
Industry average - no no yes yes no no yes yes
Industry median - yes yes no no yes yes no no
Assets weight - yes no yes no yes no yes no
Sales weight - no yes no yes no yes no yes
Table 3.11: Diversifying Acquisitions - impact on q
T he sam ple includes only deals th at coincide w ith the acquirer reporting to become diversified for the first tim e, for which the accounting m ethod is known 
and for which accounting inform ation on the target is available, q is the ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets, q Adjusted  
is the ratio between market value of assets and book value of assets minus the difference between transaction price and target’s book value. Total dif. is the 
difference between the transaction price and the book value of acquired net assets. Goodwill% is the proportion of goodw ill in the to ta l difference between  
transaction price and target’s book value.
Acquirer Target Deal Value Total D if Goodwill G oodwill % pre-merger q post-m erger q post-m erger adj. q
InPlay Technologies Inc FinePoint Innovations Inc 5.50 5.59 0.88 0.16 5.21 3.81 8.09
Bronco Drilling Co Inc Eagle W ell Service Inc 20.92 16.52 2.63 0.16 1.18 0.98 1.01
V iewcast.com D elta Com putec Inc 3.60 5.78 1.04 0.18 2.21 2.04 8.30
Rim age Corp D unhill Software Services Inc 6.19 4.34 1.01 0.23 0.88 1.59 1.95
Heritage Entertainm ent Inc Landmark Theatre Corp 6.00 6.63 1.80 0.27 0.73 0.84 0.98
R&B Falcon Corp Cliffs Drilling Co 452.07 236.14 70.60 0.30 4.19 1.06 1.13
Cobra Electronics Corp Performance Products Ltd 37.20 37.12 12.00 0.32 1.16 0.93 1.36
W estern Refining Inc C iant Industries Inc 1,134.85 650.49 299.55 0.46 2.30 1.25 1.53
X -R ite Inc Pantone Inc 180.00 171.60 85.11 0.50 1.36 1.23 1.67
M DI Inc FAS C onstruction M gmt Inc 4.20 5.79 3.36 0.58 1.64 1.26 1.67
Y oubet.com  Inc U nited Tote Co 34.20 25.46 15.24 0.60 6.48 1.96 2.58
M ohawk Industries Inc D al-T ile International Inc 2,023.89 1,756.39 1,170.31 0.67 1.38 1.50 2.93
US Xpress Enterprises Inc PST  Vans Inc 83.87 66.36 52.21 0.79 1.87 1.16 1.38
B olt Technology Corp Custom  Products Corp 5.88 5.18 4.34 0.84 3.21 3.11 4.53
Jaco Electronics Inc N exus Custom  Electronics Inc 1.60 0.54 0.46 0.84 1.09 1.01 1.02
Landstar System  Inc TLC Lines Inc 35.27 28.32 24.56 0.87 1.93 1.60 1.74
Clobal Technovations Inc Onkyo Am erica(Onkyo Corp) 40.00 34.19 31.44 0.92 2.91 1.32 2.66
M otivePower Industries Inc Young Radiator Co 70.50 41.60 39.50 0.95 1.95 2.06 2.31
HealthW orld Corp Colwood House M edical Pub 12.20 10.97 10.60 0.97 2.55 1.94 2.47
First Cash Financial Services A uto M aster 33.70 18.09 18.00 0.99 2.59 3.74 4.06
Mean 209.58 156.35 92.23 0.58 2.34 1.72 2.67
Table 3.12: Estimating the Total Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions Accounting
The sample includes diversified and standalones US publicly traded firms from 1988 to 2007. Log q — Adjusted is the log of 
the ratio between market value of assets and book value of assets minus the estimated difference between transaction price and 
target’s book value of assets. The total difference between transaction price and target’s book value of assets is estimated to be 
1.72*Goodwill. Firm excess-value-adjusted is computed using adjusted q. Diversification dummy is one if the firm reports more 
than one business segment. Log Assets -  adjusted is the log of assets minus the estimated difference between market value and 
book value of the target. Capex-to-sales is capital expenditures divided by total sales. Ebit-to-sales is Earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by sales. T-stats are reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. N is the number of 
non-missing firm-year observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5 ) (6) (7 ) (8) 0 ) (10)
Log g-Adjusted Firm Excess-Value-Adjusted
Div. Dummy -0.057 0.038 0.017 0.015 -0.003 -0.005 0.029 0.031 -0.005 -0.004
[-3.42] [2.22] [1.10] [0.94] [-0.18] [-0.29] [1.68] [1.79] [-0.26] [-0.18]
Assets-Adjusted -0.100 -0.279 -0.060 -0.061 -0.035 -0.035 -0.235 -0.236 -0.213 -0.213
[-27.8] [-33.5] [-19.6] [-19.6] [-11.0] [-11.0] [-36.1] [-36.1] [-33.0] [-33.0]
Ebit-to-sales -0.051 -0.008 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
[-26.7] [-4.17] [-17.9] [-17.9] [-18.9] [-18.9] [-4.63] [-4.56] [-3.14] [-3.13]
Capx-to-sales -0.120 0.078 -0.038 -0.038 -0.077 -0.077 0.060 0.061 0.071 0.070
[-10.4] [6.61] [-3.80] [-3.80] [-7.59] [-7.61] [5.80] [5.87] [6.56] [6.54]
Constant 0.831 0.292 0.293 -0.128 -0.128
[49.5] [19.4] [19.4] [-8.21] [-8.16]
Observations 78653 78653 78641 78649 78641 78649 78641 78649 78641 78649
R-squared 0.200 0.154 0.078 0.078 0.087 0.087 0.115 0.115 0.161 0.161
Firm fixed effects no yes no no no no yes yes yes yes
D ependent variable specificatio ns:
Industry average - - no no yes yes no no yes yes
Industry median - - yes yes no no yes yes no no
Assets weight - - yes no yes no yes no yes no
Sales weight - - no yes no yes no yes no yes
Table 3.13: Market-to-sales and Firm excess-market-to-sales regressions
This table shows the determinants of firm market to sales and firm excess market-to-sales. 
Log market-to-sales is the market value of assets divided by net sales. Excess market-to- 
sales is the log of the ratio between market-to-sales and imputed market-to-sales. Imputed 
market-to-sales is the segments’ sales-weighted average market-to-sales. Segment’s market- 
to-sales corresponds to the median market-to-sales of standalones in the same 4-digits SIC 
industry. Diversification dummy is one if the firm reports more than one business segment. 
Capex-to-sales is capital expenditures divided by total sales. Ebit-to-sales is earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by sales.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Market-to-sales Excess Market-to-sales
Div. Dummy -0.187 -0.139 -0.109 -0.126
[-7.66] [-6.74] [-5.59] [-5.20]
Assets -0.014 0.044 0.010 0.029
[-3.28] [5.49] [2.72] [3.61]
Ebit-to-sales -0.172 -0.123 -0.174 -0.153
[-106] [-58.6] [-65.9] [-60.5]
Capx-to-sales 0.740 0.349 0.466 0.448
[49.7] [22.5] [29.2] [25.2]
Constant 0.347 0.585 -0.064 0.085
[16.1] [19.2] [-3.25] [2.77]
Observations 79224 79224 79220 79220
R-squared 0.482 0.346 0.456 0.415
Firm fixed effects no yes no yes
121
Table 3.14: Deal Excess-market-to-sales and change in Market-to-sales regressions
This table shows the determinants of deal excess-market-to-sales and change in acquirer’s 
market-to-sales. Deal excess-market-to-sales is the difference between log market-to-sales 
post-merger and the log market-to-sales of a portfolio including the acquirer and the target 
firm. Change in Market-to-sales is the ratio between post-merger log market-to-sales and 
pre-merger acquirer’s log market-to-sales. Target q is the ratio between the market value 
and the book value of target’s assets pre-merger. Premium-to-assets is the ratio between 
transaction premium and the post-merger book value of merged firm’s assets. Transaction 
premium is the difference between transaction price and market value of acquired net assets 
before the deal. Diversifying acquisition dummy is one when the target and acquirer have 
different 2-digits SIC codes. Target’s weight is the ratio of the transaction price to the 
book value of the acquirer after the deal. Cash (stock) payment dummy is one if 100% 
of the deal is paid with cash (stocks). Acquirer’s size is the book value of the acquirer’s 
assets pre-merger. Deal value corresponds to the transaction price. N is the number of 
non-missing observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal Excess Market-to-sales A Market-to-sales
Div. acquisition dummy 0.008 0.007 0.009 -0.007 -0.011 -0.010
[0.40] [0.37] [0.49] [-0.43] [-0.58] [-0.55]
Target’s weight 0.040 0.041 0.084 0.050 0.046 0.058
[1.18] [1.20] [2.19] [1.16] [1.02] [1.17]
Cash payment dummy -0.028 -0.036 -0.041 -0.016 -0.013 -0.015
[-1.37] [-1.74] [-2.00] [-0.92] [-0.70] [-0.77]
Stock payment dummy -0.094 -0.089 -0.062 0.023 0.021 0.029
[-3.78] [-3.61] [-2.61] [1.05] [0.88] [1.21]
Log acquirer’s size -0.158 -0.158 -0.156 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
[-23.7] [-23.5] [-22.8] [-1.33] [-1.18] [-1.09]
Log deal’s value 0.099 0.101 0.102 0.033 0.026 0.027
[13.2] [13.3] [13.3] [4.73] [3.37] [3.29]
Target’s market-to-sales -0.002 -0.001 - 0.000 0.000
[-4.00] [-3.24] [-0.58] [0.016]
Premium-to-assets -0.024 -0.049 0.002 -0.005
[-2.00] [-2.54] [0.18] [-0.34]
Target’s q -0.027
[-8.12]
-0.007
[-2.50]
Constant 1.025 1.030 1.089 -0.071 -0.041 -0.024
[24.2] [24.5] [26.1] [-1.82] [-0.97] [-0.57]
Observations 2,851 2,851 2,851 3,279 2,844 2,844
R-squared 0.236 0.249 0.289 0.020 0.012 0.016
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